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PROTRACTED STRUCTURAL CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION
IN THE AMERICAS:

THE CASE OF NIEUW KOFFIEKAMP AND THE OAS

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RÉSUMÉ

Deux écoles dominent la théorie de la résolution de conflit international : l'école réaliste-pragmatique et l'école structurelle de résolution de problème. Dans l'ère de la mondialisation néolibérale, le conflit se manifeste sous plusieurs nouvelles formes et implique de nouveaux acteurs, généralement peu abordés dans la littérature. Les intervenants du conflit constatent une lacune à cet égard. Le cas d'analyse de Nieuw Koffikamp, Suriname, représente un exemple archétype de ce type de conflit émergent qu'on nomme le *Structural Global-local Discord and Democratic Deficit* (SGDDD).

Le projet de recherche suivant examine le rôle de l'Organisation des États américains, en tant que tierce partie et organisation intergouvernementale régionale, dans ce cas particulier de SGDDD. Notre hypothèse vise à confirmer que l'approche structurelle de résolution de problème est la meilleure approche à adopter pour résoudre un conflit social prolongé de nature structurelle.

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ABSTRACT

Two schools dominate the field of international conflict resolution theory: the pragmatic-realist school and the structural problem-solving school. In the age of neoliberal globalization, conflict has taken on novel manifestations and has materialized between a variety of new actors not traditionally dealt with by the literature. This has created a theoretical gap for interventionists. The Nieuw Koffiekamp case study from Suriname manifests this emerging genre of conflict that we have labelled Structural Global-local Discord and Democratic Deficit (SGDDD).

The following study examines what role the Organization of American States, as third party intervener and as a regional IGO, played in its attempted resolution of this specific case of SGDDD. Our hypothesis will be confirmed when it becomes clear how the structural problem-solving approach to conflict resolution is deemed the preferred theoretical approach to adopt when dealing with protracted social conflict of a structural nature.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACCRONYMS

ANRD	Agreement on National Reconciliation and Development
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BEP	Brotherhood and Unity in Politics
CR	Conflict Resolution
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FPP	Forest Peoples Programme
FTAA	Free Trade Area of the Americas
GMD	Geological Mining Service
Grassalco	Grasshopper Aluminium Company (Surinamese State Owned Enterprise)
GSR	Golden Star Resources
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
JC	Jungle Commando
JCR	Journal of Conflict Resolution
LDC	Less Developed Country
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NK	Nieuw Koffiekamp
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PSC	Protracted Social Conflict
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programmes
SGDDD	Structural Global-Local Discord and Democratic Deficit
Suralco	Suriname Aluminium Company (Subsidiary of ALCOA of the US)
UN	United Nations
UPD	Unit for the Promotion of Democracy
WTO	World Trade Organisation

INTRODUCTION: GLOBALIZATION AND CONFLICT IN THE THIRD WORLD

In the wake of the spread of the internationalization of finance, commerce and political integration there is a form of conflict emerging between certain sectors of local populations and these forces of globalization. Although the lion's share of social conflict has its etiology in the domestic fabric of the nation, these global forces can affect our conception of conflict and its resolution. The nature of conflict and its resolution has seen tremendous change in the last 15 years. Since the end of the Cold War, the ideological battle ground of the post World War II era has been largely discarded to make way for the resurgence of long-time underlying ethnic, political, economic and social conflict. In the past, Western and Communist allies overemphasised the influence of their adversary's ideological overtones in third world conflicts all the while disregarding some of the root causes of conflict in remote developing countries. This was the case with regard to US 'Realist' analysis and policy towards Latin American social and political revolutionary movements that emerged in response to oppressive and inequitable systems of wealth and power distribution during the cold war.¹

Today, the predominant pattern of conflict analysis and resolution by external actors, known to be a 'realist' paradigm, has been altered by a pervasive market oriented ethos to which many states are subscribers. Conflicts are now analysed in this frame of reference known as globalization. Many scholars have noted how the forces of globalization have had a direct impact with how conflicts are dealt. Third parties in conflict resolution have attempted to transform highly conflictual and violent societies into peaceful ones by imposing democratic elections and establishing a market based economy. In reviewing 8 different peacebuilding initiatives from the 1990's, Roland Paris argues that the adoption of neoliberal political and economic reforms to domestic institutions as a remedy to civil conflict has not reduced conflict. In fact, in some cases these reforms have lead to a further destabilisation of

¹ During this period the Pentagon and the CIA wielded tremendous influence over US foreign policy towards Latin America. One consequence of the Realist domination of US Foreign Relations was the policy of 'Containment'. This policy advocated the active suppression of social and political uprisings at all costs, even if that meant the violent overthrow of legitimate reformers and the systemic neglect of many fundamental human rights. Suffice it to refer to some notable documented examples of direct or indirect US armed intervention such as in Guatemala (1954), Cuba (1961), Chile (1973), Grenada (1983), or other covert actions perpetrated by the US in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Panama and Guatemala throughout the 1980's.

the domestic environment.² He blames this on two paradoxes inherent in the neoliberal approach to conflict settlement. Both deal with the nature of democracy and capitalism as essentially competitive systems of political and economic management. Consequently, relatively cohesive groups in society that had been traditional rivals over ethnic, social, political, economic or resource issues, tend to remain in conflict within the new context of elections where groups compete for votes, and in markets where they compete for resources, contracts and consumers.

More importantly this ‘neoliberal peace,’ as defined by Ronnie Lipschutz, is a process of peace “designed to put in place the institutional forms of a peaceful society without addressing the question of social justice.”³ Neoliberal settlements, he argues, bring warring elites to the negotiating table but do not deal with the social and economic conditions underlying civil violence. The conflict resolution practised under these circumstances is reduced to a process of bargaining between former enemies and mediated by a third party. What emerges is a settlement based on the precepts of market liberalism and a thin layer of democratic development grounded on periodic elections. These peace conditions often favour traditional elites causing problems as the state becomes constrained by the limits imposed upon it by market forces. Within these societies, economic elites see no reason to contribute to the state and the people living in poverty see their lot aggrieved by an apathetic and impotent government. Lipschutz maintains that as questions of distribution are regarded as anathema, we are faced with local fragmentation as local actors fight to be heard.⁴

In light of the dialectical relationship between global integration and local fragmentation we will frame the analysis of conflict resolution within the rubric of neoliberal globalization and its affect on the nation-state as intermediary between these global-local forces.

² Roland Paris, (1997), “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism”, *International Security*, vol. 22, n. 2 (Fall), pp. 54-89.

³ Ronnie D. Lipschutz, (1998), “Beyond Neoliberal Peace : From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation”, *Social Justice*, vol. 25, (Winter), pp. 6.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 14.

A. The Makings of Neoliberal Globalization and Local Fragmentation

In a collective work on the concept of ‘Globalization’ entitled “*La mondialisation au-delà des mythes*,” Robert Boyer attempts to piece together the main historical definitions of this vast and complex contemporary phenomenon.⁵ In 1983, Theodore Levitt, noted the increasing convergence of markets and product varieties flowing from two different vectors; technology and globalization.⁶ By the 1990’s Kenichi Ohmae identified the epicentre of globalization emanating from changes within the transnational corporation (TNC), which were marked by the expansion of a firm’s production, investment financing, recruitment, and research and development onto international markets.⁷ As a result of the TNCs’ growing presence in the world economy, firms increasingly influence the structure of international economic relations that had been traditionally dominated by nation states. Boyer stresses the discordance with the preceding era of commercial capitalism flowing from the qualitative rupture between the interactions of states, thus creating a divergent form of international regime.⁸ He also notes the expansion of international firms with their corollary multilateral regulatory frameworks, such as the WTO, has lead to further interdependence and homogenisation of policy. These definitions have reappeared under various forms in a considerable amount of the literature on Globalization.⁹

The neoliberal ethos, developed in western universities, is characterised by a reduced role for the state in the regulation and management of the economy in three main areas.¹⁰ First is trade liberalisation which leads countries to drop trade barriers by engaging in various forms

⁵ Robert Boyer, “Les Mots et les Réalités” in Serge Cordellier’s (ed), (2000, 2nd Ed.), *La mondialisation au-delà des mythes*, Paris: Éditions La découverte, translated from, “Globalization: Beyond the Mythes,” pp. 13-58.

⁶ Theodore Levitt, (1983), “The Globalization of Markets”, *Harvard Business Review*, May-June, pp.92-102.

⁷ Kenichi Ohmae, (1995), *The End of the Nation-State*, New York: The Free Press, 214p.

⁸ Paul Hirst & Grahame Thompson’s, (2000), *Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance*, 2nd Ed., Cambridge UK: Polity Press, Hirst and Thompson make a useful distinction between a further intensification of the international economy and an emerging globalised economy (p. 7-13).

⁹ See the following recent sources for various definitions of globalization and their interpretation : Hirst & Thompson, 2000, op.cit., Dani Rodrik, (1997), *Has Globalization Gone Too Far?*, Washington DC: Institute for International Economics; James H. Mittelman, (2000), *The Globalization Syndrome: Transformation and Resistance*, Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press; and Paul R. Krugman, (1998), *La Mondialisation n’est pas coupable: Vertus et limites du libre échange*, Paris : Éditions la Découverte, Translated by Anne Saint-Girons original title: *Pop Internationalism*, (1996) by Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

¹⁰ Neoliberalism is regarded to have been professed initially at the Chicago School of Economics spearheaded by Milton Friedman (1970-80s) before its adoption as the cardinal ethos in other university economics departments.

of economic integration with other states. The second pillar of neoliberal reform deals with financial liberalisation, which entails the freeing up of monetary policy either by pegging the currency or adopting a free floating currency mechanism. Another component of financial liberalisation is the relaxation of domestic and foreign investment policies to allow the free flow of portfolio and foreign direct investment (FDI). This grants investors more liberty to move their capital where and when they choose. The third founding pillar of the neoliberal ethos is the privatization of state owned enterprises and the extensive deregulation of markets and specific industries.

During the post-WWII period, the state played an intermediary role between domestic social, economic and political constituencies by mitigating the negative effects of free market liberalism. It is generally regarded that the welfare state and the social compact have been key ingredients to the post-war consolidation of universal democracy.¹¹ Although the welfare state has been tremendously affected by the neoliberal ethos, numerous authors have indicated that the welfare state has not simply withered away in developed countries.¹² The problem is essentially in less developed countries (LDCs) where the welfare state never truly matured and where poverty, dislocation and the lack of effective political and economic development pervade society leading to vast socio-economic inequality and systemic injustice. Considering that a good number of third world elites are educated in Western universities and their governments are under increasing debt pressure, it is no wonder LDCs have widely adopted the neoliberal ethos.¹³

Furthermore, international institutions have also exercised direct pressure on third world governments to adopt the neoliberal model of economic development. Loans emanating from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other regional financial institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), are issued with conditions. For instance, the structural adjustment programmes (SAP) that accompany international loans

¹¹ Rodrik, 1997, op.cit., pp. 49.

¹² Suzanne Berger & Ronald Dore, (eds.), (1996), *National Diversity and Global Capitalism*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, various authors including, Robert Boyer, and Robert Wade and Sylvia Ostry all discuss the exaggerated claims of the death of the welfare state and the distinctiveness separating national economies despite an apparent convergence of policies among G-7 nations.

¹³ Mittelman, 2000, op.cit., pp. 25.

force the neoliberal development model upon LDCs. This renders LDC governments increasingly dependent on global financial institutions to support their fledgling national budgets. One need only look to the financial crisis engulfing Argentina in 2001-02, to see the problems associated with this model of dependent development on emerging markets lacking the proper institutional and policy safeguards to protect citizens' fundamental political, social and economic rights.¹⁴ At best, neoliberal economic reforms have had variable results and in many instances, have not helped to pull LDCs out of poverty. Globalization often reinforces the structural problems of inequality and the lack of political and economic agency by the disenfranchised further entrenching traditional power relations and inciting local conflict.¹⁵ James Mittelman sums up this dialectical relationship facing states that are caught between the negative effects of globalization at the local level, particularly in LDCs, and the global actors effecting these changes. Rather than promoting a homogenisation of better living conditions, globalization has incited creative forms of local dissent further constraining governments as Mittelman states:

Globalization is not leveling civil societies around the world but, rather, is combining with local conditions in distinctive ways, accentuating differences, and spurring a variety of social movements seeking protection from the disrupting and polarizing effects of economic liberalism. Evidently, the state is constrained by a problem of supranationalism and subnationalism, facing pressures from below and above.¹⁶

Thus as indicated above, economic globalization has led to opposing trends of integration and fragmentation often marred by violent conflict. This will be further analysed in our case study of the Nieuw Koffiekamp conflict in the Caribbean nation of Suriname.

B. Identifying a Variant Form of Conflict in the Globalization Era

Globalization in the Caribbean context exhibits this emerging type of conflict, which is characterized by the impact of neoliberal reform on countries supporting a poor economic and

¹⁴ Suffice it to mention a contemporary example as witnessed by the Argentinean peso devaluation of January 2002, where once again the IMF has extended emergency loans to the country in return for further guarantees to implement a more profound SAP.

¹⁵ See Earl Conteh-Morgan, (2001), "International Intervention: Conflict, Economic Dislocation and The Hegemonic Role of Dominant Actors", *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Vol. 7, n. 2, (Autumn/Winter), pp. 33-55, for a description of the effect of SAP deprivation by powerful international regimes on certain societal groups in LDCs. The author argues that this occurs against the will of common citizens and leads to conflict.

¹⁶ Mittelman, 2000, op.cit., pp. 118.

political infrastructure. Although, dependency is a term that has lost significant appeal since it appeared in the literature on third world development, it remains a useful concept in the Caribbean basin and Latin America in general. In her anthology entitled *Democracy in the Caribbean: Myths and Realities*, Carlene Edie notes that many researchers directly link the dependent nature of national policies to international pressures.¹⁷ The IMF and other international sources of capital give western Governments (especially the US) an influential role in the internal affairs of many Caribbean countries. IMF and international loans continue to rescue these small economies from bankruptcy. However, IMF conditions have obliged developing countries to implement neoliberal reforms and severe fiscal austerity programmes. Many countries resort to the export oriented model of development to gain foreign currency in order to pay back their creditors.

Dorith Grant-Wisdom ardently opposes this brand of economic dependency because, she claims, the ones that feel the effects of these austerity programmes the most are the disempowered citizens who have no agency in policy decisions that affect them.¹⁸ She effectively identifies how the Jamaican state has been forced to retreat from its active role of instituting egalitarian, participatory and socially inclusive welfare policies.¹⁹ Perry Mars adds that this contradiction between global power and local fragmentation creates a clear democratic deficit as the disparity between the affluent and the politically and economically disadvantaged continues to grow in LDCs.²⁰

In Suriname, neoliberal economic pressure has been just as acute as anywhere because the country has been plagued by repeated authoritarian regimes and has never truly attained an independently stable system of governance and economy. Betty Sedoc-Dahlberg, a long time

¹⁷ Carlene J. Edie, (ed.), (1994), *Democracy in the Caribbean: Myths and Realities*, Westport CT: Praeger Publishers, pp. 4-5.

¹⁸ Dorith Grant-Wisdom, (1997), "Globalization, Structural Adjustment, and Democracy in Jamaica", in Ivelaw L. Griffith & Betty N. Sedoc-Dahlberg's, (eds.), *Democracy and Human Rights in the Caribbean*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp.193-211.

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 202. The author illustrates how neoliberal reforms (specifically privatisation and deregulation) have led to the deterioration of labour standards and the quality of education and health services while widening the income gap between the rich and the poor.

²⁰ Perry Mars, (2001), "Ethnic Politics, Mediation, and Conflict Resolution: The Guyana Experience", *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 355.

observer of Surinamese politics, notes that although the domestic socio-political environment is fraught with ethnic infighting and is beleaguered by patronising Dutch policies, regime instability has been largely due to the lack of financial resources.²¹ This, she argues, has led to a political climate in which foreign capital has become vital for regime subsistence. Since 1991, when the last military regime ceded power to a civilian government, Suriname has attained relative political stability. Nevertheless, Suriname has been under tremendous pressure from the IMF to reduce its expenditures and bring the country in line with neoliberal reforms. One of the strategies employed to increase economic growth has been to encourage foreign investment to exploit the country's mineral and forest resources for export. This policy has had adverse consequences on the peoples residing in the interior who are directly affected by the impact of neoliberal reforms. These reforms have imposed cuts to health care and the loss of control over lands to international investors who are exploiting Suriname's hinterland wealth. Furthermore, these reforms have resulted in significant civil unrest.²²

This is precisely the situation that has erupted in Nieuw Koffiekamp (NK) located in the resource rich Precambrian Guyanese shield of Suriname. In this small Maroon village, locals have forcefully objected to the government's wholesale liquidation of their traditional lands to a Canadian transnational mining company. The government has repeatedly neglected the rights of Maroon and Amerindian peoples despite numerous pseudo-legal assurances to accord them certain economic and territorial privileges.²³ In fact, in its effort to attract FDI, it has actively done the opposite. The mining concession granted by the Surinamese Government to Golden Star Resources Ltd. (GSR) of Vancouver/Denver is in direct conflict with the land rights entitled to Maroons under the *Accord for National Reconciliation and Development* (ANRD). This conflict is a poignant example of the contrasting world visions and the impact

²¹ Betty Sedoc-Dalhberg, (1994), "Suriname: The Politics of Transition from Authoritarianism to Democracy", in C. J. Edie's, (ed.), *Democracy in the Caribbean: Myths and Realities*, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, pp. 133.

²² See the following sources for more details on how globalization has affected the Forest Peoples of Suriname, Marcus Colchester, (1995), *Forest Politics in Suriname*, Utrecht, Netherlands: International Books, and Philippa Haden, (1998), *Cuestiones Forestales en la Region del Escudo de las Guayanas : Una Perspectiva sobre Guyana y Surinam*, London : Overseas Development Institute, <http://www.odifpeg.org.uk/espanol/publications/papers/eutfp/eutfp-03-espanol.pdf>, last consulted 15, July, 2002.

²³ 'Maroon' is the adjective given to peoples known as descendants of escaped African slaves living in the West Indies and Suriname. Suriname's Amerindians are another ethnic group but they share with Maroons distinctive cultural traits as they are both involved in primarily subsistence forms of farming, hunting, fishing or mining in the interior jungle of the country.

of globalization on an indigenous community. In addition, this genre of conflict is prevalent throughout the Americas and is a consistent consequence of the expansion of neoliberal reforms.

There are numerous documented cases of conflicts involving foreign finance, particularly in the mining industry, and local populations throughout the world. In Latin America alone, there are three such conflicts occurring at this moment involving Canadian firms and local populations over these “new” security issues.²⁴ In Peru, for instance, there is a conflict occurring with the local communities that surround a mining development operated by Manhattan Minerals of Vancouver at its Tambogrande site in the Andes.²⁵ In San Luis de Potosí, Mexico, a local coalition of residents of a nearby mine at Cerro San Pedro have pleaded for an end to North American mining activities in their vicinity.²⁶ A third example is the conflict that has been brewing in Northern Chile where Toronto based mining firm Barrick Gold Ltd. intends to establish a vast 320 hectare and 800 metre deep open pit gold and silver mine.²⁷ In all these cases local residents welcome certain types of mining near their communities but not the ones proposed because they have or may have devastating effects on the environment particularly water resources and local agricultural production. These projects threaten the livelihood of nearby residents who have protested their establishment leading to violence in three of the four cases. Clearly, the rejection by local residents of proposed mining operations raises serious ethical, cultural and developmental problems for all those involved.²⁸

The brief description of these four cases reveals three common denominators within the context of globalization. First, these are examples of conflicts over environmental land use patterns between traditional ways of life and certain forms of capital intensive development.

²⁴ In all likelihood there are probably many more examples of this type of conflict in the Americas but for the purpose of this study we will simply provide these additional three cases to illustrate our point.

²⁵ Allan Robinson, (2001), “Peruvian mine site a political flash point”, *Globe and Mail*, March 27th, pp. B1 & B8.

²⁶ Roch Tassé, (2001, October), *Canadian Mining Activities in Mexico: Project Report*, Ottawa: Mining Watch Canada, 15p, not yet on the Internet.

²⁷ M Ossa, (2001), “Una valle se muere”, *Pastoral Popular*, n. 276, (16th October) Centro Ecuemênico Diego de Medellín, Santiago, Chile.

²⁸ For the sake of brevity and to keep focus on the subject matter, I can not go into significant detail or employ a comparative study to illustrate how the case of Nieuw Koffiekamp is an endemic manifestation of this type of conflict. Nevertheless, there are plenty of examples of economic conflicts between investors and local populations abound.

Secondly, they evolve primarily in weak states under international pressure to adapt to the macro-economic climate. Lastly, these types of conflicts are occurring within countries that have been characterised by a democratic deficit stemming from the lack of means to communicate to elites, the lack of accountability and the lack of popular sovereignty among disenfranchised citizens at the local level. We will call this type of conflict *structural global-local discord and democratic deficit* or SGDDD.

Now that we have delineated the global context of neoliberal economic reforms and indicated that the NK case study is a paradigmatic example of this emerging phenomenon termed SGDDD, we will examine the concept of conflict and its resolution which is the subject of this thesis. The following chapter will begin with a discussion of the notion of conflict over time and its theoretical foundations shaping the literature on conflict resolution. The literature review synthesises a great deal of the conflict resolution research into two main schools of thought: (1) the pragmatic-realist approach and (2) the structural problem solving approach. The thesis proposes that these two rival explanatory theories differentiate how to explain and to conceive conflict and differentiate how to prescribe conflict resolving interventions. The following review will attempt to schematise these two schools comparing them and providing a conflict theory table to distinguish them. Subsequently, we will be able to compare the two approaches while analysing the case study. This will enable us to better determine which approach, the pragmatic-realist or the structural problem solving approach better explains and responds to the genre of conflict identified here as structural global-local discord and democratic deficit.

As will be detailed in the following pages, the case of Nieuw Koffiekamp provides a sound illustration of this genre of SGDDD. However, there is another element to be introduced in this conflict equation. That is the role of the third party intervener to bring about reconciliation between these global and local actors. In the NK case, the Government of Suriname was unable to effectively manage the conflict and consequently requested the assistance of the Organization of the American States (OAS) who via its Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD) established a small task force to examine the conflict and to broker a settlement.

The role of the third party intermediary will be analysed in the context of non-military interventions to better ascertain the expectations and the limits of conflict resolution based on the two theoretical approaches. In section 1.1.2., we review the meagre literature on the role of regional multilateral institutions as third party conflict resolution interveners in disputes resembling SGDDD. The last section of the first chapter constructs the research question and develops a research method in the deductive analysis of the case study. Chapter two describes the case of Nieuw Koffiekamp and the OAS intervention. Chapter three demonstrates how the case of NK is an example of a protracted social conflict in the structuralist tradition and how it is an SGDDD conflict. In addition in section 3.3., we analyse the role of OAS conflict resolution activity in general and in the NK case in particular. The argument proposed is that one of the two theoretical approaches will better enable the conflict resolution practitioner, in this case a regional intergovernmental organization, to analyse conflict and to suggest a normative framework for its resolution. The demonstration ends with some conclusions on the systemic role regional IGOs can perform in the resolution of systemic conflict like SGDDD.

CHAPTER 1: CONFLICT RESOLUTION THEORY AND CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY

The following section will review the literature on conflict in general at the international level and the two major schools to emerge in the field of conflict resolution. Sociology has had an early impact on the field with the writings of George Simmel and Lewis Coser, and others who introduced notions of the nature of conflict and its role in society as an intrinsic, inevitable and natural aspect of reality and social change. Coser was one of the first social theorists to develop a set of propositions pertaining to the functions of social conflict in human development.¹ Essentially, Coser regards conflict as a healthy manner in which to bring about communal reform and human progress. This positive assessment of conflict was a stark contrast to the position held by traditional sociologists who viewed conflict as an aberration and something to be rooted out.² Edward Azar builds on this concept to define *conflict* as a dispute over mutually incompatible goals between two or more parties in the absence of co-ordinating or mediating mechanisms required for adequate resolution.³ Some theorists have distinguished between two types of conflict. First, a *dispute* is about negotiable interests that can be settled by compromise, while *conflict* is about human needs and involves addressing underlying causes for effective resolution.

Another distinction concerning the nature of conflict is the difference between *symmetrical* and *asymmetrical* conflicts. In a symmetrical conflict parties in dispute are similar in type and have similar capabilities. For example, two states with relatively similar levels of economic and military might are said to be engaged in a symmetrical conflict. However, when we deal with the state and its military or police forces engaged in a dispute with a rag-tag guerrilla movement, we would consider this an asymmetrical conflict. One of the first significant contributions to identifying the structure of conflict is Johan Galtung's *conflict triangle* of violence, which encompasses both asymmetrical and symmetrical

¹ Lewis Coser, (1964), *The Functions of Social Conflict*, New York: Free Press, pp. 16.

² Ibid., pp. 22. Borrowing from the ideas of George Simmel, Coser also proposes that conflict is a form of social change and that conflict can have the function of establishing group identity which bind together peoples of similar traits. This is followed by propositions to the effect that conflicts serve as a group preserving mechanism and as a social safety valve exposing the dynamic relationship of interpersonal and 'in-group' conflict in addition to the conflicts between groups or with 'out-groups'.

³ Edward Azar, (1990), *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases*, Aldershot: Dartmouth Pub., pp. 5.

conflicts.⁴ Galtung suggests that conflict can be viewed as a triangular relationship with contradiction (C), attitude (A) and behaviour (B) at its vertices. Here the *contradiction* refers to the underlying conflict situation, which includes the real or perceived incompatibility of goals between conflicting parties. In a symmetrical conflict, the contradiction is defined by the parties, their interests and the clash of interests between them. In an asymmetrical conflict the contradiction refers to the parties, their relationship and the conflict of interests and or needs inherent in their relationship.




Figure 1.1. : Galtung's Conflict Triangle

The *attitude* refers to the negative and often aggressive perceptions/misperceptions, *cognitive* (beliefs), *emotive* (feelings), and '*conative*' (will), held towards another actor. This predisposition can often lead to aggressive *behaviour*, which represents Galtung's third triadic element in the model. Behaviour can include cooperation, coercion, and gestures signifying conciliation or hostility. Galtung sees conflict as a dynamic, non-linear process in which underlying conflict will manifest itself in a cyclical fashion if not dealt with properly. Groups will galvanise into organised opposition around this structure and can develop hostile attitudes and reciprocally aggressive behaviours. The conflict may widen with the entry of extraneous actors, further complicating the dynamic and adding secondary issues to the peace agenda. This complicates the task of addressing the root causes of the initial conflict between the parties. Resolution thus involves a set of transformations initially of the belligerents' attitude towards each other and of the issues at hand, which will change the behaviours and finally the relationship underlying the contradiction causing conflict in the first place.

⁴ Originally published in 1969 but extracted from Johan Galtung's (1996), *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*, London: Sage Publications, pp. 72.

A.J.R. Groom considers parties in a conflict to be almost always asymmetrical in significant ways.⁵ Traditionally, however, academics have been most interested in state to state symmetrical conflict. This started to change with the study of deep-rooted social conflicts described by Azar, Burton, Kriesberg, Gurr and others who viewed conflict from a communal perspective. Rogers and Ramsbotham note that this literature surfacing in the 1970's was scarcely noticed by the mainstream international relations (IR) and strategic studies literature of the time.⁶ This literature effectively anticipated the post-cold war shift of focus from the realist preoccupations with nuclear deterrence and state centric conflicts to what Edward Rice has called *wars of the third kind*.⁷

In his study on the types of war, *The State, War and the State of War*, Kalevi Holsti provides a historical analysis of the three major currents or classes of war throughout the modern period since the Crusades.⁸ The first type of war is the institutionalized armed conflict or *classical type* of war, which was described by Karl von Clausewitz as the 'continuation of politics by other means'. The nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of a new type of *total war* exemplified by the Napoleonic wars, the US civil war and the World Wars of the twentieth century. Holsti seeks to distinguish *wars of the third kind* as wars that are asymmetrical internal conflicts between groups fractured along ideological and factional or national lines. They are deemed people's wars because they often manifest themselves in national liberation movements that are attempting to topple an external colonial presence or a native oligarchic and oppressive totalitarian regime.⁹ The third category of war, internal conflict, is of primary interest to this study as it most resembles SGDDD.

⁵ A.J.R. Groom, (1990), "Paradigms in Conflict: The Strategist, the Conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher", in John Burton & Frank Dukes, (eds.), *Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution*, New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 95.

⁶ Paul Rogers & Oliver Ramsbotham, (1999), "Then and Now: Peace Research – Past and Future", *Political Studies*, vol. 47, pp. 740-754.

⁷ Edward E. Rice (1988), *Wars of the Third Kind: Conflict in Underdeveloped Countries*, Berkeley: University of California Press. As a former diplomat, Rice's study illustrates how inadequate US expert analysis was in examining the root causes of third world civil wars of a rural and popular nature. The first two types of wars, according to Rice, were conventional wars of a symmetrical dynamic in addition to nuclear wars.

⁸ Kalevi J. Holsti, (1996), *The State, War, and the State of War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 36.

1.1. The Field of Conflict Resolution: Concepts, Schools and Application

Conflict resolution is a field of study emanating from the research on war and peace and international relations in the post World War Two period. The field emerged in the Cold War context of superpower rivalry of the 1950s and 1960s with the development of nuclear weapons, which threatened human survival. In North America as in Europe scholarly journals began publishing distinctive approaches to conflict analysis and resolution. Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham, & Tom Woodhouse, note that by the 1980's these approaches were beginning to make their way into peace negotiations in some of the most acute problem areas such as South Africa, the Middle East and Northern Ireland.¹⁰ Some philanthropic foundations and former statesmen, such as former US president Jimmy Carter and Eduard Shevardnadze of the USSR, established conflict resolution centres to address the problem of emerging ethnic conflict in the post-Cold War era.

The field of study has been pioneered by a group of academics and mediating practitioners from a wide range of disciplines and professions. The value of studying conflict as a general phenomenon emerged in fields as diverse as IR, psychology, domestic politics, sociology, industrial relations, and community mediation, right through to family and interpersonal reconciliation. Jean Luc Marret comments on this multidisciplinary approach affirming how psychology and psycho-sociology, have had a strong impact on the theoretical trajectory of the discipline, for instance, in its treatment of frustration/aggression theory and human needs theory.¹¹ The field of conflict resolution is characterized by two basic approaches emanating from this eclectic range of influences distinguishing the field as its own academic discipline. Unfortunately, there is no definitive study differentiating the North American pragmatist from the European structuralist approach. Consequently, we are left with the cumbersome task of determining which theoretical stream individual works stem from in order to schematize the literature. Often many of the authors themselves do not identify the theoretical school to which they belong, so we infer this by the nature of their analysis.

¹⁰ Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham & Tom Woodhouse, (1999), *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*, Oxford: Polity Press, pp. 2.

¹¹For a general introduction to the field of conflict resolution refer to the above reference and to Jean-Luc Marret, (2000), *La Fabrication de la Paix: Nouveaux conflits, nouveaux acteurs, nouvelles méthodes*, Paris: Ellipses Édition Marketing S.A.

A. J. R. Groom defines the foundations of these paradigms of conflict around three key figures, their academic centres and three different approaches to IR.¹² The realist approach to conflict is probably the most well known and is based on the state as primary actor whose interests are defined in relative power wielding capabilities. Kenneth Boulding is identified as one of the most important figures to emerge from the pragmatic-strategic studies school of research. An alternative to the realist-strategic approach to international conflict resolution is based on the structuralist critique of IR. This research emanates from the post-behaviourist position calling for greater emphasis on future oriented, politically relevant, and value-laden research.¹³ Johan Galtung and his *Journal for Peace Research* was the early embodiment of this movement, emphasising the notion of structural violence as a prime cause of conflict in society. A third approach to conflict studies identified by Groom is based on John Burton's "World Society" concept. This approach regards the state as an empirical question rather than as being an axiomatic question, whereby the state is not necessarily the dividing line between intra-state consensus and inter-state anarchy. The state is indeed not a cohesive unit acting in unison as bureaucratic politics play a role in diversifying interests between non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations and other special interest groups.

However, in contrast to Groom's categorisation, we maintain that this pluralist-problem solving approach to conflict resolution does not differentiate itself from the structuralist approach enough to warrant creating a new stream. Both the structuralist and World Society approaches emerged as a reaction to the realist perspective. Both conceive conflict as endemic, latent and with its etiology stemming from the lack of individual and collective needs fulfilment. Finally both approaches prescribe similar resolution techniques for third party interventions. Pauline Baker also distinguishes between only two schools of conflict resolution dividing the peacemaker profile into conflict managers and democratizers. Essentially this categorisation mirrors the current distinction between the pragmatic-realists preoccupation with negotiable reconciliation and the structural problem solvers' preoccupation

¹² Groom, 1990, op.cit., pp. 71-98. Groom's description of the literature serves as a base to how we characterize the field.

¹³ The behaviourist-traditionalist debate of the 1960s refers to the application of non-value laden scientific experimentation research of social phenomena producing concrete demonstrable results. Traditionalist considered this 'scientific' research as simplistic if not naive. See Rogers and Ramsbotham, 1999, op.cit.

with justice and institutional change.¹⁴ Therefore, we combine the last two perspectives to divide the literature review into two not three distinct schools.

1.1.1. The North American Pragmatic-Realist School

In the 1950s, there was a burgeoning interest in conflict resolution largely due to the rising intensity of the Cold War and bi-polar nuclear relations between the superpowers. Interestingly, English born member of the Society of Friends (a Quaker and pacifist organization) professor Kenneth Boulding was a key founder of the first academic periodical in the field in 1957 with the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (JCR). In addition, he founded the *Center for Research on Conflict Resolution* at the University of Michigan. Boulding, an economist by training was joined by a small group of researchers from various disciplines such as mathematician-biologist Anatole Rapoport who advanced game theory analysis derived from the prisoner's dilemma scenario. Two principal motivations that indicate the intellectual and empirical trajectory of this nascent school of thought were clearly identified in the first issue of this groups' new journal:

The first is that by far the most important practical problem facing the human race today is that of international relations – more specifically, the prevention of global war. The second is that if intellectual progress is to be made in this area, the study of international relations must be made an interdisciplinary enterprise, drawing its discourse from all the social sciences, and even further.¹⁵

Boulding's publications focus on the prevention of war and the failure of the international system to avert war. In these two publications, *Conflict and Defense* and *Perspectives on the Economics of Peace*, Boulding advances the thesis that the decline or obsolescence of the sovereign nation-state is the prime catalyst leading to the failure of international regimes to prevent war.¹⁶ In his view there needed to be reform of international organizations, namely the UN, and further development of mechanisms that would track conflicts and act as warning beacons to provide answers for reducing the probability of war during the Cold War era.

¹⁴ Pauline Baker, (1996), "Conflict Resolution Versus Democratic Governance: Divergent Paths to Peace?" in Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, & Pamela Aall, (eds.), *Managing Global Chaos, Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*, Washington, DC: States Institute of Peace Press, pp. 563-571.

¹⁵ Extracted from the review article by Rogers & Ramsbotham, 1999, op.cit., pp. 743.

¹⁶ Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, 1999, op.cit. pp.42.

1.1.1.1. The Pragmatic-Realist Concept of Conflict

In general, the pragmatist perceives conflict as emerging from a conflict of interests over scarce resources (including territory) incurring material gain or loss. Conflict is considered inherent to the human condition. Conflict between societies occurs because each nation state pursues goals incompatible with those of other states thus they must be controlled or managed by design. Of course this places the state in the position of independent variable as the most significant actor in the international system. The system resembles the ‘anarchic state of nature’ and is governed by the principle of ‘self-help’, which posits that states compete with one another and act on the basis of self interest.

The pragmatic-realist paradigm for conflict analysis is fundamentally anchored in the levels of analysis concept first systematised by Kenneth Waltz who suggested that the causes of war can be found at the levels of the individual, the nation-state, and the international system.¹⁷ Levy notes that Waltz’s framework was modified by certain realist scholars melding together the individual dimension of analysis with the nation-state into a simplified dichotomy of nation or unit level and systems level analysis. This approach led to the many theories on the sources of international conflict such as: assumptions on the inherently conflictual and chaotic world system; the security dilemma; balance of power theories; power transition theory; hierarchical equilibrium theory; liberal economic theories of trade; and mutually assured destruction.¹⁸ These systemic level explanations for conflict dominated the research by pragmatic and strategic researchers during the cold war period. This exclusive bifurcation opened up a wide array of criticism as bi-level analysis fails to explain a significant amount of variance in the outbreak or expansion of regional or international conflict.

At the individual unit level, pragmatic conflict theory is based on a rational-economic model, which regards social-psychological aspects of behaviour to be determined by the compatibility or incompatibility of real interests. Lewis Rasmussen states that in contemporary protracted conflict, overwhelmingly about disputes over control of resources, the affirmation

¹⁷ Jack S. Levy, (1996), “Contending Theories of International Conflict: A Levels-of-Analysis Approach”, in Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, & Pamela Aall, (eds.), *Managing Global Chaos, Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*, United Washington, DC: States Institute of Peace Press, p. 4.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, for a description of the various power theories common to the realist and pragmatic discourse, p. 4-9.

of identity, or the assurance of security, individuals and groups initiate plans, policies and laws designed to satisfy ‘in-group’ or individual needs.¹⁹ Hence, within this framework national in-groups will deny the basic human needs of their adversaries because the out-group is considered a competitor. However, these strategies of adversarial domination or coercion often backfire and do not result in control of the out-group and lead to an exacerbation and prolongation of conflict. The out-group reaction then leads to further entrenchment and conflict polarisation. Subsequently, the security dilemma fuels the escalation of conflict as states or groups prepare to defend themselves and their interests abroad prompting a reciprocal reaction by adversaries. An arms race is the classical example of this type of conflict escalation due to a realist security dilemma.

The North American pragmatist or strategist schools of conflict generated a great deal of literature on the theoretical and mathematical models of arms races. One early contribution is *game theory*. Boulding claims that two hawkish and brilliant intellectuals of their day, von Neumann and Morgenstern, advanced this theory emanating from micro-economic analysis of zero-sum and n-person theory where one’s self gain is another’s loss.²⁰ Traditionally, the task of conflict resolution has been to enable conflicting parties, who normally regard their conflict in a zero-sum perspective, to move towards perceiving conflict as a non zero-sum outcome. The non-zero-sum theory prescribes that either there is a lose-lose or win-win outcome or a possible compromise between the two. Positive-sum game theory, as developed by Rapoport, embarked on this empirical research having a profound impact on how to examine actual processes of conflictual interaction.²¹ The simple representation of game theory is manifested in the *prisoner’s dilemma* illustrating the tendency for contending strategies to end in lose-lose outcomes.²²

¹⁹ Lewis Rasmussen, (1997), “Peacemaking in the Twenty-First Century: New Rules, New Roles, New Actors” in William Zartman & J. Lewis Rasmussen, (eds.), (1997), *Peacemaking International Conflict: Methods & Techniques*, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, pp. 23-50.

²⁰ Kenneth Boulding, (1990), “Future Directions in Conflict and Peace Studies”, in J. W. Burton & Frank Dukes’, (eds.), *Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution*, New York: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 37.

²¹ Anatole Rapoport, (1967), *Fights, Games and Debates*, Ann Arbor, MI : University of Michigan Press.

²² Briefly, the prisoner’s dilemma is based on a game theory of possible options available to two prisoners being accused of the same crime. Both have two options, they can either cooperate or defect but they are both held in ignorance of the other’s position and choice. According to the theory, the prisoner’s mutual suspicion of the other, often lead him to chose to defect ending in a lose-lose outcome.

This type of theory played an important role in the formulation of policy during the Cold War and particularly in the *Détente* period when relations between the worlds' superpowers improved markedly. Boulding correctly claims that Charles Osgoods' idea of *Gradual reciprocated international tension-reduction theory* went a long way towards providing a basis for US/USSR rapprochement during the Henry Kissinger era leading to the *Strategic Arms Limitations Treaties*.²³ The theory title is virtually self-explanatory indicating that small and gradual moves or concessions of peace by one party will incite a similar response by the adversary.

Another important aspect of the nature of protracted conflict to emerge from this line of pragmatic thinking is the difficulty of ending conflicts based on rational approaches of conflict cycles. Belligerents often react irrationally believing that continued conflict is the most effective means to achieve their objectives. At times this may be the case but seldom in protracted conflicts. A belligerent's perception of the win-lose relationship and the move from the battlefield to the negotiating table depends upon how the parties perceive their situation. Violent conflict is often accentuated by a cycle of 'plateaus' and precipices that are crucial indicators of when to end a violent conflict. The concept of the *mutually hurting stalemate* developed by Zartman determines when a conflict is 'ripe' for resolution and/or intervention by a third party.²⁴ Conflict 'plateaus' are reached when the conflict seems to be an unending affair with no possibility of respite. Correspondingly, the precipice represents the realisation that the conflict is about to take a turn for the worse and intensify to the point of being catastrophic if the option to settle is not pursued. According to Zartman, when parties realise that continuing the cycle of violent reprisals will not lead to a decisive victory, the conflict has 'ripened' and has reached the point of a mutually hurting stalemate.²⁵ At this point parties negotiate because they regard continued confrontation as worse than the risks associated with a settlement.

²³For a brief analysis of Osgoods' theory see Louis Kriesberg (1997), "The development of the Conflict Resolution Field" in I. William Zartman & J. Lewis Rasmussen, (eds.), (1997), *Peacemaking International Conflict: Methods & Techniques*, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, pp. 51-77.

²⁴Saadia Touval & I. William Zartman, (eds.), (1985), *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press with the Foreign Policy Institute, School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, in their introduction p .13.

²⁵ I. William Zartman, (1997), *The Structuralist Dilemma in Negotiation*, Montréal: REGIS, Research Group in International Security.

1.1.1.2. The Pragmatic-Realist Role for Third Party Intervention

The conventional form of third party intervention most resembles the pragmatic-realist approach to conflict resolution. A critical focus is placed on balance of power relations that call for the employment of coercive tactics when necessary. It is characterized by outside intervention with the ultimate goal of ending violent hostilities. This primary goal of the external intervener, however, may not necessarily be the same as that of the conflicting factions unless they are uniformly exhausted and are looking for a respite from hostilities. The most common solution to conflict prescribed by the pragmatist or objectivist approach is mediation and negotiation because it is believed that the root of the problem is an incompatibility of negotiable interests. *Negotiation* is a series of discussions between the main protagonists of a conflict seeking to settle or resolve their dispute. *Mediation* involves the intervention of a third party for the purpose of abating or resolving a conflict through negotiation. Although parties to conflict generally retain control over outcome, mediation can be accompanied by positive or negative inducements provided by the third party to entice or coerce the parties into a settlement.

At the ontological level of conflict resolution, Boulding made an elementary distinction between *hard power*, a force that commands or employs threats to coerce compliance with settlements, and the more commonly employed *soft power*, a force that recommends and influences.²⁶ In the first case disputes are resolved by an intermediary or powerful adversary who induces a settlement by convincing a belligerent ‘to accept the terms of peace like I say or else I will do something you would not like’. In the case of soft power the focus is on power exchange whereby the belligerents agree to compromise by stating, for instance, ‘if you choose to do this in my interests I shall do that in your interests’. A third option identified by Boulding is the *integrative power* approach characterized by persuasion and resolution backed by addressing fundamental long term problems. The appropriate analogy would be to regard this less as a negotiated exchange but as a construction of peace by working together. Boulding argues conflict resolutionists often attempt to employ, alternate and combine these three forms of power. The power-based bargaining framework is believed to be effective in

²⁶ Kenneth Boulding, (1989), *Three Faces of Power*, Newberry Park : Sage.

this approach because a negotiating process is one of maximising one's relative power positioning so that one can extract the most benefit from a settlement.

Touval and Zartman claim that self interest renders third party mediation a partial intervention for two reasons. The first is essentially a defensive motive because it is supposed that a conflict between two parties threatens the interests of the third party intervener.²⁷ In such situations Touval and Zartman argue that third parties often seek to limit the damage to themselves by promoting a settlement either by directly mediating or encouraging another organization to do so. A second self-interested motive for mediation is the desire to extend and increase one's influence within the conflict zone. In this instance, the conflict is of no direct consequence for the intervener. The authors conclude that a mediator will seldom be indifferent to the terms being negotiated and often promote a peace settlement that is in accord with the mediators own interests. In the end the primary objective of the pragmatic-realist approach to intervention is a return to order and stability with the settlement of core issues to the conflict.

1.1.2. The Structural Problem Solving School

In contrast to developments in North America and the pragmatists' preoccupation with nuclear deterrence and violence reduction was the peace research movement emerging in Northern Europe. The most remarkable scholar and founder of the structuralist school was Johan Galtung. In 1959, Galtung helped to establish the *International Peace Research Institute of Oslo* (PRIO) and launched the *Journal of Peace Research* in 1964. Subsequently, a peace research movement burgeoned in Northern Europe.²⁸ In England, a parallel conceptual tradition was devised by a coterie of notable scholars first emanating from the *Centre for the Analysis of Conflict* established at the University College London in 1966, under the directorship of John Wear Burton.

²⁷ Touval & Zartman, 1985, op.cit. pp. 8.

²⁸ In 1962 the *Polemological Institute* was formed in Groningen, Netherlands; in 1966 the *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute* (SIPRI) was opened to commemorate Sweden's 150 years of peace; and in 1969 the *Tampere Peace Research Institute* was inaugurated in Finland.

Like the structuralists, the work of this group of scholars led to a paradigm shift from conflict resolution conceived as a struggle for power employing face to face negotiating techniques to a behavioural view of conflict and its resolution. During this time, the failure to resolve conflicts via the UN Charter and international actors at the first track level revealed the weaknesses of the international legal framework championed by realists and liberal internationalists.²⁹ Consequently, in the late 1960's the London group adhered to a novel approach of bringing parties together in a non-adversarial environment which places the emphasis on mutual exploration and analysis. This new milieu of communicative exchange, or what Burton labelled 'controlled communication,' stresses the resolution of conflict through a framework in which actors remain free decision-makers until an acceptable option is agreed upon rather than handing over decision making authority to a tribunal or mediator.³⁰ Therefore, the emphasis of the structural problem solving school is no longer on simply states or structures as objects of study but rather on individuals, their unfulfilled needs, and their inter-relations with other belligerents.

1.1.2.1. The Human Needs Approach to Conflict Resolution

Galtung, Burton and many other scholars in the conflict resolution field were deeply affected by psycho-social analysis and the contribution of social scientists about working on basic human needs.³¹ Beginning with the ground breaking work of Abraham Maslow in the early 1950s, the concept of human needs attempted to hierarchically schematise primal human necessities to live a fulfilling life. Maslow classified these basic human needs into five categories: physiological needs, safety needs, belonging and love needs, esteem needs, and needs for self-actualisation. Since the beginning, basic human needs scholars have been interested in applying this study to a theory of development. After some years of reflection and

²⁹ Louise Diamond and John McDonald, (1996), *Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace* (3rd edit.), West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press. The reference to first track diplomacy derives from the statist approach to conflict resolution whereby the government through official and non-official diplomatic channels is the principle actor in the peace process for the purpose of reaching a settlement of a dispute.

³⁰ John W. Burton, (1969), *Conflict & Communication*, New York: The Free Press. This was the first detailed study published by Burton on what would be known later on as the problem solving conflict resolution technique employed by academics and diplomats as primarily an analytical tool to open communication lines.

³¹ For a general discussion of the emergence of the human needs approach see the Katrin Lederer's (ed.), (1980), *Human Needs: A Contribution to the Current Debate*, Cambridge MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, Publishers, and see John Wear Burton's, (ed.), (1990b), *Conflict: Human Needs Theory*, London: The MacMillian Press Ltd., 358p., for the application of the human needs approach to conflict.

applied research in the area scholars began applying this approach to the resolution of conflict. Rosati, Carroll & Coate stress the fundamental assumption that individuals drive world society.³² In order to analyse world society scholars must consider what underlying motivations draw individuals into social relationships that challenge policies and institutions, as well as the processes through which this occurs. Highlighting the role of human needs theory in conflict relates directly to the long term legitimacy and stability of political and social systems. Rosati Carroll & Coate maintain that those systems, which fail to provide the basis for needs fulfilment, will inevitably grow unstable and undergo a process of systemic upheaval eventually leading to social change.³³

However, the application of human needs to conflict resolution is controversial. Katrin Lederer and the authors in her collective study identify some of the epistemological problems with needs theory.³⁴ Lederer acknowledges that there are various debates about what exactly is a need, and whether needs can be universally applied and recognised in different cultures both spatially and temporally.³⁵ Leaving this debate aside it is important to note, however, that there is a difference between a need and a need satisfier. For instance, the need for food and belonging are generally considered universal and objective needs while the consumption of pork and the admittance to a local street gang are considered means by which to satisfy those needs. Need satisfiers are certainly culturally determined and are based on subjective and historical data. Therefore, what some might call a need is actually a desire or satisfier of a fundamentally essential need.³⁶

³² Jerel A. Rosati, David J. Carroll & Roger A. Coate, (1990), "A Critical Assessment of the Power of Human Needs in World Society", in John Wear Burton & Frank Dukes, (eds.), *Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution*, New York: St. Martin's Press, pp.174.

³³ Ibid., pp. 157.

³⁴ Lederer, 1980, op.cit., see introduction.

³⁵ Ibid., for more on this debate consult Lederer's collective, chapters by Masini, Galtung, and Mallman and Marcus, Roy, and Rist as well as Christopher Mitchell, (1990), "Necessitous Man and Conflict Resolution: More Basic Questions about Basic Human Needs Theory", in John Wear Burton, (ed.), *Conflict: Human Needs Theory*, London: The MacMillian Press Ltd., pp. 149-176.

³⁶ See Johan Galtung, (1980), "The Basic Needs Approach", in Katrin Lederer's (ed.), *Human Needs*, New York: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, Publishers, pp. 55-125, for a comprehensive list of human needs divided into four main classes. These classes are considered the standard in the literature; security needs, welfare needs, identity needs, and freedom needs.

Social psychologist and expert on inter-group conflict Ronald Fisher draws the critical link between the understanding and acknowledgement of basic human needs and conflict.³⁷ He argues that an understanding of needs theory is fundamental to the improvement of inter-group relations and the resolution of protracted social conflict. Essentially, human needs theory develops our understanding of the nature and underlying causes of social conflict and what it means to be human. Fisher attributes a great deal of conflict to the frustration of the need for identity and recognition as a central element in the causation, escalation, and potential resolution of inter-group and international conflict. Furthermore, John Burton specified in 1979 that needs theory doesn't necessarily advocate the goal of individual happiness but regards need satisfaction as a stepping stone on the path to a harmonious society as he states:

The behavioural interest in human needs is not in making the individual happier, though this may be the outcome. It is in determining the conditions necessary for social organizations to survive harmoniously. Problem-solving at the social level – be it the small groups, the nation-state or interactions between states – is possible only by processes that take the needs of individuals as the basis for analysing and planning.³⁸

Like Fisher, Burton maintains that conflict is caused by the need for identity or security etc. Problems arise when conventional efforts to find a solution to deep-rooted conflicts do little to take into account underlying needs.³⁹ In part, the protraction of conflict is caused by inappropriate conflict management procedures applied in the search for a short term settlement leaving protagonists with the feeling that the peace process amounted to little more than official lip service. The burden of failure to resolve conflict is shared by protagonists and third parties who fail to recognise that deep rooted conflicts are caused by the denial to recognise inalienable values or the frustration of basic human needs. Thus once again Burton and the Structuralists draw a clear distinction between interests that are negotiable and needs and values that are non-negotiable.

³⁷ Ronald J. Fisher, (1990), "Needs Theory, Social Identity and an Eclectic Model of Conflict", in John Wear Burton, (ed.), *Conflict: Human Needs Theory*, London: The MacMillian Press Ltd., pp. 89-112.

³⁸ John Wear Burton, (1979), *Deviance, Terrorism & War: The Process of Solving Unsolved Social and Political Problems*, Oxford: Martin Robertson, pp. 79.

³⁹ John Wear Burton, (1987), *Resolving Deep Rooted Conflict*, Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

1.1.2.2. From the Structuralist Conceptualization to Protracted Social Conflict

The emergence of Peace Research and the problem solving approach was largely a reaction to the traditional study of international relations and diplomacy that initiated a profound epistemological shift in the study of conflict and peace. Often conflict and peace researchers allude to a paradigmatic shift in how we explain and influence interactions in the international realm because the dominant paradigm can not account for the changes in conflict relations and international politics. The concept of protracted social conflict helped to produce this shift of emphasis in conflict analysis and it is based on the structuralist research of Johan Galtung among others.⁴⁰ From his conflict triangle, Galtung introduced the notions of *direct violence* (aggressive assault or murder), *structural violence* (death by systemic problems such as poverty and malnutrition) and *cultural violence* (prejudices that blind us or seek to justify injustice). This is an amplified interpretation of the concept of conflict in society that is based on the principle that peace, defined by the absence of all forms of violence, is a complex and difficult social goal. Galtung makes a distinction between conflict at the manifest level involving empirically observable and conscious actualisation and at the latent level, which is theoretical, inferred and subconscious. Here, Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse draw the distinction between instrumental/pragmatic analysts who view the source of conflict objectively, emphasising objective aspects such as competing material interests or behaviours, while Galtung and the structuralists regard conflict without conflictual attitudes or behaviours as a latent and structural form of conflict.⁴¹

Initial indications illustrate that this ambitious or ‘maximalist’ interpretation is idealist yet not impossible to attain because if we can collectively do something to avoid civil strife, poverty, injustice or malaise among certain segments of society then we are committing a form of structural violence.⁴² Violence is therefore present when humans in conflict are unable to attain their actual or potential somatic and mental realisations.⁴³ Galtung draws the

⁴⁰ We will describe in detail the meaning of protracted social conflict once we have reviewed its theoretical underpinnings.

⁴¹ Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, 1999, op.cit., pp. 14.

⁴² See Herman Schmid, (1968), “Peace Research and Politics”, *Journal of Peace Research*, no. 3, pp. 223 and Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, 1999, op.cit. p. 43 for more discussion of the Maximalist/Minimalist debate.

⁴³ Johan Galtung, (1969), “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research”, *Journal of Peace Research*, n. 3, pp. 167-191.

distinction between direct violence where there is a subject and object of the violence and indirect or structural violence where there may not be a particular aggressor as he explains:

In both cases individuals may be killed or mutilated, hit or hurt in both senses of the words, and manipulated by means of stick or carrot strategies. But whereas in the first case these consequences can be traced back to concrete persons as actors, in the second case this is no longer meaningful. There may be any person who directly harms another person in the structure. The violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances.⁴⁴

This line of thought had a significant impact on the Peace movement. The issue of power and the unequal distribution of resources struck a cord with a whole generation of social and development theorists. The *Structural Theory of Violence* is thus intimately connected to, but not dominated by, Marxist analysis of inter and intra-state relations. One can see this link far more clearly in Galtung's *Structural Theory of Imperialism* that appeared shortly after the structural violence thesis, which highlights dependency theory.⁴⁵ The theory accounts for the growing disparity between rich and poor countries by focussing on inherently unequal terms of trade stemming from the cleavages drawn between periphery and centre interests both within and between the North and South. The logic of his conflict triangle and his emphasis on structure explicates the familiar proverb, 'violence breeds violence' as belligerents are stuck in a system which reproduces patterns of injustice and aggressive reactions.

Structuralist notions of violence and conflict influenced the work of John W. Burton and the problem solving approach to conflict resolution by developing a new way of conceptualising conflict based on the individual and collective human needs. The world society/pluralist approach of including many transnational actors shifts the analysis away from the traditional state-centric optic thus rendering legal and law enforcement remedies poor management mechanisms.⁴⁶ For Burton and his coterie, conflict is not simply defined by incompatible interests, but involves needs, interests and tactics. War is a tactic. Conflicts are

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 170-171.

⁴⁵ Johan Galtung, (1971), "A structural Theory of Imperialism", *Journal of Peace Research*, n. 8, pp. 81-117. This is related to the heartland/hinterland thesis or centre/periphery paradigm of development and power relationship between elites colluding in both the North and South.

⁴⁶ John Wear Burton (1985), "World Society and Human Needs", in Margo Light & A. J. R. Groom's, *International Relations : A Handbook of Current Theory*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Pub., pp. 46-59.

often defined in terms of tactics, which tend to distort the analysis and cloud over the underlying causes. Perhaps the late conflict resolution theorist, Edward Azar formulates the best single explanation of the conception of conflict by adherents of the structural problem solving approach.

Azar was particularly interested with rising outbreaks of identity related conflicts since the Second World War.⁴⁷ These types of conflicts between differing ethnic groups had often remained dormant during the Cold War era due to repressive regimes operating within the orbit of the superpowers geopolitical sphere of influence and assistance. Azar refers to these types of intrastate conflicts as '*protracted social conflicts*' (PSC), as they possess several unique properties. These religious and ethnic identity conflicts have profound underlying factors striking at the core of human developmental needs expressed in terms of cultural values, human rights and communal recognition and security. For instance, terrorism and other forms of low-intensity conflict are common manifestations of PSC by non-state actors. Azar notes that as internal repression, external intervention and the manipulation of local grievances increase the likelihood of subversive and violent reactions by groups fighting for the recognition of certain rights will also increase. He states that in the long term, "unmet psychopolitical and socio-economic needs lead to dysfunctional cognitive and behavioural patterns that are not easily remedied by ordinary methods of diplomacy or the use of force."⁴⁸

Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse suggest that the late Azar went perhaps the furthest in the 1970's and 1980's to systematise the sources of contemporary conflict based on mobilised identities, exclusionist ideologies, fragile and authoritarian governance, and disputed sovereignty.⁴⁹ Azar identifies four clusters of variables as preconditions for his PSC model: (1) communal content; (2) human needs; (3) governance and the role of the state; and (4) international linkages.

First, the multicommunal makeup of society is perhaps one of the most critical components of PSC. Ethnic, linguistic, religious, or other cultural identities demarcate the

⁴⁷ Azar, 1990, op.cit.

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 2.

⁴⁹ Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, 1999, op.cit., pp. 72.

distinctions between various politicized groups.⁵⁰ Azar considers two factors responsible for politicizing communal groups in society leading to inter-communal conflict. The first being the colonial legacy of a country in which colonial rulers employed 'divide and conquer' tactics and in some cases artificially implanted different communal groups in a region to control or supplant the natives. The second factor emerges from historical discord and rivalry between groups for control of government and other sources of wealth and power.

A second condition leading to conflictual inter-group relations are the obstacles to fulfilling human needs. This reiterates the impact of human needs theory on the conflict resolution literature as individual and communal survival is contingent upon the satisfaction of certain material as well as non-material and non-physical needs. Azar affirms however, that deprivation of material needs *per se* does not directly give birth to conflicts. It is the allocation or exchange of the means to satisfy such needs that is a function of access to the superstructure of society that determines whether a situation is potentially conflictual.

The third set of variables that constitute PSC is the critical role played by the state and good governance. The state governs and mediates between sectors of society with the legitimate use of force regulating and protecting citizens for the collective good. This is the basis of a governing state's legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. If the state fails in its role to provide citizens with the basic means to develop their individual and collective potential on an equitable basis then a country may be prone to problems of a protracted nature. Most states that experience PSC will be characterized by ineffective, corrupt, parochial, fragile and authoritarian governments that often favour some groups over others.

The last set of variables introduces the extraneous factors of international linkages that create PSC. Referring to the dependent relationship of the state on the greater international system of commerce, finance, and political affiliation, the state is neither autonomous nor independent of external influences. Often this dependence on foreign trade, investment and other forms of support will distort or compromise the state's capacity to provide services for its citizens. As the case study will indicate, all four sets of variables play a role in PSC.

⁵⁰ Azar, 1990, op.cit., pp. 7.

1.1.2.3. The Structural Problem Solving Approach to Third Party Intervention

Structuralists introduce the notion of a positive and negative peace in reaction to the North American pragmatic school of conflict resolution. According to structuralists, a negative peace agenda is one that revolves around power bargaining in the conflict dynamic where a belligerent or intervening actor exercises its influence in giving positive or negative incentives to accept a settlement. Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse affirm that the use of coercion is associated with this more limited ‘minimalist’ agenda of preventing war and in particular nuclear war, and defines peace as a state where there is an absence of direct violence.⁵¹ In contrast, a positive peace refers to the absence of direct and indirect violence by way of a concerted effort to address the structural problems inherent in a conflict. Peace researchers believe that the only way to institutionalise conflict resolution is to build structures of power, which address the notion of social justice. The peace researcher therefore has a proclivity to become an activist in assisting the underdog in asymmetrical conflicts. She takes up the struggle to reconstruct social and economic structures so that the inherently incompatible interests of different groups can be mediated within a new context of relations emphasising egalitarian principles.

Facilitated conflict resolution is achieved via the analytical problem-solving method with the objective to find agreed upon options or means to cooperate once belligerents have jointly completed a thorough analysis of the problems plaguing their relationship. This is often regarded as the pre-negotiation exploratory phase of an intervention. In Burton’s model of the controlled communication workshop, the third party’s role is one of a relatively passive and objective facilitator who assists the parties in realising their own common or overlapping interests when various problems threaten to disrupt or severely downgrade their bargaining relationship.⁵² This professional facilitator will provide the expertise, knowledge and conflict resolution experience required, facilitating communication and suggesting theoretical explanations rather than imposing practical solutions. The model calls for a small panel of scholars and conflict resolution practitioners to invite nominees from conflicting parties to a

⁵¹ Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, 1999, op.cit.

⁵² John W. Burton, (1986), “The Procedures of Conflict Resolution”, in Edward Azar & John W. Burton’s, (eds.), *International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Pub., pp. 104-05.

ten-day session of face to face manipulated discussions. There is no requirement for proposals, no bargaining and no negotiation. The nominees may be made up of official or unofficial representatives such as scholars, students, or others who may not be capable to make decisions yet have some access to decision makers and are well respected within their communities.

With some unexpected discoveries, Burton and his colleagues employed this method during the 1960s and to many PSCs since. In the Cyprus case, Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities on the island state presumed that the other desired unification with the mother nation. However, when Burton brought them together in London in 1965 they realised that the underlying need of both communities was in fact, independence.⁵³ The essence of controlled communication is well posited by its author when he declares that:

In short, the parties are helped not by the third party as such, but by the ordinary academic tools of analysis, to stand back from their conflict, and understand its origins and manifestations. Once each party is in a position to perceive the problem from a behavioural point of view of the other, communication is effectively controlled and tends to become constructive.⁵⁴

This method of conflict resolution developed into a whole genre of its own known as the ‘problem solving approach’. The principal tenets of the structural problem-solving school outlined by Burton in his monograph entitled *Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict*, indicate that this approach is derived from the understanding provided by human needs theory featuring the following five elements.⁵⁵ The first element seeks to distinguish between interests that are negotiable and the underlying basic motivations and values that cannot be bargained away. The second element is the analysis of motives and values, perceptions of motives and values, and of confusion between interests, tactics and goals. A third feature provides an opportunity to assess the cost of ignoring, suppressing or failing to promote revealed non-negotiable needs. The fourth element seeks to assist parties in disputes in order to deduce what alterations in structure, institutions and policies are required to enable the fulfilment of needs. This needs fulfilment approach is applied equally to groups that were previously deprived and to those

⁵³ John W. Burton, (1986), “The History of Conflict Resolution”, in Edward Azar & John W. Burton’s, (eds.), *International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Pub., pp. 42-55. The first case where this problem solving approach was applied was a conflict in Southeast Asia, involving Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. It proved to be a positive experiment as violent hostilities ceased shortly thereafter.

⁵⁴ Burton, 1969, op.cit., pp. 72.

⁵⁵ John W. Burton, (1987), *Resolving Deep Rooted Conflict*, Lanham, MD: Uni. Press of America, pp. 23-24.

whose interests will be compromised by impending change. The fifth element of the approach to facilitated conflict resolution seeks to assist the parties involved in monitoring events and communications. This translates into assistance for the parties in anticipating responses and being aware of the impact of policy changes while moving towards an improved relationship.

Social psychologist, Herbert C. Kelman, illustrates how the needs approach can have a critical impact on the ‘integrative problem solving’ approach. The workshop focus deals with concerns rather than positions in order to explore the needs and fears that underlie these demands. Consequently, parties are able to redefine the conflict in terms of needs and then it may become possible to find a win-win solution via the adoption of different need satisfiers. He demonstrates this approach in a simplified Israeli-Palestinian conflict workshop model.⁵⁶ At first glance, what seems to be a straightforward dispute over the distribution and control of territory (in the West Bank and Gaza) is unveiled as a conflict over the collective needs of the belligerents. Kelman maintains that the focus of this workshop is to identify collective needs, which are identical to individual needs, and that include identity, security, recognition, autonomy, dignity, justice, and development. In this case, for the Palestinians the primordial need is defined in terms of national identity and sovereignty, whereas for the Israelis, needs are defined in terms of national security.

Towards the end of his career Burton emphasised the role that the problem solving approach could have as a political system.⁵⁷ Burton has employed the term ‘provention’ rather than prevention in alluding to the idea of not only preventing a conflict from erupting into violence, but taking steps to remove the sources of conflict in the first place. In this respect, prevention is actually acting too late, as there are already grounds for parties to engage in direct conflict. Provention seeks to promote the conditions in which collaborative and valued relationships adequately control behaviour. In line with the structuralist critique, Burton advocates attempting to eliminate the structural causes of violence by adopting a problem

⁵⁶ Herbert C. Kelman, (1990), “Applying a Human Needs Perspective to the Practice of Conflict Resolution: The Israeli-Palestinian Case”, in John Wear Burton’s (ed.), *Conflict: Human Needs Theory*, London: The MacMillian Press Ltd., pp. 283-297.

⁵⁷ John Wear Burton, (1995), “Conflict Provention as a Political System”, in John A. Vasquez, James Turner Johnson, Sanford Jaffe, & Linda Stamoto’s (eds.), *Beyond Confrontation: Learning Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Era*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, pp. 115-130.

solving process as a preliminary panacea in all realms of social and political life. In his view “conflict resolution thus becomes part of decision-making theory and practice” and it can also be deduced that “fundamental changes are required in our traditional we-they, adversarial decision-making institutions, taking conflict resolution into the field of political decision-making and institutional change.”⁵⁸ This structural reform advocated by both structuralists and problem-solvers produces a synthesis of their intervening approaches to conflict resolution.

Now that we have categorised and conceptualised conflict and its resolution according to two different theoretical approaches we can now briefly examine what the literature says about the role of regional IGOs in the resolution of systemic or protracted social conflict. The conflict under study in this thesis is typified by problematic and endemic structures that result in conflict at the local level. It is crucial to address the structural causes of conflict that are at the root of poorly functioning democracies and a system of trade and investment, which implicitly takes advantage of such states struggling from these systemic problems. Therefore, a response to such problems requires not only action at the local or national level; it requires a concerted effort at the international level. Multilateral and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) should play a preponderant role in resolving such systemic conflicts.

1.1.3. The Role of Regional Intergovernmental Organizations in Conflict Resolution

The problem of conflict identified in the introduction involving local communities and foreign investors is a relatively new and accelerated manifestation of an old problem of underdevelopment occurring within the context of globalization that requires a new form of conflict resolving intervention. Therefore, this variant form of conflict requires a new type of CR approach by IGOs. There are advantages to IGO interventions in this type of conflict because they have the ability and competence to analyse general trends and problems at the intra-state, inter-state and the global levels. Theoretically, regional institutions and IGOs are more relevant interveners because they can act as interlocutor between the various international actors (i.e. transnational corporations and societal actors within nation-states) on the multilateral level and provide sound institutional assistance at the national-state level.

⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 123-124.

There is relatively little academic reflection on the role of regional intergovernmental organizations in non-military conflict interventions of a PSC nature.⁵⁹ From the outset we will make a distinction between third party military interventions with other forms of conflict resolving interventions. Due to the actors and issues of this case study, we primarily deal with the latter form of non-military intervention, peacebuilding and peace settlement initiatives. A clear distinction is drawn to differentiate the role of international organizations in peacekeeping from that of IGO involvement in peacebuilding. Moreover, this is particularly the case when it comes to the type of conflict under the analytical scope of this study. In our case study the state of Suriname had solicited the assistance of the OAS to play a role in resolving this conflict in a practical and institutional manner leading to more of a peacebuilding function. What does the literature say in this instance?

Since of the end of the Cold War there has been resurgence in the faith of international regimes to create a global polity circumscribed by rules of conduct for global actors. In his widely read leaflet entitled *An Agenda for Peace*, former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali calls for greater adherence and emphasis on global, and particularly regional organizations, to prevent, to make and to maintain a durable peace. This is done, he argues, by focusing on social peacebuilding initiatives that design new institutional political and economic regimes as well as security ones.⁶⁰ In the early 1990s, the UN was being repeatedly called upon to intervene both diplomatically and militarily in conflict zones to the point where the UN could not meet the demand of such expensive endeavours. In conformance with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter devoted to the idea that regional arrangements or agencies deal with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as appropriate, Ghali called for regional IGOs to assume greater responsibility for regional peace. Fen O. Hampson states that these third party institutions can play a key role in establishing new norms of conduct in the area of human rights without undermining the peace settlement

⁵⁹ Christopher Mitchell, (1994), "Conflict Research", in Margo Light & A. J. R. Groom's, *Contemporary International Relations : A Guide to Theory*, New York: Pinter Publishers, pp.134.

⁶⁰ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, (1992), *An Agenda for Peace*, New York: United Nations.

itself. This entails fostering the development of institutional mechanisms for democracy and rights adherence via a sustained long-term commitment to building a durable peace.⁶¹

In the early 1990s there was a great deal of optimism for peace promotion by IGOs through functional integration as seen in Europe. One of the academic fathers of regionalism, Ernst B. Haas, states that the contemporary global climate effectively ending the Hobbesian view of an uncooperative interstate system should allow for a more comprehensive definition of collective security. Haas argues that “instead of merely deterring and, if necessary, reversing acts of aggression, the practice of collective security ought to be expanded to bring about peaceful change before aggression becomes a temptation for the dissatisfied.”⁶²

Haas’ observations would eventually lead to a redefinition of security, something which Buzan, Waever and de Wilde do in their collective work entitled *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. These authors proposed a complete rethinking of security by broadening the definition of security beyond the traditional politico-military or security complex theory to one encompassing other sectors of analysis such as the societal, economic and environmental sectors.⁶³ Security and the securitisation of an issue are the consequences of recognising an existential threat to a designated referent object such as state sovereignty or clean water. This essential threat to an actor warrants the utmost priority in which normal rules of political decision making and freedoms of society do not apply. Employing a constructivist operational method, this ‘new’ framework for conceptualising security simply adapts the realist perspective to a world marked by multiple actors and multiple levels of analysis within multiple sectors of security threats.

Therefore, regional security is now redefined to incorporate more than simply military-political issues grounded in state sovereignty, recognition and integrity. However, from the

⁶¹ Fen Osler Hampson, (1996), “Why Orphaned Peace Settlements Are More Prone to Failure”, in Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, & Pamela Aall, (eds.), (1996), *Managing Global Chaos, Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*, Washington, DC: States Institute of Peace Press, pp. 533-550.

⁶² Ernst B. Haas, (1993), “Collective Conflict Management: Evidence for a New World Order?”, in Thomas G. Weiss’ (ed.), (1993), *Collective Security in a Changing World*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Pub., pp. 91.

⁶³ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever & Jaap de Wilde, (1998), *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder Co.: Lynne Rienner Pub. For a definition of security complex theory see pp. 12. These authors are known to be adherents of the Copenhagen School of security studies.

structural problem solving perspective, the amplification of security issues was fully implicit in the structuralist critique of traditional techniques of conflict resolution. Structural problem solvers already employed a broadened view of conflict issues based on distinguishing interests from existential needs in their analysis and treatment of conflict between various non-state groups. From this perspective the ‘new security framework’ proposed by Buzan et al. is superfluous when analysed within the rubric of the peace and conflict resolution literature which has, since the structuralist critique of the pragmatic-realist approach, always been concerned with ‘new security issues.’ However, the widening of the security agenda propagated by the Copenhagen School of conflict is beginning to influence how IGOs approach conflict in the post cold war era.

For the most part, the role of regional organizations has been traditionally preoccupied with collective security arrangements that primarily include coercive intervention in interstate conflicts. Gordenker and Weiss define the concept of collective security in the historical perspective as a concerted effort by the international community to coerce a government that transgresses the peace.⁶⁴ The military interventions of the UN or other coalitions of nations dominate the literature on the issue of intervention for collective security ends. Gordenker and Weiss maintain that states and state sovereignty remain the primary features of the international system and only large-scale violence stemming from interstate territorial disputes or intrastate fragmentation will warrant intervention by the international community. They add that ‘non-traditional’ security issues such as economic malaise, environmental degradation, massive migration or other humanitarian emergencies while important, have not generated the same amount of attention or resources from regional organizations.⁶⁵

In the past, IGOs have primarily dealt with interstate conflicts over resources or territorial sovereignty. States in conflict often agree to invite IGOs to provide services: as a third party mediator; in dispatching inquiry missions; to provide ‘good offices’ support; to conciliate; or to act as a judicial arbitrator.⁶⁶ What is unique about regional organizations is

⁶⁴ Leon Gordenker & Thomas G. Weiss, (1993), “Whither Collective Security? An Unsettled Idea in a Changing World”, in Thomas G. Weiss, (ed.) *Collective Security in a Changing World*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 209-219.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 213.

⁶⁶ J. G. Merrills, (1998), *International Dispute Settlement*, Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.

that states act on a collective basis providing a more coherent and secure strategy of mutual assistance and cooperation and in turn, norms may be created and adhered to. According to Kumar Rupesinghe, coherence and norm evolution are precisely what is lacking, however.⁶⁷ He suggests that policy coherence is lacking due to the diffuse levels of peacemaking activities provided by the UN, IGOs, individual country foreign aid programmes, scholar-consultants and the numerous grassroots and international NGOs. The sum total of peacemaking assistance conducted in a particular conflict zone needs to be coordinated by developing a strategic concept of objectives and means for sustainable conflict transformation. IGOs with expertise in the field and who maintain multi-level relations with a variety of actors would be an ideal vehicle for conducting this type of strategic coordination. This has yet to be implemented and little has been written on the topic.

One of the notable exceptions is Connie Peck's comprehensive study devoted to the UN and regional IGO involvement in peacebuilding.⁶⁸ In *Sustainable Peace*, Peck provides a systematic assessment of the state of contemporary conflict and the role of the UN, IGOs, and NGOs in promoting enduring peace throughout the world. Peck stresses the need to take a more holistic approach to conflict resolution employing the concepts of human needs security and good governance. She identifies the underlying causes of conflict and the role of the international community in conflict prevention, which includes IGO involvement in both interstate and increasingly intrastate conflict prevention assistance.

Peck argues that IGOs are involved in three main areas of peace development. The first area incorporates mechanisms employed for the peaceful settlement of disputes in various capacities. These include legal instruments for dispute settlement, decision making forums with the capacity to act, a secretariat that monitors potential problems, the use of good offices by the Secretary General, other special envoys or expert groups, a commission on the rights of minorities, and the ability to send short and long term missions for the purpose of fact finding, mediation or institutional peacebuilding. The second area in which IGOs have been active in

⁶⁷ Kumar Rupesinghe, (1995), "Conflict Transformation", in Kumar Rupesinghe, (ed.), *Conflict Transformation*, London: MacMillan Press, pp. 88.

⁶⁸ Connie Peck, (1998), *Sustainable Peace: The Role of the UN and Regional Organizations in Preventing Conflict*, Lanham MA: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

promoting peace has been the assistance provided to build sound democratic institutions that include electoral monitoring and assistance, technical or advisory assistance to governments, active liaison with NGOs and mechanism for the emergency defence of democracy. A third area critical to peace has included IGO mechanisms devoted to the protection of human rights. These consist of human rights legal instruments, special instruments for the rights of minorities and first nations, technical and advisory assistance in human rights, human rights monitoring agencies, special rapporteurs reports, emergency human rights mechanisms, a commissioner and commission for human rights and a court of human rights. A combination of these three areas of technical assistance, monitoring and enforcement help to further entrench peaceful relations between and within states. In conclusion, Peck notes that finding a new mandate for IGOs to perform a more active role in preventing intrastate conflict has found resonance within the international community and they should become more active peacebuilders in the future.

However, MacFarlane and Weiss maintain that although regional actors are intrinsically equipped to deal with the dynamics of regional conflict, there remain several obstacles.⁶⁹ For instance, they argue that IGOs should not be viewed as a viable alternative to the UN in a conflict management role. Upon analysing the role played by the OAS, ASEAN, OAU and other regional institutions involved in conflict intervention, they concluded that these bodies were relatively ineffective for promoting and establishing peace when compared to the activities of the UN. Their main limitations were the lack of resources, the lack of legitimacy and independence from regional hegemons and the traditional structural weaknesses of regional IGOs.

Despite the limitations of regional IGOs involved in third party conflict interventions there is a growing need for regional and global institutions to deal with problems that transcend international borders and sectors of the international economic and political community. Unfortunately, little has been written on the type of conflict identified in this study, that is, structural global-local discord and democratic deficit and the role of regional IGOs. Scholars studying regional security arrangements have not adequately dealt with the

⁶⁹ S. Neil MacFarlane & Thomas Weiss, (1992), "Regional Organizations and Regional Security", *Security Studies*, vol. 2, no. 1 (autumn), pp. 6-37.

role of institutions in conducting structural conflict resolution on a global or regional scale, hence the research problem for this study. The present investigation proposes to address this dearth in the literature by examining the role of the OAS in protracted social conflict resolution. This may allow for a more profound understanding of the current theoretical approach of OAS activity in this area. We now move on to the methodology of our case study examination and verification of a rival theory comparison employing Nieuw Koffiekamp and the OAS as our primary objects of study.

1.2. Case Study Methodology

1.2.1. Definition of Operational Concepts

A variety of authors make an effort to define the terminology employed in the conflict resolution literature.⁷⁰ The terms defined in this section do not cover the entire gambit of the esoteric jargon normally identified within the discipline but have specific relevance to the study. At the most basic level, scholars view *conflict* as arising from an incompatibility of goals between two individuals or groups of individuals. This entails the whole range of political conflict that is pursued by peaceful means or with the use of violence. In the NK case, we are dealing with *armed conflict*, which denotes a narrower category, resulting from the use of force by the parties involved. *Conflict settlement* means the reaching of an agreement between the parties which enables them to end armed conflict.

Conflict resolution on the other hand, is a more comprehensive term that implies that deep-seated sources of conflict be addressed and resolved prior to any settlement. Therefore, this means that communicative, political, economic, or social mechanisms are established to voice grievances and effect changes. This should pacify a situation, curtail violent behaviour, and eliminate hostile attitudes, effectively changing the structure of the conflict. *Conflict transformation* is a development of conflict resolution in which asymmetric conflicts are transformed to address unjust social relationships. The term is employed in the understanding of the peace process where transformation denotes a sequence of necessary transitional steps to reform the public decision making procedures of society.⁷¹ In this view, conflict transformation is analogous to Burton's conception of 'provention'.

Today, we are faced with a whole multitude of violent conflict based on identities, religion, and national (ethnic) security that may accompany a movement to create ones own state representing ones own identity. These civil wars are the predominant form of violent

⁷⁰ Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, 1999, op.cit., Azar, 1990, op.cit., Burton, 1990a, op.cit., etc.

⁷¹ The definitions were largely inspired by the section of Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, *ibid.*, pp. 19-22.

conflict in our age.⁷² This is not the type of violent conflict that we are dealing with in our case study. The following diagrams display the relationship between the actors of past and contemporary structural conflict with the wide vertical arrow indicating the violent manifestation of conflict between parties. The following figure displays the type of structural economic conflict that was prevalent in the past.




Figure 1.2. Economic Conflict Dynamic during the Cold War

In the past, economic conflicts over foreign investment were dealt with differently. Often these types of conflicts emerged as LDC governments intervened to repatriate profits or to nationalize foreign enterprises in key industries. If the threat of nationalization was an imminent eventuality, multinational corporations responded by seeking the assistance of their home states to intervene on their behalf. Consequently, this type of conflict was primarily expressed at the interstate level within a realist framework.

With globalization the situation has changed as transnational firms or TNCs are less encumbered by national laws from home or by national laws in their host countries. They have become international ‘citizens’ increasingly regulated by their own set of rules circumscribed in bilateral or multilateral trade and investment agreements. The changing nature of neoliberal reforms pre-empts the automatic need for a second state, often the home state of the investors, to get involved in economic disputes with other states or local populations. In addition, these conflicts situate LDC governments in a more precarious position because they have begun to

⁷² There is a great number of authors who have systematically quantified the occurrence of civil wars and identity based conflicts, see Holsti, 1996, op.cit., Donald M. Snow, (1996), *Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, and Ted Robert Gurr, (1993), *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts*, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

intensively court international finance signing over control of resources in legally binding contracts. What we are dealing with here is a conflict between local populations and foreign firms with the state increasingly caught between these two different actors. On one side is the transnational firm that the LDC government has engaged on a legal and even political level. Their adversaries, on the other side, are traditionally neglected local populations, ethnic minorities or indigenous peoples whose ways of life have been severely disrupted by uninvited large scale industrial development.




Figure 1.3. Structural Conflict Dynamic under Globalization

Clearly there are structural issues to be addressed in this type of conflict as evidenced by the replication of this type of conflict beyond the confines of our case study in Suriname. The international system of investment and the neoliberal ethos have aggravated the existing problems of inadequate democratic institutions and unaccountable governments in third world nations. Global actors simply play by the rules of the game to exploit the relative advantages of doing business in countries with insufficient regulations, a lack of accountability and under increasing political and economic pressure to conform to the predominant ideology of neoliberal development.

Therefore, foreign investment eventually comes into direct conflict with local populations who are severely affected by this type of development. These local peoples, often rural and subsistence farmers or miners, have not been given the appropriate means to influence the effects of global and national forces on their own communities. The legacy of the weak state dominated by national elites will ultimately be at fault for not responding to the needs of its constituents, particularly ethnic and aboriginal minorities. The situation for tribal and indigenous peoples is particularly disastrous as they have a particular relationship to their

territory, which is intimately allied to their cultural survival, but that is threatened by this brand of uninformed and un-consented foreign industrial development. Indeed, factions of national elites often benefit from neoliberal reforms, which cause such malaise within their jurisdiction.

The NK conflict is emblematic of an emerging type of conflict presented in the introduction. It is contextualized within the rubric of neoliberal economic globalization. Therefore, this type of conflict poses a very different theoretical and praxeological problem for third party intergovernmental interventions mandated to help construct a lasting peace. The case study of Nieuw Koffiekamp, characterized by a conflict involving three parties; a local population, foreign transnational investors and the nation-state, is not an incarnation of the third type of war so omnipresent in the contemporary era.⁷³ In other words, this genre of conflict is not simply between different ethnic factions or identity based groups vying for control of political or economic resources within a nation state. Nor is the conflict between symmetrical actors such as two states disputing an issue of sovereignty, recognition or state security, where IGO interventions have been more frequent.

The involvement of FDI within the context of a liberalising Surinamese market economy demonstrates the role played by international actors and international regimes in causing an internal conflict. This is one reason justifying the intervention of an intergovernmental organization. The OAS as a third party providing democratic institutional assistance and her good offices, brings a fourth dimension to our diagram adding an element of greater complexity to the resolution of this conflict.




Figure 1.4. Structural Conflict Dynamic under Globalization with IGO Intervention

The OAS was invited to intervene as mediator in this conflict by the Surinamese Government and has direct relations with the state as well as with the two conflicting parties. Once again the state plays a central role in mediating this conflict as all the actors must go through the state to have any concrete action approved.

As subject of the study it is critical to shed some further meaning on the phenomenon of *Structural Global-local Discord and Democratic Deficit*. The term assembles a combination of factors that characterize this brand of dispute leading to violent conflict. Fundamentally, SGDDD is a conflict that emerges as a result of global forces adversely affecting local populations in a pre-existing context, where certain groups of society suffer from a systemic lack of political and economic agency. *Structural Global-local Discord* alludes to the conflict that arises when global economic actors together with national power brokers impose a certain development model on local populations resulting in conflict. This conflict may be over a conflict of interests or it can go much deeper, stemming from an existential problem threatening the primordial needs of certain groups. These global and national actors effecting changes to the domestic or intrastate environment do so within the larger context of neoliberal economic globalization. Neoliberal economic reforms play a central role in triggering the changes taking place in local communities creating conflict.

Nonetheless, underlying this structural issue of economic globalization is the legacy of the weak state representation model. The lack of political and economic agency strikes at the heart of the issue of government legitimacy. *Democratic deficit* is the term ascribed to the inability of domestic political and economic institutions to assure that the fundamental rights of all citizens be protected especially in the case of aboriginal minorities who have obtained certain rights and norms under national legislation and international convention respectively. However, there is democratic deficit on another level. Here there is a systemic issue of inadequate government representation and accountability on both the domestic and international plane. This alludes to the lack of an effective and democratic body legislating, implementing and adjudicating rights and managing the international political economy. In SGDDD, neoliberal economic development spearheaded by multilateral trade and investment

⁷³ This refers to what Rice called 'Wars of the Third Kind' described in the introduction of the present chapter.

agreements, international financial institutions and TNCs, is not managed nor accountable to a supranational democratically elected body. This is the other side of the double-edged sword of democratic deficit in SGDDD.

1.2.2. Operational Structure

The research issue is conflict and its resolution in international relations. In section 1.1. a great deal of emphasis was placed on the descriptive development of two theoretical approaches; the pragmatic-realist approach and the structural problem-solving approach. Each school attempts to conceptualize conflict and its resolution with the intervention of a third party differently. The central research problem is the gap in the literature that examines this emerging type of structural conflict in international relations. Consequently, the preceding section attempted to define this emerging form of conflict to determine its etiology. In addition, we identified a second research problem due to the lacunae on the methods of resolving such conflict with the assistance of a multilateral institutional intervener. The subject of the research project is thus conflict and more specifically SGDDD and its resolution. The primary research question is how might a regional intergovernmental organization intervene in the emerging SGDDD type of conflict.

An analysis of the case study will reveal which theoretical school best explains to the NK conflict, that in turn, informs us how to prescribe the appropriate third party approach to resolution. In contrast to many types of studies of this genre in the social sciences, theory will not only provide the analytical approach to the examination but it will also be one of the objects of the study. This can be defined as a descriptive case study as identified by Robert K. Yin.⁷⁴ Descriptive theory does not entail a simple explication of a cause and effect relationship but covers the entire scope and the depth of the object under study. The method therefore is a process of in-depth examination of a case from an objective and detailed break down of the case's constituent elements. Secondly, the case study analysis will determine which theory best explains the conflict effectively indicating which of the two conflict resolution methodologies should be implemented to construct a lasting peace.

⁷⁴ Robert K. Yin, (1993), *Applications of Case Study Research*, Newbury Park: Sage Publications, pp. 21.

As noted by Yin, a common feature of rival theory research is the absence of a target hypothesis. He identifies this as the *null-hypothesis* because there may not be a direct causal link between variables. There is instead the existence of a phenomena alone and the next best thing is a rival theory which seeks to explain a certain phenomena outcome. This substantive theory does not limit the analysis to simply a relationship of cause and effect between the independent and dependent variables. Therefore, we will take a phenomenon such as SGDDD, and attempt to frame and explain it by employing theoretical constructs outlined as either the pragmatic-realist or the structural problem solving approach.

The null-hypothesis: The conflict of Nieuw Koffiekamp in Suriname between foreign mining investors and local communities is a clear manifestation of what is defined here as *Structural Global-local Discord and Democratic Deficit*. This study proposes that the structural problem solving approach is the preferred theoretical tool to explain and subsequently diagnose SGDDD conflict and to prescribe a systemic process of resolution with the assistance of the OAS as the most appropriate third party intervener.

1.2.3. Verification of the null-Hypothesis

The verification of the null-hypothesis is divided into two parts. The first part is to extensively examine the Nieuw Koffiekamp case study in question using a specific method of objective descriptive analysis. In the second part, we analyse the intervening method of the OAS with a specific analytical framework derived from our discussion of the two conflict resolution schools described earlier.

1.2.3.1. Adaptation of the Wehr Model of Conflict Analysis

Chapter two is devoted to extensively examining the conflict of NK deconstructing it and identifying its constituent parts. The strategy of verification will adopt a model of conflict mapping in order to establish the etiological roots of the conflict. The model proposed by Paul Wehr will serve as a guidepost dissecting the study into two macro-micro level sections

accompanied by numerous subsections.⁷⁵ Section 2.1. on the general contextual factors including the geographical, historical and political background of Suriname will position the state and its problems within a larger framework in time with particular attention paid to the interior war that plagued Suriname from 1986-1992.

Section 2.2. examines the particular circumstances leading to conflict in NK evincing how the conflict evolved. These immediate factors include the particular NK context and the government policies and actions that led to conflict in the first place. Subsequently, the dynamics of the conflict will be addressed including the precipitating events, the proliferation of the conflict and polarisation of the parties into entrenched opposition to each other. We will take a closer look at which parties are involved including the primary, secondary and tertiary conflict actors. Finally, our model of analysis seeks to identify the issues of the NK conflict including its legal-based, interest-based, needs-based and value-based issues. Figure 1.5. is a brief outline displaying our Conflict Analysis Map adapted to the case study.

- 2.1. General Conflict Context: Geographical, Historical, Socio-political Summary
 - 2.1.1. Geography and History
 - 2.1.2. Contemporary Political Development of Suriname
 - 2.1.3. Civil War in the Interior
- 2.2. The Particular Conflict of Nieuw Koffiekamp
 - 2.2.1. Conflict Context
 - 2.2.2. Conflict Dynamics
 - 2.2.3. Conflict Parties
 - 2.2.4. Conflict Issues

Figure 1.5. Descriptive Conflict Analysis Map

By identifying the historical and contemporary contextual factors, the nature of the parties involved, the issues, and the dynamics of the NK conflict we illustrate how it emerged and evolved in the Surinamese context. Finally, in section 2.3., we describe the efforts and actions of the OAS to resolve the Nieuw Koffiekamp conflict.

⁷⁵ Paul Wehr, (1979), *Conflict Regulation*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, p. 18-23, this conflict map has been modified to fit the needs of the current study. This comprehensive model of conflict analysis should be considered as an objective and non-partisan analytical tool that does not favour one CR school over the other.

1.2.3.2. Analytical Framework: Conflict Resolution Theory Comparison Table

Once the parameters of this conflict have been delineated, the third chapter of the thesis will compare, through a process of pattern matching analysis, which rival theory best explains the dynamics of the NK conflict. The detailed description of the theoretical foundations of conflict resolution research in the literature review has enabled us to differentiate two distinct ways of conceptualizing conflict and prescribing an intervening method. To assist us in differentiating these two theories we have developed a Conflict Resolution Theory Comparison Table. The Table is divided into two sections. The first section entitled the Conceptualization of Conflict is composed of several variables that place each school in a primary IR conceptual frame. Secondly, we identify the focus of the actors involved in the conflict under study and then attempt to describe how each school conceptualizes conflict and attributes its etiology.

The second half of the CR table provides the analytical framework for determining the intervening method adopted by the third party intervener. The variables in this analytical framework are based on the interveners' approach to conflict resolution, her focus on improving the relations of the parties involved, the nature of her relationship to the belligerents, and the tactics she employs in the mediation/negotiation process. The final variable of our analytical framework of intervening methods is the all important third party objective established for the intervention, which sets the general parameters and trajectory of her involvement in the peace process.

Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse denote a significant distinction between the two approaches to their conflict resolution interventions.⁷⁶ The first encompasses the objectivist rational negotiation/mediation approach of the North American pragmatist school. The second emphasises the social justice and structural reform approach of European structuralists school and the subjectivist controlled communication and problem solving approach developed by Burton et al. The structural problem solving approach is non-partisan to partisan for the less powerful adversary so as to ensure its full participation and influence in the conflict resolution

⁷⁶ Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, 1999, op.cit., pp. 63.

process and settlement. The pragmatic-realist approach is considered partisan by default for the more powerful adversary as the third party reinforces traditional forms of power-based negotiation between asymmetrical adversaries to reach a settlement to the conflict reinforcing their natural advantage. The following Conflict Resolution Theory Comparison Table clearly distinguishes the theoretical framework of the two rival theories.

Table 1.1. Conflict Resolution Theory Comparison Table

Conceptualization of Conflict	Pragmatic-Realist	Structural Problem-Solver
IR conceptual framework	Realist Theory	Pluralist/Critical Theory
Primary actors in IR conflict	State centric with affiliated allies	Non-state-centric Many different actors
Concept of conflict	Inherent in man Incompatible interests: often over scarce resources and power	Perceptions of incompatible interests and the frustration of basic human needs
Etiological focus of analysis	Negotiable interests, actor capabilities and relative power in economic and military terms and tactics, the power framework distinguishes a dichotomy between national and international factors	Non-negotiable individual and collective needs based on structural factors leading to protracted social conflict, PSC is composed of 4 factors; communal content, human needs, governance and the state, and international linkages
View of issues	Objective	Subjective
Analytical Framework for Intervening Method	Pragmatic-Realist	Structural Problem-Solver
	Known also as Conflict Managers	Known also as Democratizers
Approach to conflict resolution stresses	Application of influence and threat systems, manipulation through coercion if necessary	Supportive techniques of communication and fostering greater understanding of the other
Focus on improving relations of the parties stresses	Employing pragmatic confidence building steps to foster the trust among the leaders present in the negotiations	Principled focus working on modifying the relationship between groups of people via the structure of their relationship
Relationship of intermediary to parties stresses	Non-partisanship/or assistance to the top dog by default	Non-partisanship/or assistance to the bottom dog to be able to fully participate and have a bearing on an asymmetrical peace settlement
Interventionist tactics	Process based mediation and negotiations within a power bargaining framework	Facilitation and rapprochement through interactive problem solving framework
Intervention objective	A reduction of violence, reconciliation, settlement, order and stability based on balance of forces, also known as 'negative peace'	Legitimized resolution of conflict, structural change and the institutionalization of the rule of law stressing social justice or a positive peace, also known as 'provention'

Table 1.1. Two primary approaches to the study of conflict. Adapted from A. J. R. Groom table.⁷⁷

⁷⁷ Groom, 1990, op.cit. pp. 96. The table has been significantly adapted by dividing it into two major sections by adding, expanding and renaming certain elements, and combining the structural and problem solving approaches.

The verification of the null-hypothesis will employ the descriptive case study to reveal, which intervening method was adopted by the OAS in the NK case. The first section of chapter three begins by demonstrating which of the two rival theories best explains and conceptualizes the conflict of NK. We employ the first half of the analytical Table to compare the variables with the description of the conflict in question from chapter two. In a second instance, we demonstrate by providing specific evidence of how the NK conflict in Suriname is a manifestation of what we have called a Structural Global-local Discord and Democratic Deficit conflict. This will enable the reader to distinguish and contrast how the theories explain the etiology of conflict and prescribe specific conflict resolution techniques, which involve integral policy implications.

In section 3.3., we begin with a brief discussion of the OAS commitment and action in the area of conflict resolution and democratic development. Subsequently, we will analyse the OAS intervention by applying the Analytical Framework component of the Table to determine which of the two intervening methods was employed by the regional IGO in the case of NK. This will enable us to evaluate how the OAS was incapable of establishing a durable peace settlement in Nieuw Koffiekamp. In the fourth section of our analytical chapter, we apply what we have learned from the conflict resolution theory examined above and the case study to present some general reflections and suggest an institutional approach to conflict resolution via an IGO. This entails a dual pronged strategy of conflict resolution based on timely interventions and continued institutional assistance and reform. Finally, we conclude by returning to comment what may be drawn from the analysis on conflict resolution theory and we will suggest some future areas of research in the field of structural conflict resolution.

1.2.4. Information Gathering

The study will focus primarily on theoretical documentary research building on the literature from the field of conflict, conflict resolution and international relations cited in the introduction and first chapter. Some literature on land rights problems, globalization and on the Guyanese region is also consulted. The primary documents published on the case study are two OAS reports: One specifically on the conflict in Nieuw Koffiekamp and the second is the

OAS/UPD Suriname project *Final Report*. The Peace Accord, GSR-Suriname Mineral Agreement and the applicable international legal instruments were equally consulted. Information of the Nieuw Koffiekamp case will be supplemented by news reports issued by media outlets as well as some primary documentation obtained and diffused by Non-Governmental Organizations working in Suriname and for indigenous peoples throughout the developing world. The author of the study has also discussed the case with persons directly involved in the OAS conflict intervention that provide some additional background material.⁷⁸

⁷⁸ Informal interviews were conducted in 1998-99 (long before this thesis undertaking commenced) while the author was working as a communications and research intern with the OAS in its Unit for the Promotion of Democracy. This is when the author initially became aware of the Nieuw Koffiekamp case and the 1997 OAS Report of this conflict. This experience provided the author with some first hand knowledge of the internal workings of this regional IGO in the field of conflict resolution as well as the opportunity to establish personal relations with various professionals working in this field and directly on the Nieuw Koffiekamp case. Many of the conclusions presented here were inspired by what the author was able to observe and interpret while working at the OAS headquarters in Washington DC.

CHAPTER 2: THE CASE OF NIEUW KOFFIEKAMP AND THE OAS

Chapter two provides the material foundation for our descriptive case study. In the following sections we will dissect the conflict into various subsections that will explain the case of Nieuw Koffiekamp systematically. Therefore, we examine the macro and micro factors that have lead to the conflict, which suggests the type of conflict under the analytical microscope. Subsequently, this will allow us to evaluate with greater clarity how the OAS responded to this type of conflict in its' Surinamese intervention. It is critical for the chapter to begin from the macro-level of analysis in order for the study to follow a logical sequence of contributing factors. The following discussion will assume a narrative form of explication.

The first section deals with the general context of the conflict shedding light on the geographical, historical and socio-political factors that pervade Surinamese society. These contextual factors including the interior civil war occurring from 1986-1992 make Suriname a potential breeding ground for structural conflict. In section 2.2. we take a closer look at the immediate contextual factors directly leading to the conflict of NK. In addition, we will report on the conflict dynamics including the precipitating events, the emergence of issues and their proliferation, and finally, the polarisation of the parties. Subsequently, we examine the various primary, secondary and interested third parties to the conflict. In addition, we will describe the various types of legal and facts based, interest based, needs based, and value based issues causing the NK conflict. In the last section of the chapter we examine in more detail the actions of the OAS to bring about a lasting peace in Suriname and specifically in Nieuw Koffiekamp.

2.1. General Conflict Context of Suriname

2.1.1. Geography and History

This section will profile Suriname briefly describing its geographical and historical context, which will elucidate the reasons for the country's violent difficulties in the last 25 years since independence. This former Dutch colony is the smallest independent country on the continent located on the northern tip of South America bordering the North Atlantic Ocean between Guyana, French Guyana and Brazil to the South.

Map 2.1. Northern Tip of South America with Suriname Inset

Map 2.2. Suriname with District Boundaries

The social, political, cultural and economic history of Suriname has been built upon the forests and mineral deposits in the interior shield and the country's alluvial soils lining the coastal plains and sandy savannah belt. Precambrian rock underlies the interior's rolling hills and lush tropical rain forests crowned by a closed canopy of about forty meters. Further towards the south the topography is characterized by successive mountain ranges of between 500 and 1,200 meters in altitude separated by meandering rivers with large rocks strewn about forming cascading rapids, which make navigation to the interior difficult. The interior shield accounts for over 80 percent of the country's land mass but is home to less than 10% of the country's inhabitants. The interior zone is the home of Maroon and Amerindian kin-ordered societies or 'Forest Peoples' as they will be referred to in this study.

Suriname is a resource rich country endowed with vast forests, agriculturally fertile land, abundant offshore fish stocks and substantial mineral deposits in the shield that have stimulated its development from the colonial period through to today. The main industries include bauxite and gold mining, aluminium smelting, lumbering, food processing, and fishing. Currently, the economy is dominated by the bauxite industry, which accounts for more than 15% of GDP and 70% of export earnings. The mineral riches lured the first Europeans to the area but they were quickly disappointed by the inaccessible terrain of the interior.

In order to understand the contemporary situation of conflict in Suriname, one needs to obtain a clear view of its colonial past that serves as the backbone of both the economy and ethno-political foundations of the country. The British, French and Dutch were the principal colonial powers involved in administering the region. The Europeans encountered indigenous peoples from the Carib and Arawak tribes on the Coastal plains and the Trios and Oayanas tribes of the interior jungle areas. In 1667, the Dutch gained decisive military control of Suriname, adding to its possession a 175 plantations mostly owned by British colonists. The colony was immediately devolved to the Dutch West Indian Company (WIC) that both politically and commercially administered the possession as an enterprise.¹ Subsequently, the plantation economy of the coastal plains was expanded employing Dutch technology in

¹ The WIC administration ended in 1816 when the Governor of Suriname became the official representative of the Dutch Crown ruling the colony by royal decree.

irrigation to control flooding and take full advantage of the fertile alluvial clays of the lowlands. The economic and political capital then became Paramaribo.

Naturally, labour was a scarce ‘commodity’ for planters as was the case in many parts of the Americas. Consequently, the Dutch depended heavily on imported African slave labour. Production consisted of primarily sugar, coffee, cocoa and small amounts of cotton. By the mid-nineteenth century the slave-plantation economy was already in decline when in 1863 slavery was abolished. However, under slavery the African population suffered a tremendous toll while it was subjected to deplorable working conditions, which incited many to flee into the forests. Although 325,000 slaves were transported to Suriname over the colonial period a mere 33,621 slaves gained their freedom in 1863 revealing a situation of severe abuse. Overwork, mistreatment, and disease had resulted in the death of large numbers of African slaves. Nonetheless, the situation did improve for these ex-slaves. Upon leaving the plantations many African-Surinamese headed to the capital of Paramaribo and to other towns to settle and cultivate small plots of land for local markets. This ‘Creole’ population gained better access to education and services and eventually began to take up employment in professional, administrative and commercial sectors.

The renegade and fleeing slaves who sought a way out of bondage prior to the abolition of slavery had a completely different American experience than their Creole brethren.² In the 18th and 19th centuries many Africans escaped the plantations and headed to the interior sanctum of the dense tropical forests to establish small tribal-subsistence communities based on their matrilineal kinship cultures of native Africa. Despite European attempts to impede the flight of slaves, such as strict penalties for desertion and military incursions on them, Maroon settlements were able to survive and often even retaliated by raiding coastal settlements to obtain implements and supplies they lacked. In the 1760’s after several armed conflicts between rebel slaves and plantation owners, peace treaties were brokered and the rebel Maroon communities were able to live without fear of reprisals in the

² On a semantical note, the employment of the term “American” in this document refers to the noun for the inhabitants of all the nations of the Americas. In addition, English spelling throughout the thesis is in conformance with the *Gage Canadian Dictionary*, (1983) Toronto: Gage Publishing Ltd.

interior. In the 18th and 19th centuries the Dutch colonial administration recognised Maroon rights to territorial and political autonomy by two centuries of practice.³ By the end of the nineteenth century six Maroon nations lived in the interior along the side of Amerindians to whom they resembled more than their Creole brethren inhabiting the coast.⁴

After the abolition of slavery, the plantation owners were in dire need of new sources of cheap labour. From the 1870's to the 1930's the Dutch colonial administration decided to import contract or indentured labour. First, Dutch planters transported 34,000 East Indians then another 33,000 Javanese Indonesians (of the former Dutch colony) were imported to work on the plantations. Even a small number of Chinese were brought over on a similar indentured system. Much to the chagrin of the planters, however, after their obligations were paid most of the indentured labourers either returned to their native countries or settled elsewhere in Suriname establishing new ethnic communities in the coastal regions. Consequently, the plantation economy had collapsed by the 1950's and most of the agricultural production now came from small independent farms harvesting local market goods. More recently, mechanisation has reversed this trend and now the size of farms is increasing, producing commodities for distant markets.

The ethnic composition of the country has been marked by the successive waves of slave or indentured labour imported to the country by landed elites. With a total population of 433,998 (est. July 2001), Suriname remains a relatively small but multi-ethnic nation. Surprisingly, the East Indian component known as the Hindustani community represents the largest single share of the ethnic make-up of the country with 37 percent of the total. The rest of the ethnic composition is made up of the Creole community with 31%; Javanese with 15%; Maroon with 10%; Amerindian with 2%; Chinese with 2%; European with 1%; and various other communities rounding out the final 2% of the population.⁵ Although there was a policy

³ Ellen Rose Kambel & Fergus Mackay, (1999), *The Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Maroons in Suriname*, Copenhagen, Denmark: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, p. 16.

⁴ These Maroon nations include the Saramaka and Matawai in the Upper-Suriname and Upper-Saramacca rivers, the Ndjuka and Paramaka along the Marowijne and Tapanahoni river, the Boni on the Lawa River, and the Kwinti along the Coppename River.

⁵ Statistics from the ethnic composition of Suriname emanate from the CIA (2001), *World Fact Book 2001*, US Government web site : <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>, consulted on March 29th 2002.

of assimilation in place in the early part of the twentieth century, these communities have largely developed in many cloistered neighbourhoods of Paramaribo or in isolated rural areas of the coastal plains. The official language of the country is Dutch but English is also widely spoken. Sranang Tong also known as Taki-Taki is the native Surinamese language of Creoles and is considered the *lingua franca* of the young. Hindustani, a dialect of Hindi, and Javanese are also widely spoken in their respective communities.⁶ This diversity has had a considerable impact on the political development of the nation.

2.1.2. Contemporary Political Development of Suriname

Since 1948 when universal suffrage was adopted, voting in national elections has largely followed the ethnic contours of the country as many political parties are founded on ethnic identity affiliation. This has created many problems for consolidating democracy in the country and has led to instability and a lack of government focus when institutionalising reforms. In order to form a government, parties need to create alliances and run in coalitions.⁷ This has led to a great deal of instability as governments under intense public protest are forced to either call early elections or step down because of the lack of parliamentary support (i.e. 1951, 1958, 1969 and 2000). Conversely, the consociational nature of the system has also enabled the country to avoid extensive interethnic polarisation and fragmentation leading to violence.⁸ Occasionally, cooperation between the different ethnic groups called the ‘politics of brotherhood’ (*broederingspolitiek*) or ‘broad basis’ formation, has emerged effecting progressive change. The OAS maintains that when *broederingspolitiek* has prevailed, it has buttressed periods of relative stability in government.⁹

The independence of Suriname came rather late in comparison with other nations in the Americas. A national consciousness slowly emerged in the 1930s after mounting pressure by

⁶ Ibid., the religious breakdown also reflects the colonial heritage: Hindu 27.4%, Protestant 25.2% predominantly Moravian, Roman Catholic 22.8%, Muslim 19.6%, and indigenous beliefs accounting for 5% of the total.

⁷ OAS, (2001), *Peace Democracy in Suriname: Final Report of the Special Mission to Suriname (1992-2000)*, Washington DC: Unit for the Promotion of Democracy of the General Secretariat of the OAS.

⁸ Referring to Coser’s propositions mentioned in section 1.1., the fact that Surinamese communities did not become polarised behind one issue and two clearly defined groups helps the country avoid intense ethnic rift.

⁹ OAS, 2001, op.cit.

local Surinamese, particularly among the Creole and Hindustani communities who began calling for independence. Finally, enough pressure was brought to bear on reluctant domestic groups to accept independence from a willingly acquiescent colonial power in 1975. The future looked bright for the new state of Suriname with Dutch aid pouring in and the bauxite industry fairing well. However, the OAS notes that the new Constitution of the Republic was a flawed document because it contained no provisions regarding local representation, particularly in hinterland areas.¹⁰ In 1980, the first of two coup d'états was perpetrated by dissatisfied military officers who would rule Suriname from 1980 to 1987 and again from 1990 to 1991. This brutal pseudo-socialist military dictatorship was marred by flagrant human rights abuses and economic mismanagement, which led the Dutch to suspend all aid in 1982.

2.1.3. Civil War in the Interior

Civil war erupted in the mid-1980s as a result of the traditional discord between the geo-cultural and ethnic realities of the interior Forest Peoples and the inhabitants and possessors of the coastal and urban power of the country. Up until the mining developments in the bauxite sector of the 1940s, Forest Peoples were mostly left undisturbed by the government and commercial interests from coastal areas. These kin-ordered societies were able to maintain their traditional forms of decision making and small-scale subsistence ways of life effectively maintaining their cultural distinctiveness in relative isolation for over 250 years. Attempts by the central government to integrate these kin-ordered societies into the social and economic fabric of the nation-state did not succeed. Although some Amerindians and Maroons have adopted some western customs, norms, occupations and live in nuclear families in coastal areas, traditional practices persist in the village setting of the interior. Integration of these kin-ordered societies has posed a formidable challenge to the development of the state and society.

The precipitating events of the interior conflict started in 1985 with a series of armed robberies carried out by Maroons under the leadership of Ronnie Brunswijk, ex-body guard of

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 16.

the military dictator, Desi Bourterse. The military government reacted harshly burning down houses in Brunswijk's home village of Mungotapoe. The Surinamese Liberation Army or later known as the Jungle Commando (JC) was formed a year later from Maroons of the Ndjuka culture in Eastern Suriname. At its peak, the JC did not number more than a thousand guerrilla fighters. The 'illegal combatants' as they are labelled by the government of Suriname, began their interior insurgency by attacking military installations, large public infrastructure projects, transportation routes and SURALCO facilities, the state owned aluminium mining and production company. It is reported that the Netherlands, the United States and France supported the rebel insurrection to help oust the military dictatorship from power in the 1980s, one of the main objectives of the JC.

The first major act of resistance was the raid on the military post at Albina in July 1986 when the JC took 12 soldiers hostage, triggering a cycle of attacks and counterattacks by the belligerents. The military launched many counter offensives, often indiscriminately targeting non-combatants, which initiated a period of systemic human rights violations. For instance, one event that attracted world wide attention was the military operation at the village of Moiwana where some 50 Maroons were massacred including, infants, children, women and the elderly.¹¹ In the six years of conflict many villages were ruined and numerous infrastructure facilities, including schools, hospitals, bridges, and power lines were destroyed. One of the results of violent collective reprisals and human rights violations committed by both sides was a massive refugee problem. Approximately 10,000 Maroons and Amerindians fled Eastern Suriname for French Guyana. By 1987, the Jungle Commando had control of nearly one third of the country and threatened the outskirts of Paramaribo. It is alleged that the military armed the Tucayana Amazonas Amerindians in order to counter the JC.

A peace agreement was tentatively brokered in 1989 at Kourou a town in French Guyana, after a return to a civilian government in 1988 prompted hope for a lasting cessation of hostilities between the illegally armed combatants and the military. High on the list of

¹¹ This is currently the subject of an Inter-American Commission on Human Rights investigation initiated by the relatives of this massacre and represented by Moiwana '86, the NGO promoting human rights in Suriname and established after the event in question.

demands of Forest Peoples were development issues, land rights and the status of traditional kin centred authority. However, the peace did not last because the government was unable to convince the military to agree to the terms of the Kourou Peace Accord illustrating the relative autonomy of the military from civilian control. Other Maroon groups from the Angula, Saramaka and Mendela communities joined the fray after the Kourou peace talks failed in 1990. The military once again took over in a non-violent coup in December of 1990. This time however, elections were called within six months.

Faced with many problems, the New Front coalition Government under President Runald R. Venetiaan finally succeeded in 1991, albeit tenuously, in supplanting Commander and Ex-military chief, Desi Bouterse, from the highest ranking post in the Army. Since 1991, the military has slowly relinquished its powerful position in the state and the civilian government has gradually been able to subdue the military. In 1992, at the village of Lelydorp, a peace accord was struck between the Government, the Military, the Jungle Commando, the Amerindian Tucajana Amazones and three smaller Maroon groups. The Agreement for National Reconciliation and Development (ANRD) included a 14 article plan to disengage, disarm and develop the interior areas to create the conditions for a lasting peace.¹²

2.2. The Conflict of Nieuw Koffiekamp

2.2.1. Conflict Context

The following is primarily a descriptive analysis framing the events of the conflict within its larger context while equally describing the events, issues and actors involved in our study. The Interior war between the military government and Maroons and the subsequent Peace Accord constitute a general background for the conflict that emerged between foreign investors and the village of Nieuw Koffiekamp in 1994. With the military problem subsiding in Suriname, government attention could now concentrate on the economy which needed serious reform to recover from years of civil strife and military control. In 1993, the Venetiaan government implemented a neoliberal structural adjustment programme (SAP) in an effort to

¹² The ANRD will be further examined as it is a critical document according certain rights to Amerindian and Maroon peoples having a direct impact on the conflict under study in Nieuw Koffiekamp.

bring the economy under control. A single official floating rate replaced the numerous fixed exchange rates, foreign exchange rules were liberalised, monetary financing of the government budget was halted. In addition, the government consolidated its debt with the Central Bank and a repayment schedule was agreed to, subsidies were eliminated and tax collection was improved. The neoliberal SAP hit the country hard with volatile currency exchange rate fluctuations and severe inflation, particularly acute in the last two years.¹³ However, the most detrimental pressure exerted by the neoliberal reforms on the interior is the accelerated intensity of mining and forestry development. Taking advantage of peace in the interior, the Government rushed in courting foreign investors to develop the hinterland of the country, wishing to exploit its rich natural resources. Scholars of Suriname Ellen Rose Kambel and Fergus Mackay maintain that up until recently, logging was limited to the so called forestry belt that runs in a 40 kilometre wide strip from east to west along the coastal area.¹⁴

The primary foreign developers of the liberalised Surinamese economy were Asian logging companies and Canadian gold mining firms. By 1993, between 3 to 5 million hectares, almost two fifths of the country's land mass was conceded to Malaysian and Indonesian logging companies, while by 1999 exploratory concessions for transnational mining firms covered over 30% of Suriname's land mass. The situation became so alarming that diplomatic missions from the European Union, the IDB and elsewhere shuttled in and out of the country offering aid and incentives to the government in exchange for assurances that it would cease the wide scale distribution of concessions leading to the destruction of the environment.¹⁵

In the mining sector, the government significantly augmented the number of permits issued to small-scale prospectors. It is believed that up to 40,000 small-scale US\$200 mining permits were issued by the government to Brazilian miners (called 'galimpieros') between 1997 and 1999. In addition to the thousands of foreigners, another 10,000 Surinamese, many

¹³ The OAS Final Report, 2001, op.cit., indicates that in 1994 one US dollar earned 85 Surinamese Guilders while in June of 2000 the US dollar fetched over 2000 SG. In 1999, public response to the declining value of the guilder, increased impoverishment and prolonged economic pain led directly to social and economic instability. Weeks of street protest in 1999 convinced the Wijdenbosch government to call early elections in 2000.

¹⁴ Kambel & Mackay, 1999, op.cit., pp. 14.

¹⁵ Ibid., In addition, Golden Star Resources Ltd. (GSR) acquired the greatest share of gold mining concessions in Suriname during the 1990s.

of them Maroons, took up active small-scale mining in the interior indicating a robust and diffuse industry. However, the massive influx of miners and this type of small-scale mining has been detrimental to the environment and to the people who depend upon it. Shootings have been reported between Brazilians and Maroons, people have been killed and farming areas have been destroyed. An estimated 20 tonnes of mercury, employed in the processing of ore for gold extraction from small-scale operations, have been released into the environment.¹⁶ Many water ways have been contaminated resulting in diseased fish and the need to import clean drinking water where once water could be drunk from local streams.

The accelerated economic development plan has not been managed in an appropriate manner, leaving the interior in a condition of general lawlessness, which creates severe social and environmental problems for traditional residents of the forests. In most cases, Forest Peoples affected by these changes are not consulted prior to the granting of concessions to land on which they live or depend upon for their daily sustenance. Foreign capital is actively courted to exploit the natural riches of the country, yet the state has not ensured the integral cultural survival of its interior peoples. This situation of macro-economic instability and the rapid transformation of the economy, particularly in the interior, has sharpened cleavages between the poor and the rich segments of the population.

The likely outcome of such unbridled development compounded by the lack of democratic representation of Forest Peoples is another genre of interior conflict typified by what occurred at the village of Nieuw Koffiekamp. In 1992, the State owned mining company, Grassalco, handed over the 17,000 hectare Gros Rosebel concession to Golden Star Resources Ltd. (GSR) a North American gold mining firm registered out of Vancouver, British Columbia, and headquartered in Denver, Colorado. After some debate emerged regarding the question of land rights accorded to Maroons living within the limits of the concession under the ANRD, the Venetiaan Government and the National Assembly overwhelmingly approved the transfer of exploration rights to GSR on March 1, 1994. The village of NK and what is left of the village of Gros, are located in the middle of the Gros Rosebel concession.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 15.

- Map 2.3. Northern Portion of the District of Brokopondo with Gros Rosebel Concession Inset
- Map 2.4. Location of the Village of Nieuw Koffiekamp in the Gros Rosebel Concession

2.2.2. Conflict Dynamics: Violence in Nieuw Koffiekamp

2.2.2.1. Precipitating Events

A few weeks after state sanction of the Gros Rosebel Concession, the media began reporting on problems in the area. Surpress, a local wire service, reported that GSR was plagued by illegal mining activities within the concession of some 500 small-scale miners.¹⁷ GSR erected gates and fencing to restrict access to mining sites on its concession and employed a private security force to protect its interests. In addition, the Government established a police post in Brownsweg, the nearest major town. Over the next few months more miners poured into the area and clashes between the police and small-scale miners occurred frequently. One small-scale miner had even lost his life when a mining shaft collapsed due to vibrations from an adjacent GSR drilling machine. A delegation from the National Assembly visited the Gros Rosebel concession in November of 1994 and attempted to convince small-scale miners to leave the area. Unfortunately, this conflict resolving attempt did not succeed and by the end of December GSR had issued a ten-day ultimatum to the Government threatening to stop the project if progress was not made in settling the issue of conflicting mining claims. The Minister responsible for Justice and the Police, Mr. Girjasing reacted promptly the following day telling the National Assembly that if necessary, the government 'would shoot miners from the air if they did not comply with Government demands.'¹⁸

Early on the Minister of Justice acknowledged that some of the small scale miners, particularly the residents of local communities such as NK, had a legitimate claim to mining in the area. However, despite government involvement, non-compliance and general lawlessness prevailed. An armed robbery occurred against a GSR surveyor camp, and consequently the company began stepping up its security measures in early 1995. The government attempted to establish another zone for the hundreds of small-scale Maroon miners to be located outside the

¹⁷ OAS, (1997), *Natural Resources, Foreign Concessions and Land Rights: A Report on the Village of Nieuw Koffiekamp, Special Mission to Suriname*, Washington DC: Unit for the Promotion of Democracy of the General Secretariat of the OAS, pp. 62. The OAS report on the conflict provides a great deal of detail as to the specifics of the NK case and is the principle source employed in this analysis of the specific circumstances

¹⁸ OAS, 1997, *op.cit.*, pp. 63.

GSR concession but this did not work as access to the alternative area was difficult and a promised road was never constructed. A five week Maroon blockade was erected in the summer of 1995 preventing GSR from trucking in supplies to the concession and more armed guards were hired by the Canadian company. Confrontations ensued between the security forces and the small-scale miners who had taken up encampments on the concession.

2.2.2.2. Issue Emergence and Proliferation

Initially, GSR tolerated small-scale mining activities by the villagers but as time went on over a thousand small-scale miners entered the concession. Tensions appeared as soon as the Company began to ask the small-scale miners to vacate the concession. It is quite clear that small-scale mining interferes with large scale operations and vice versa and both cannot operate simultaneously. The small-scale miners took advantage of company trenches and exploration underway by mining in the open mineral veins consequently affecting accurate sampling. By September of 1994 there were several hundred miners still in the concession and GSR erected barriers and gates in order to keep the small-scale miners from reaching two mining sites with their vehicles.

A pattern of escalation and relative calm characterized the conflict from 1994 to 1995 until finally the government called in Gaaman Songo Aboikoni of the Saramaka to mediate. The Gaaman, a traditional regional leader of the Saramaka group of Maroons, installed a Commission for Nieuw Koffiekamp consisting of District Commissioners R. Libretto, I. Waldend, District Secretary F. Lehman, Mr. W. Vreedzaam, and three representatives of the village. Although most of the hundreds of small-scale miners eventually evacuated the concession, the NK villagers continued to occupy an area known as Royal Hill on the concession.

GSR management insisted on the implementation of provisions of the Mineral Agreement that included the expulsion of small-scale miners from their concession in addition to prohibiting trespassing. This policy leaves no room for the villagers of NK to conduct their traditional farming and mining activities in the areas adjacent to their community. Soon it

became clear that the protagonists in this conflict were the villagers and miners of NK and the representatives of the mine. NK and GSR representatives met over this period of time to negotiate a settlement with the assistance of the Gaaman but no written record was kept and the parties were not able to come to an agreement. As talks progressed it became apparent to the delegations representing NK and the company that any agreement would require the recognition of rights granted to the village under the terms of the ANRD leading to some sort of systemic arrangement to prevent large and small-scale activities from disrupting each other. However, over the year the positions of the parties became entrenched leading to further conflict in other areas.

2.2.2.3. Polarization and Recent Developments

Initially, tensions increased as soon as the company began exploration activities in the Gros Rosebel concession when it became apparent that it enjoyed more legal right to the concession than other small-scale miners active in the region. Shots were often fired by the police and security forces involved in preventing the encampment of small-scale miners on the concession. The company became more aggressive in its attempt to remove the trespassers after one of its survey teams was robbed by armed individuals. The World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP) and Moiwana 86, a local NGO helping the Maroons at Gros Rosebel, reported that members of both the police and GSR's private security force have been implicated;

in threatening, harassing and intimidating members of the community...On a number of occasions [police and security forces] shot live ammunition at or over the heads of Nieuw Koffiekampers...Many of those who have been shot at were doing nothing more than tending their agricultural plots and gathering food in the forest.¹⁹

Reports of violence were numerous in this period fuelling animosity amongst the villagers of NK against international finance. For instance, on August 28, 1996, Moiwana 86 reported that security personnel for GSR had been implicated in a incident near the village of

¹⁹ Project Underground, (1996), *Golden Star/Cambior in Suriname, Drillbits & Tailings: September 16, 1996*, pp.5, NGO web site: <http://www.moles.org/ProjectUnderground/drillbits/0915/96091505.html>, last consulted 3/04/2002.

NK in which four women and one man were injured as a result of running away from shooting.²⁰ Tensions between the Maroons of NK and GSR increased as it became apparent that the Company would attempt to convince and or eventually force the removal of the village to another site so that an active open pit mine could be constructed 500 metres away from the current location of NK.

In April 1997, GSR President and CEO, David A. Fennel, sent a letter to the Koffiekamp Kollektief (the village council) formally notifying the community of NK why it would be necessary to relocate the village. The letter states that the activities of the village would not be congruent with the operation of an adjacent large scale mine. There is a great deal of danger near a mine and the villagers would not be able to go about doing their regular business in the area. In addition, the company arranged two visits for 12 local inhabitants of NK to see what life is like on the grounds of a full scale mining operation at the Omai Mine in Guyana.²¹ Nonetheless, according to the Forest Peoples Programme, an international NGO working to protect aboriginal land rights, at least 80% of the NK community is opposed to relocation and fearful of the consequences.²²

In a subsequent NGO workshop in April of 2000, bringing together various peoples directly affected by Canadian Mining interests from around the world, Dennie Frits Pryor, resident of Nieuw Koffiekamp, describes how traditional activities of villagers had been stifled by GSR's attempts to protect its mining interests in the concession from 1994-1999 as he states:

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ World Rainforest Movement, Forest Peoples Programme, (1997), *Indigenous Community in Suriname Resists Mining: Golden Star Resources, Cambior and Nieuw Koffiekamp: Tribal Rights and Mining in Suriname*, June 10, NGO web site: <http://forestpeoples.gn.apc.org>, last consulted April 9, 2002. The April 29th letter from GSR CEO D. Fennel and the NK letter of reply were put up on the Internet by this NGO.

²² The people of NK are aware of Cambior and GSR's infamous Omai gold mine spill, one of South America's worst mining disasters, when a tailings dam ruptured pouring 3-4 million cubic litres of cyanide and heavy metal-laced waste into the Omai and Essequibo Rivers. The spill killed all aquatic life in the Omai river and severely disrupted the lives of Amerindians living along the Essequibo river. Cambior contested a C\$600 million lawsuit filed in Quebec and Guyana by persons damaged by the OMAI mine disaster. However, the Company has settled damages with the majority of the persons affected already. Cambior News Release, February 22, 2002, issued on the Cambior Internet site : http://www.cambior.com/communiqu/fr_press_english.htm, A Guyanese Supreme Court Judge threw out of court the class-action suit for the plaintiffs' repeated inability to file an affidavit.

People have not been able to negotiate the right to do small-scale mining. The companies' activities are moving ever closer to the village and are now up to the mountain where the village cemetery is located. The people can't go where they need to, to hunt and fish. They are being shot at when they go in to areas that are off bounds. The people have also been told that they will be relocated again in a few years to make place for the mine.²³

In the summer of 2000, the Government had still not issued the final license to exploit the deposit to the companies and it remains unclear whether this authorization has been granted. Negotiations between the community and the government continue off and on without the direct involvement of the company. The police and security forces continue to try and clear the NK miners from the concession. The last reports from December of 2001 suggest that there are still Maroons mining on the concession and this continues to cause problems for all the parties involved.²⁴ In the summer of 2002, the conflict remained in limbo because the protagonists had not settled their differences and the Maroons of the interior had not been assured of their rights on their native land.

2.2.3. Conflict Parties

2.2.3.1. Primary Actors

We have distinguished three levels of principal parties in this conflict. However, other individuals and NGOs have interests in the Gros Rosebel conflict and the following descriptive list of parties should not be viewed as exhaustive. Nonetheless, the actors listed below are the groups that have had the most important bearing on the outcome of this protracted conflict: the foreign company Golden Star Resources Ltd now owned by Cambior Inc., the village and miners of Nieuw Koffiekamp and the Government.

The first primary actor, GSR, is originally a Canadian Mining Transnational now headquartered in Littleton, Co., USA. GSR is a gold and diamond exploration and development company which holds significant gold and diamond exploration interests in other

²³ MiningWatch Canada, (2000), *On the Ground Research: A Workshop to Identify the Research Needs Affected by Large-Scale Mining, April 14-16, 2000, Ottawa, Canada: Workshop Report*, Ottawa, pp. 2.

²⁴ De Ware Tijd, (2001), "Nieuw Koffiekamp Ready for New Negotiations", in the Internet News Source English Bulletin, from the 25th of September, <http://www.dwt.net/englishnews/archive/Archive%202001/September/English250901/E3.htm>, last consulted 10/07/2002.

locations in the Guiana shield and in West Africa. GSR is considered what is known as a ‘junior’ mining company because it is primarily involved in ‘discovering’ minerals and metals world-wide and in obtaining access to such finds. Juniors tend to depend heavily on venture capital raised on the stock exchange and are often backed by larger, more established mineral producing firms.²⁵ GSR is listed on the Toronto (TSE) and American Stock Exchanges (AMEX). GSR’s majority partner in the infamous Omai mine in Guyana, Cambior Inc. of Montreal, exercised its option to acquire 50% of GSR’s Gros Rosebel concession in early 1997. On November 1, 2001, Cambior announced that it would buy out the rest of GSR’s shares in the Gros Rosebel concession for US\$5 million on closing with an additional US\$1 million to be paid over three years.

Former state owned enterprise from Montreal, Cambior Inc. is a gold and niobium producer with operations, development projects and exploration activities in Suriname, Guyana, Quebec, the United States, Peru, and Mexico. Cambior also trades on the TSE and the AMEX. It has picked up the role of major miner in that it will eventually bring the possession at Gros Rosebel into production if there are positive developments on the NK front and in the price of gold. It also prides itself for submitting its Environmental Management System (EMS) to ISO 14001 certification, known as the “green standard”. In December 2001, Cambior announced that it was: engaged in discussions with the Government of Suriname to confirm availability of electric power and costs; reviewing Grassalco’s participation in the Gros Rosebel project; and would establish a Surinamese operating company for the concession. Once these matters are resolved, Cambior can pursue its primary goal, which is to complete a final feasibility study by mid-2002 and to prepare a low-operating cost project for construction by the end of 2002.²⁶

Our second protagonist in the conflict is the community of NK, which has an unusual village history.²⁷ The residents of NK belong to the Ndjuka tribe of Maroons but their original village of Koffiekamp formed an enclave in the Saramaka territory near the mouth of the Sara

²⁵ For a more detailed discussion about junior and major mining firms refer to FPP, 2000, op.cit.

²⁶ Cambior Inc. (2001), Press Release, Longueuil December 5,

http://www.cambior.com/archives/communiqués/2001/anglais/index/fr_press_2001.htm, last consulted 15/5/02.

²⁷ An in-depth description of NK/Maroon culture is warranted at this point. See OAS, 1997, op.cit., NK Report.

creek, a tributary of the Suriname river. In 1963 the Afobaka hydroelectric Dam project forced the displacement of 6000 Forest Peoples from Central Suriname as Lake Brokopondo was created to supply the Suralco bauxite mines and aluminium production facilities with power. The people of Koffiekamp moved their village to kilometre 106 on the old rail line connecting Paramaribo to the Sara creek gold fields.²⁸ This settlement was given the name Nieuw Koffiekamp and was on the Mamanarie stream a tributary to the Saramacca River. Like their fellow Maroon settlements, NK developed a distinct and autonomous socio-cultural and kin-based society. Kinship and descent ties are fundamental in establishing working relations especially in the gold mining sector. Political office in these societies is tied to matrilineal decent lines. Each nation has a paramount chief called a *gaaman* and regional chiefs called *ede Kabitens*, working together with village and assistant village chiefs called a *kabiten* and *basya* respectively consisting of Maroon leaders.

Decision making procedures follow the societal levels described above with the family elder holding the ultimate word at the family unit level. Village meetings with elders and the chiefs are held to discuss matters which concern the entire community. Gaan kuutus are convened between all elders, village, regional, and nation chiefs when regional or societal issues need to be addressed. Such matters would include external relations, inter-village disputes and other issues affecting the entire interior population. Ownership of property, land, and resources is collective while personal items may be individually owned. Moral and ethical responsibilities are primarily collective. Most social obligations to family are through the matrilineal side such as preparations for funerals and aid to other family members etc. For instance, if they can afford it, Maroon men working in the city will be called upon to take in their sisters' children when they reach puberty to gain an education outside the village. In 1851, the original villagers of Koffiekamp were baptised and today most inhabitants of NK maintain allegiance to the Moravian (Protestant) faith.

The village economy is only partially integrated in the money economy and partly provides for its sustenance through collective participation in traditional shifting cultivation,

fishing and hunting or gathering and small-scale mining. The village is dependent upon imported manufactured goods of all kinds. In order to pay for commercial goods and food-stuffs villagers sell surplus agricultural products such as watermelon, bananas, corn, ginger and tubers, while rice, sweet and bitter manioc and vegetables are produced for domestic consumption only. Village agricultural land plots are dispersed throughout the Gros Rosebel mining concession but within walking distance from the village. Harvested timber constitutes an important source of building material for boats and rafts employed for transportation and is also sold to local sawmills for cash. However, gold mining is by far the single most important economic activity offering a cash income to the village. NK villagers have been involved in small-scale mining on Royal Hill and other deposits within the concession for many years.²⁹

The Maroons involved in the cultivation of goods for sustenance and for market can be regarded as peasants. In his influential book entitled, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century*, Eric Wolf categorises peasants as a population that is by definition existentially involved in cultivation and states some characteristics of this group living off the land which sheds some light on the condition of the Maroons.³⁰ Wolf views peasants as tenants and sharecroppers or owner-operators of communal or small private lands cultivated with the help of others from the community. One is considered a peasant as long as one makes day to day operational decisions. These peasants are not wholly dependent on the market as a good portion of produce is consumed within the village assuring subsistence. In the case of Maroons from NK, a good portion of the residents are dependent on these small plots of land and small-scale mining in the areas adjacent to their village.

The third principal actor in this conflict is the government, which is involved as it accorded two sets of similar rights to different groups that have come into conflict with the other. In the preceding contextual sections of this thesis we provided a great deal of information on the nature of the government in Suriname and the general factors leading to the

²⁸ Documentary film producer Runningman offers an inside look at the impact of mining on Amerindian and Maroon communities in Suriname. He spent a day in the village of NK talking with residents, Runningman journal entry #67, <http://www.runningmanonline.com/reports/journal.asp?lognumber=67>, consulted 03/04/2002.

²⁹ OAS, 1997, op.cit., pp. 47, this includes royalties NK receives from small-scale miners and wages earned or spent in the village.

³⁰ Eric Wolf, (1971), *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century*, London: Faber and Faber.

conflict. Not only does the government have the moral obligation to resolve a dispute it is ultimately responsible for, but it also has a legal obligation to the foreign mining company and a pseudo legal or political obligation to the Maroon community of Nieuw Koffiekamp. In the former case the Mineral Agreement constitutes a legally binding contract and in the latter case, the Government has the pseudo-legal obligation to honour the terms of the Peace Accord (ANRD) signed by itself and by representatives of the Maroons from the Jungle Commando.³¹ These stakes in the conflict render the government a primary actor.

2.2.3.2. Secondary Actors

Secondary actors are distinguished because they have an indirect stake in the outcome of the dispute but do not feel themselves to be directly involved. Grassalco, the state-owned mining company, which had originally ceded the concession to GSR, will be simply considered a secondary actor. Although Grassalco was involved in the negotiations with the villagers of NK and it will benefit from royalties once the mine is in operation, it is largely represented by the government and the foreign mining company. The other small-scale miners who were involved in this conflict in the early days will be considered secondary parties. These miners are in an ambiguous legal position because they are not considered local residents or natives to the region and therefore lose all claims to mine in the concession. For the most part, these Maroon or Brazilian Galimpieros do not have government permits to mine there and continue to be a 'nuisance' to the foreign mining companies notwithstanding their general withdrawal from the concession.

Other actors identified by the Forest Peoples Programme (FPP an international NGO), is a paid consultant of GSR who has been accused of trying to bribe members of the NK village council and former military dictator Desi Bouterse who became involved as a government representative in the affair.³² Bouterse was the leader of the ruling National Democratic Party in 1999 and he and his bodyguard are alleged to have publicly threatened to

³¹ Further legal involvement of the government will be analysed in the conflict issues section.

³² Forest Peoples Programme, (2000), *Undermining the Forests: The Need to Control Transnational Mining Companies-A Canadian Case Study*, in Collaboration with the NGO's Philippine Indigenous Peoples Links & World Rainforest Movement Moreton-in-Marsh, UK, pp. 50-51.

kill community representatives if they did not accept the eventual relocation of the village. His involvement in the conflict is troubling considering the track record of his military dictatorship and treatment of Maroons in the 1980's. Both these two actors have tried to become intermediaries in the conflict, yet there appeared to be little or no progress and they may well be aggravating the situation rather than resolving it.

2.2.3.3. Interested Third Parties

There are several international and national NGOs involved in the NK conflict including ones we have already cited; Moiwana 86 of Suriname and the Forest Peoples Programme of the World Rainforest Movement both of whom intervened to provide assistance to the residents of NK. The permanent resident of the Guyanese region for the FFP also offered his services to the company and the community to help arrive at a resolution in the late 1990s. At the national level several local actors have attempted to intervene in the conflict. The Ganaan Songo Aboikoni, the regional Saramaka tribal leader, should be considered a domestic third party as well.

However, the role of the OAS is of primary interest to this study. As the regional IGO for the Americas, the OAS established a special mission to Suriname in 1992.³³ As is the case with OAS interventions, the government of Suriname officially invited the OAS to assist the country in negotiating and constructing a lasting peace after 6 years of an 'interior war' and many years of military rule. Its official mandate is: to assist the government in formalising and safeguarding a durable peace, and in strengthening national institutions and the democratic order. In real terms the OAS Special Mission to Suriname lasting from 1992-2000, assisted the government in finally arriving at a peace agreement with the illegally armed groups of the interior and the military by helping to draw up the terms of the Agreement of National Reconciliation and Development (ANRD).

³³ The Organization of American States (OAS) is one of the world's oldest regional organizations dating back to the first International Conference of American States, held in Washington, D.C, from October 1889 to April 1890. The charter of the OAS was signed in 1948 in Bogotá and amended thereafter several times to further its cause to strengthen the peace and security of the continent. In addition to this mandate the OAS seeks to promote and consolidate representative democracy, with due respect for the principle of non-intervention. For this reason the OAS normally only sends missions to member countries if it is invited officially by the host government. The OAS is made up of 35 member states (minus one as Cuba has been under suspension from the OAS since 1961).

2.2.4. Conflict Issues:

2.2.4.1. Legal and Facts Based Issues

At the first level of analysis, the crux of the issue leading to this conflict revolves around the same economic and territorial rights awarded to two different parties by the Government of Suriname in a period of two years. In 1992, the Government of Suriname signed a peace agreement with the Forest Peoples of the Interior granting them certain land rights for their daily sustenance and their development as a people. In the same year the government was actively soliciting large-scale foreign investment to exploit the mineral riches of the interior. In doing so it accorded certain exploration and mineral rights to Golden Star Resources Ltd. The private transnational corporation was issued a concession on which a Maroon community lived and worked.

The inhabitants of the village of Nieuw Koffiekamp live in a former conflict zone of the interior war of 1986-1992. They are considered beneficiaries of the ANRD Peace Accord signed on August 8th 1992 between fellow Maroons, Amerindians and the Government. According to the ANRD peace under article 10 (concerning the right to land), 'citizens who live and reside in a tribal setting' are to be accorded certain land rights to their 'residential areas' and that they are to be entitled economic zoning rights in the area including agriculture, fishing, logging and small-scale mining. Article 10 reads:

- 1) The Government shall endeavor that legal mechanisms be created, under which citizens who live and reside in a tribal setting will be able to secure a real title to land in their respective living areas.
- 2) The demarcation and the size of the respective living areas referred to in the first paragraph, shall be determined on the basis of a study carried out with respect thereto by the Council for the Development of the Interior.
- 3) The traditional authorities of citizens living in tribes or a body appointed thereto, will indicate a procedure on the basis of which individual members of a community can be considered for real title to a plot of land in the area referred to in paragraph 2.

- 4) Around the area mentioned in paragraph 2, the government will establish an economic zone where the communities and citizens living in tribes can perform economic activities, including forestry, small-scale mining, hunting and fishing.³⁴

The main point to be identified here is that although the provisions of the Accord concerning land rights are quite vague, they do clearly set out the intention of the Government to demarcate and establish certain rights for Forest Peoples. Without going into exhaustive detail over the semantic debate of the ANRD, one can see that the terms used here are fairly vague and concepts such as ‘living areas’ and, ‘communal and economic zones’, were not well defined. The OAS NK report notes that this article has led to confusion and disputes between the government’s viewpoint and the concepts retained by Forest Peoples.³⁵ For instance, disagreement emerged over which peoples could benefit from such a treaty. The government argued that only persons residing in the village setting could be granted these rights while many of the small-scale miners themselves had moved to the coastal areas or to Paramaribo before returning to mine in the region. Unfortunately, it has been 10 years and the ANRD has not been fully implemented and the critical issue of Forest Peoples land rights has not been protected in Surinamese law. In fact, Fergus Mackay of the FPP insists that Suriname remains the only country in the Western Hemisphere that does not in some way recognise Indigenous and Tribal Rights to lands and resources in its legal system.³⁶

Furthermore, the issue is complicated by other national and international legal documents. In its 1997 Report on the conflict, the OAS mission states the Peace Accord is constrained by the Constitution of Suriname. Article 10 of the Peace Accord violates article 41 of the Constitution because under this Article all mineral rights rest with the State as it states that “natural riches and resources are property of the Nation and shall be used to promote economic, social and cultural development.”³⁷ The OAS confirms that the issue of contradiction between the ANRD Peace and the Constitution was to be settled in the demarcation of economic zones for Maroons. In this case, where mineral deposits are located

³⁴ Section extracted verbatim from the ARND Lelydorp Peace Accord of 1992, which is reproduced in its entirety in the Appendix of the *OAS*, 2001, op.cit.

³⁵ *OAS*, 1997, op.cit., pp. 78-79

³⁶ *Forest Peoples Programme*, 2000, op.cit., pp. 41

³⁷ *OAS*, 1997, op.cit., pp. 75-76.

within these zones, the villagers were to be given ‘priority right’ to conduct small-scale mining and other self sustaining economic activities.

In addition, at the national level the Mining Decree (E-58) dating from May 8th, 1986, spells out the rules for which mining activities can occur in Suriname and to which any concession must conform to. There are separate rules for large-scale and small-scale mining. In the case of the very large Gros Rosebel concession awarded to GSR some of the provisions from the Mining Decree were waived. For instance, the 17,000 hectare acquisition was 7000 hectares more than the allowable limit under the Mining Decree. This explains why GSR signed a special mineral Agreement with the Government superseding the 1986 Mining Decree. Consequently, the National Assembly of Suriname had to pass an ‘enabling act’ authorising the Ministry of Natural Resources to sign the extraordinary GSR-Mineral Agreement.

Under the terms of the Mining Concession Agreement, GSR is to respect all laws of Suriname. One of the major issues of the conflict is the question of the relocation of the village of NK. The community of NK is well aware that relocation must be negotiated with its village council in the Koffiekamp Kollektief. This council and the people of NK have already once formally rejected the offer of the company to relocate binding the company legally in one respect.³⁸ The OAS report notes that Article 6.11 of the Mineral Agreement signed between GSR, the Government and Grassalco uses the words ‘absolutely necessary’ in referring to the condition for which relocation of local populations will be permitted. Article 6.11 reads:

- 1) The Private Parties will not hinder nor disturb the way of life of the autochthonous population living within the concession area present.
- 2) The Republic of Suriname will not promote, encourage nor permit the establishment of new settlements in Gros Rosebel during the period that this agreement is in force.
- 3) The Private Parties will encourage their employees to respect the traditions of the autochthonous population living in the concessions.

³⁸ In a letter dated May 28, 1997, E. Vijgeboom, President of the Koffiekamp Kollektief, rejected the request by GSR President David A. Fennel to relocate their village to make room for a mine. In his rebuttal he argues that the company had not provided enough reason for the relocation of the NK village. The letter was distributed by the World Rainforest Movement’s Forest Peoples Programme in Suriname on the Internet : <http://forestpeoples.gn.apc.org/index.htm>

- 4) In the event the relocation of a village is deemed necessary, the following guidelines will be observed:
- i) The matter will be handled with the greatest possible care.
 - ii) Permission of the Government of the Republic of Suriname is required.
 - iii) Consultations will be held with the traditional authority of the village.
 - iv) Parties to the agreement will initiate an adequate relocation program, taking into consideration the instructions of the responsible Minister.³⁹

In addition to highlighting the Article specifically relating to the local population, we identify another clause mentioned in the OAS report that experts refer to as the “derogation clause” common in this type of contract. Article 15.3.5. of the GSR Mineral Agreement states that the “Government and Grassalco assured GSR that there were no claims or impediments of any type which could derogate the right to exploration, exploitation and development of the area covered by the Mineral Agreement.” This agreement makes no specific mention of the village of NK or the Lelydorp Peace Accord signed just twenty months earlier.⁴⁰ Nonetheless GSR was well aware of the community of NK since company officials and geologists conducted preliminary studies in the area in 1991.

At the heart of the issue are the government’s convenient recognition of Forest Peoples legitimate land rights to the area they inhabit in the ANRD and its ignorance of such rights when it is expedient. However, the government is bound by certain international laws and conventions, which recognise specific Indigenous rights. The OAS study on the situation of NK provides a detailed examination of the various legal mechanisms employed within the Inter-American legal system, the UN legal system and in International Labour Organization (ILO) convention.⁴¹ These international legal regimes require full adherence by Suriname as signatory to these treaties and charters.

³⁹ OAS, 1997, *op.cit.*, pp. 85.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, It is interesting to note that one of the members of the commission of the National Assembly which prepared the enabling act was also a member of the Peace commission that prepared the ARND.

⁴¹ The UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the two subsequent International Covenants on Political and Civil Rights (1966) and Cultural, Social, and Economic Rights (1966), accord certain rights to local populations as well as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and the Inter-American Declaration of Human Rights. Several decisions and reports by the IACHR and the UN draft declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples reiterate aboriginal right to life and affirm that indigenous peoples have the collective and individual right not to be subjected to ethnocide and cultural genocide, including prevention of and redress for: (a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities; (b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources...., OAS, 1997, *op.cit.*, pp. 90-91. Other international legal documents mentioned in

In addition, OAS and UN draft declarations on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples exist which go even further than the ILO Convention Number 169 concerning Indigenous Peoples in Independent Countries. This ILO convention from 1989 was deemed the most important legal instrument calling for the protection of special rights to indigenous peoples.⁴² If one were to combine all the elements of these legal instruments we would find a great number of standards could be applied to the case of NK. These norms require: the right to life and that of cultural integrity, subsistence practices, and the relationship to the land of indigenous peoples be protected; that some form of land and resource rights be recognised including the protection of traditional resource use; that forcible relocation be prohibited; that free and informed consent be accorded in such cases; that indigenous institutions be respected and; that mechanism be established by which indigenous peoples are able to effectively participate in decisions that directly relate to land and resource management in their traditional territories.⁴³

2.2.4.2. Interests Based Issues

The single most important interests based issue is the economic interests in the conflict over land and resources use in the Gros Rosebel Concessions. On the one side, GSR is attempting to remove inhabitants and miners from its concession for the purpose of mineral exploitation. The OAS report states that GSR had already invested over ten million US dollars in exploration activities in the Gros Rosebel area. The interests of the other main protagonist are a little more complicated in that they refer to their inherent needs and values as well. The Maroons of NK have been mining there for many years. The OAS report on NK claims that gold mining has always been an integral part of the Maroon economic tradition.⁴⁴ Gold mining was employed to pay off large debts or to purchase manufactured items. It is clear that the

the study are The OAS Charter of 1948, the American Convention of Human Rights and its protocols in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador, 1988), the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (1966), the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), and finally the environmental conventions including the International Convention on Biodiversity (1992), the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992), and the Statement of Principles on Forest Management (1992).

⁴² Specific reference was made to the ILO convention 169 in Article 11 of the 1992 Peace Accord and was the first legal instrument in international convention to institutionalise indigenous rights.

⁴³ The basis of this summary was taken from the OAS 1997, op.cit., pp. 99.

interests of the villagers of NK are best served if they gain bargaining leverage in the dispute. Martin Misiedjan, a representative of the village of NK describes the plight of poorly advised and educated Maroons who know little about large scale mining stating that “the people see their only choice as one of negotiating the best deal possible.”⁴⁵ The interest of the villagers is indeed economic as well.

The interests of the government are equally important. The government is responsible for according rights to both conflicting parties. It wishes for peace but it gains more financial rewards from large-scale exploitation of its natural resources by foreign firms than by the small-scale exploitation of Maroons. It should gain a percentage of the profits once the mine is in operation but at the time of the OAS report on NK, the government of Suriname had not been compensated from any of its mining concessions throughout the country. Therefore, the sooner the mine is in production the better, from the Government’s perspective.

2.2.4.3. Needs Based Issues

It is difficult to discern needs when referring to a Canadian mining firm. GSR had economic interests as opposed to needs that are compromised by the conflict with the villagers of NK. If the market conditions are suitable, GSR can mine just about anywhere it finds a deposit and acquires title. The government does not have needs defined in the traditional sense. Remember that needs refer to a necessary condition or objective requirement and as something that has to be satisfied at least to some extent, in order for the need subject to function as a human being. In this case, the need to physical sustenance is clearly a need for the community of NK being compromised by the mining development of a foreign company. The villagers of NK need to have access to their plots of agricultural land and to small-scale mining sites, which have provided them with much needed hard currency and agricultural subsistence. If not, they need to find another manner in which to satisfy the need to earn a living in their area. However, this is extremely difficult when there are no other readily available options.

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 34.

Secondly, the villagers of NK have the need for security. Large-scale development leads to the deterioration of their way of life and threatens the mere existence of the community. Clearly, relocation of the community against the will of villagers would be a severe infraction of the need for security. In addition, the need for identity and for recognition are painfully evident in this case. Maroons in general need to be recognised under the laws of Suriname. Concomitantly, the ability to have an effective voice in how their lives are affected or acquiring political agency are certainly primordial concerns for Maroons. The fact that the community was not even consulted is a stark denial of such a need and an indication of the Government's flagrant disregard in this particular case of its Forest Peoples.

When a concession of land, upon which Maroons are dependent, is ceded to a foreign entity without prior consent or even consultation, it incurs a profound effect on the way Maroons can live and decide how they can live. This is thus a candid neglect of aboriginal recognition and political agency. The need of addressing the issue of control over the political processes that affects security, identity and recognition described in the first chapter has most certainly been abrogated. This will undoubtedly propagate a sense of injustice felt by Maroons in the interior. The socialisation and politicisation of this sentiment has manifested itself in the community's organization of dissent. The roadblock in the spring of 1995 and continuous expressions of disapproval evoked by the actions of the government and the company including the refusal to relocate are prime examples of this dissension. The need for territorial integrity and political recognition or empowerment strike at the heart of this issue.

2.2.4.4. Values Based Issues

The NK conflict is founded upon issues that are far more fundamental involving; beliefs, values and the traditional relations between Maroons and the environment. Traditional land tenure and production have a direct effect on family life in the village setting. Notwithstanding that it has been a dynamic relationship. For some time, village leaders across Suriname have granted small-scale mining concession to miners from Brazil and other areas of

⁴⁵ MiningWatch Canada, 2000, op.cit. pp. 2.

Suriname. They are given approximately 10% of the production for allowing small-scale miners access to lands near their domains. Equally, a good portion of the community relies on small-scale mining as a way of life not only for labourers but for village merchants who provide miners with some services and implements. The social and ecological consequences of such small scale mining near villages, has been noted in the OAS NK report.⁴⁶ Nonetheless, for many years this activity has been able to survive along side and within the community, which is also intimately tied to subsistence-shifting cultivation of agricultural necessities.

The OAS Report clearly identifies the most fundamental rift in the conflict as one of contrasting ideologies rooted in how the two worlds, Maroon and corporate culture survive and expand. The entire gambit of Maroon society including its social, political, and economic systems is linked to clan ownership of territory. Any threat to that traditional tribal territory threatens the every existence of the community. Allowing large-scale mining activities in their traditional domains means that local Maroons will likely get involved in the operation effectively turning them into wage labourers, or big mining will force the community to relocate entirely. Introducing new forms of industrial scale production implies a corresponding new relationship with the natural environment that will undoubtedly have an effect on who makes decisions in the village, who has the power and how wealth is distributed. If a mine were to be established it would represent 8-12 years of automated large-scale production while the same mineral deposits in the concession for many small-scale miners represents a life time of employment.

From the perspective of the mining company, having full title and unlimited access to the concession is a primordial condition for establishing a mine. These differing world views need to be reconciled either by complete isolation or through some form of assimilation and compromise. The essential question that remains is, who will make the decisions about how that assimilation will take place if it does at all. Under the current decision making structure, Forest Peoples are excluded.

⁴⁶ While small-scale mining does have detrimental effects on the environment as cyanide and mercury leaching occurs among other effects, to date this has not forced communities to relocate.

2.3. The OAS Conflict Resolution Intervention and the Commission for NK

As mentioned in the methodology section, the Organization of American States is a third party intervener in the conflict of Nieuw Koffiekamp. The OAS Special Mission had been originally sent to Suriname following a return to democracy after nearly a decade of military rule and 6 years of an interior conflict with ‘illegally armed’ Maroons and Amerindians. The Mission mandate was to assist the government in formalising and safeguarding a durable peace and in strengthening national institutions and the democratic order. It was directly involved in the negotiations of the Lelydorp Accords of July and August 1992 that inaugurated the peace. The OAS offered legal assistance to amnesty efforts and assisted the transition to democracy with technical electoral assistance and monitoring. One of the essential tasks described in the OAS Final Report was the mission’s commitment to assist the government in identifying and creating an awareness of the causes of the problems that led to the interior conflict.⁴⁷ This awareness is an essential first step in the process of conflict prevention and transformation for future generations.

The OAS provided some institutional assistance with the drafting of the 1992 Lelydorp Peace Accord and then played a crucial role in decommissioning the former combatants by demobilising, disarming and disposing of their weapons. Other activities included technical support to national institutions, particularly to the national electoral commission. The OAS Mission also organized electoral observers to monitor several elections throughout the mandate of the Mission that lasted from 1992 to 2000. The resident co-ordinator of the OAS mission also participated on the Evaluation Commission composed of representatives from both sides of the conflict mandated to follow the progress and implementation of the Peace Accord. The Evaluation Commission was to remain in contact with former combatants and the government acting as a crucial information conduit.

This commitment and expertise of the OAS was put to the test in April of 1995, when the minister of Natural Resources, Franco R. Demon, asked the OAS Special Mission to assist

⁴⁷ OAS, 2000, op.cit., pp. ii.

the Government in finding a solution to the problem of Nieuw Koffiekamp. The Government felt that it was not possible to properly assess an appropriate solution to the conflict without having more information on the village itself: the number of inhabitants, their economic activities, the locations where they conduct these activities and other relevant information. Subsequently, a survey team was assembled consisting of representatives from the Ministry of Natural Resources, the Ministry of Regional Development, the OAS Special Mission and a local economic consultant. Several field trips were conducted and information from those visits provide the basis of the OAS report on NK. This comprehensive report is the centre piece of the work conducted by the OAS to assist in the resolution of this protracted conflict.

The already extensively cited OAS report entitled *Natural Resources, Foreign Concessions and Land Rights: A Report on the Village of Nieuw Koffiekamp, Special Mission to Suriname*, published in 1997, was the result of documentary research of the issues in question complimented by many fact finding assignments to the area and participation at the negotiations between the parties. The trips to the village of NK and to the company's operating facilities in the concession cannot be underestimated. Without such primary observation and research, the activities of the Special Mission could not have culminated in such a thoughtful and informative document. The two declared objectives of the OAS-NK report are to present basic information on the problem of NK and to gain experience in conducting a land rights survey.

Chapter 1 of the OAS-NK report covers the technical aspects of both small and large scale mining and their respective impacts on the peoples and the environment. The second chapter of the report documents the cultural, social, political and economic attributes of the people of Nieuw Koffiekamp. In short, the section provides a detailed view at how the villagers of NK live. Chapter 3 explores the activities of GSR and the social, economic and political impact of its brand of development on the local population. The following chapter examines the pertinent legal instruments that have a direct impact on the conflict that include the Constitution, the Mining Decree, the Peace Accord, the Mineral Agreement and other national instruments as well as the international Charters and Accords that have an impact on the case. Chapter 5 contains an overview of the Activities of the Commission for Nieuw

Koffiekamp and a summary of the fourteen meetings held by this commission from September 1995 to July 1996.⁴⁸ Chapter 6 contains a summary of the entire report and the appendix contains the draft agreement of the Commission for NK.

The second main function of the OAS in the NK conflict resolution process was its role as mediator-facilitator at the negotiation table. The group assembled was known as the Commission for Nieuw Koffiekamp established after the intervention of Gaaman Aboikoni in July of 1995. The first meeting was held in September 1995 and the fourteenth and last meeting was convened on July 2, 1996. Apart from the Commission for NK identified above, the groups attending the 14 meetings were composed of representatives from the Government, the village of NK, Grassalco, GSR and the OAS Special Mission. The reluctant participation of GSR came only after the company agreed to become a full member of the forum and not simply an observer. For the first six meetings the focus was on the different options available to solve the problem until finally it was agreed that three parties would submit a written proposals. The Commission Chair, a Government representative, prepared a draft proposal as did Grassalco and the Ministry of Natural Resources represented by the Geological Mining Service (GMD). Finally, the OAS Special Mission also submitted a proposal. Over the next eight meetings the participants deliberated on the merits of the proposals and a sub-group worked on a draft synthesis of the three submissions. The parties had agreed to adopt a ‘harmonisation’ approach to the problem to achieve a sustainable peace in the case benefiting all parties concerned. However, the fruits of the Commission turned sour when the Director of Grassalco thought the proposition and conclusions of the Commission exceeded its mandate.

The crux of the negotiated draft agreement confirmed the parties’ commitment to observe all the legal provisions of the Peace Accord and the Mineral Agreement. The villagers of NK agreed to halt all mining activities in GSR’s concession and to take up small-scale mining activities at sites ten or more kilometres away on State land. In return, the parties agreed that land right provisions formulated in Article 10 of the ARND should be applied to NK and that resulting demarcation would be employed to give preferential rights to villagers

⁴⁸ Chapter V of the OAS NK report is the source of the information on the work of the Commission for NK discussed below.

in certain economic zones. The villagers also expected some form of compensation to help defray the expenses connected to the increased travel distances to get to their agricultural plots or mining sites. From a reading of the report it appears that there was no discussion of the complete relocation of the village of NK.

Eventually, it was only the Commission for NK and the village of NK that would issue a reaction to the final proposal. The villagers of NK voiced their support for the draft agreement. The other participants felt that it should be up to the President and the Council of Ministers to make the final decision. In early 1996, officials from GSR had suggested they had problems with the draft agreement but the company never formally submitted a reply so it is impossible to specify anything about the matter. The OAS report states that the recommendations deliberated upon by all the participants were never unanimously approved. After the 14th and final meeting, it was agreed to forward the report to the Ministry of Natural Resources and it was also asked that the chairman of the Commission request the government to formalise the mandate of the Commission effectively clearing up the confusion as to the official objective of the Commission. This was never done and the draft agreement was never tabled for implementation. In the following chapter we shall analyse and comment on the two main contributions of the OAS in the NK conflict resolution process.

In summary, this chapter has served to provide a general description of the problem at hand in Suriname and in Nieuw Koffiekamp in particular. The general context of conflict in Suriname is founded on the geography and colonial history of the country. Recent political developments since the independence of Suriname in 1975 have generated a great deal of political and economic instability. The dependence of Suriname on foreign markets for aid and capital have further hampered efforts to ameliorate the situation for citizens particularly those Forest Peoples living in the isolated interior of the small Caribbean nation. Successive military dictatorship and repressive policies have hastened the isolation and disempowerment of Forest Peoples from the interior that had lead to a 6 year violent war between them and government forces.

As soon as the companies began active exploration in the concession, the local miners resisted and a conflict quickly emerged between the global miners and the local residents of NK. A multitude of parties were drawn into the conflict including the main belligerents; the local Maroons, the mining company representatives, and Government officials. Other secondary and third parties became involved further complicating the resolution of the conflict. The issues were numerous ranging from legal constraints on the actors both in an international contract to the issue of international norms that create certain standards with regards to human, aboriginal and tribal rights. Economic and territorial interests are at stake, but a fundamental rift based on the individual and communal needs and values, and the culture of large scale industrial development, are the founding pillars of the conflict pitching the Maroons and the Canadian Miners apart.

Clearly, the international nature of the conflict and the interventionist legacy of the OAS in Suriname existing since the signing of the 1992 Lelydorp Agreement made it a natural third party mediating intervener. The OAS conflict resolution intervention in the NK conflict provides a good test case for not only illustrating how this novel type of conflict is emerging in developing countries but also how this conflict calls out for a systematic response by a regional authority like the OAS to find a structural and durable solution and to establish a working procedure to effectively deal with similar problematic relations between communities. In addition in the following chapter, we raise the question of how to characterize the nature of the OAS third party intervention in this form of protracted social conflict knowing what we have learned in the first chapter on conflict resolution theory. We will now move on to a theoretical application of the case study analysing the type of service rendered by the OAS in NK and its potential role in the area of conflict resolution in general.

CHAPTER 3 : CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE OAS INTERVENTION IN THE SGDDD CONFLICT OF NIEUW KOFFIEKAMP

In this chapter we attempt to establish three main premises. The first is to illustrate how the conflict of Nieuw Koffiekamp falls within the protracted social conflict (PSC) theory of the structural problem solving school of conflict resolution. Secondly, we will show how this type of PSC exemplified in the NK conflict case study is a manifestation of a phenomenon that we have labelled *structural global-local discord and democratic deficit*. Having established the first two premises, we will be better informed of how to analyse the intervention of the OAS to determine, in a first instance, how it approached the conceptualization of the problem of NK. In a second instance, by employing our analytical framework model, we shall be able to characterize the nature of the OAS intervention and assess whether or not it was successful in this endeavour. Once we have established these three propositions we shall be in a position to critically examine the intervention outcome of the OAS operation in NK. Finally, we provide some general reflections on what a regional IGO can do in the future to better respond to and ultimately better stem the outbreak of SGDDD conflict.

The demonstration of this analytical chapter begins with a step by step examination of the NK conflict using as variables the elements from the top half of the Conflict Resolution Theory Comparison Table presented in the first chapter. Employing this criterion will enable us to demonstrate how the NK conflict consists of the four factors that characterize a protracted social conflict. In a second section we will see in what way the conflict of Nieuw Koffiekamp is a paradigmatic example of a structural global-local discord and democratic deficit. It is clear that in this era of increasingly intertwined global markets citizens, particularly in LDCs, have begun feeling some of globalization's negative effects on their local economy and society. It is in these countries where SGDDD is most salient and where local citizens have resisted with the most fervour illustrating the latent PSC that underlie these societies.

In the third section of the present chapter we analyse the nature of the OAS intervention in NK. This section is subdivided into two parts beginning with a brief introduction to the OAS' involvement in the area of conflict resolution. Subsequently, we shall

apply the latter segment of the Conflict Resolution Theory Comparison Table to identify which type of intervention method, based on our two theoretical constructs; best informs us of the OAS' involvement in the NK conflict. This includes a detailed analysis of the two main contributions of the OAS in the conflict resolution process of NK.

Finally, in section 3.4., this theoretical input will enable us to critically assess the effectiveness of the OAS intervention in Nieuw Koffiekamp. This permits us to impart a general commentary of the nature of SGDDD and its resolution via the structural problem solving approach. We then explicate two fundamental roles that a regional IGO can play to address this emerging and omnipresent form of conflict in the era of neoliberal globalization. The first role is to provide the hemisphere with a coordinating and analytical intervening service of conflict mediator and facilitator. This role is analogous to that rendered by the office of the ombudsperson originating in Scandinavian countries. Secondly, IGOs can assume a more systematic and long term role in democratic institution building to address the structural problems of good governance and economic development through persistent institutional reform. In that way, the IGO will be more effective in the transformation and 'provention' of conflict on the road to structural peace in its respective region.¹

3.1. The Conflict of Nieuw Koffiekamp as a Protracted Social Conflict in the Structuralist Tradition

When we examine the conflict of NK and compare it with the conceptualisations of conflict offered by the two main schools of conflict resolution we find that one explanation exceeds the descriptive and explanatory relevance of the other. Contrary to the state centric view of conflict propagated by the pragmatic-realist school, it can be demonstrated that the NK conflict is better explained by using the theoretical assertions advocated by the structural problem-solving school. Referring to the "conceptualisation of conflict" segment of the Conflict Resolution Theory Comparison Table, enables us to better evaluate how the case of NK resembles the explanatory model of PSC developed by Edward Azar.

¹ It is important to disclose that due to the scant amount of literature on the subject matter, both in terms of the type of conflict under study, which is SGDDD, and the role of IGOs in structural conflict transformation, we will not be relying heavily on secondary sources in this analytical chapter. Instead, the author utilises his case study, his experience working for the OAS and much of the literature already cited to support his main arguments.

Table. 3.1. Conflict Resolution Theory Table: Conceptualisation of Conflict

Conceptualisation of Conflict	Pragmatic-Realist	Structural Problem-Solver
IR conceptual framework	Realist Theory	Pluralist/Critical Theory
Primary actors in IR conflict	State centric with affiliated allies	Non-state-centric Many different actors
Concept of conflict	Inherent in man Incompatible interests: often over scarce resources and power	Perceptions of incompatible interests and the frustration of basic human needs
Etiological focus of analysis	Negotiable interests, actor capabilities and relative power in economic and military terms and tactics, the power framework distinguishes a dichotomy between national and international factors	Non-negotiable individual and collective needs based on structural factors leading to protracted social conflict, PSC is composed of 4 factors; communal content, human needs, governance and the state, and international linkages
View of issues	Objective	Subjective

Table 3.1. This is the first segment of the table extracted from section 1.2.

The pragmatic-realist conceptualisation of conflict inadequately explains this genre of conflict seen in the case of Nieuw Koffiekamp because we are dealing with diverse actors outside the state arena. There is the foreign enterprise, the local community and the Government of Suriname who are the principal parties to the conflict. Secondly, it is not simply a conflict over scarce resources and incompatible goals. Although the conflict is certainly about incompatible economic interests, it also primarily involves cultural needs, communal rights and needs for self-preservation as well as political and cultural sovereignty for the Maroon community of NK. The right to decide how one's own community will develop is a primordial need for any local community. The security dilemma, game theory and the balance of power realist theories of conflict management inadequately explain the motivations behind the behaviour of the belligerents in the NK case. Thirdly, the fact that no resolution to the conflict could be achieved after several months of negotiations within the Commission for NK framework and several years of discussions thereafter, leads one to the conclusion that there are structural issues to be addressed due to the conflict's protracted nature.

The employment of a modified Wehr model of conflict analysis presented in the previous chapter enabled us to gain a greater understanding of the conflict by breaking it down into its constituent parts. Reviewing the historical and political development of Suriname in

general and then describing the context of the particular conflict of Nieuw Koffiekamp including its dynamics as well as the parties and the issues involved, now enables us to see how this conflict more appropriately resembles the conceptualisation of structural problem-solving conflict analysis. This asymmetrical conflict is characterized by the fact that the local community may still be forced off its land. If the residents of NK are simply required to relocate without addressing issues of cultural identity, political autonomy and needs fulfilment development, then this conflict will simply manifest itself in other ways and in a different place in the future. Once again, as in 1963, foreign financed development risks completely uprooting the same community, but this time threatening its very survival.

The government implicitly acknowledges that the rights accorded to GSR in the Mineral Agreement will supersede the privileges afforded to its Forest Peoples of the interior in the peace established by the ANRD. GSR has the means to exert tremendous pressure. It has employed an armed security force and has an inside track on influencing the government. The community of Nieuw Koffiekamp is poor, relatively uneducated and has resorted to traditional forms of resistance such as non-compliance of company regulations within the concession and has protested by setting up roadblocks to the entrance of the concession.

In terms of the conflict etiology, addressing the final element of Table 3.1., it is apparent that the NK case most resembles the structural problem-solving conceptualisation of conflict. There is a strong correlation between the attributes of the NK conflict and the protracted social conflict model proposed by Azar. In fact, his four preconditions for PSC are present in our case study. In the first instance, the primary issues of the conflict are subjective, as the way the Maroons view their community, environment and customs is dependent upon their cultural values. This corroborates the existence of the communal content of the conflict. The communal content of the conflict manifests itself differently than traditional inter-ethnic conflicts. This is not a direct conflict between two symmetrically distinct ethnic groups per se. The Maroon community of NK is certainly a cultural entity distinct from that of its adversary, the transnational mining firm-GSR. The NK conflict is between two incompatible ways of life. Industrial mining culture conducted alongside traditional small-scale farming and mining will

not function in this particular environment. The company will only settle if the residents relocate but the village of NK is determined to keep its community where it is.

However, the communal issue goes far deeper than simply a conflict over world visions because the Government is involved. The central government in Paramaribo is predominantly made of people who live on the coast and who do not readily identify with the issues of the ethnically distinct Maroons of the interior. As we have already seen in the preceding chapter, there is a high degree of ethnic heterogeneity in Suriname where Forest Peoples scarcely make up 10 percent of the total population. The communal problem of interior vs. coastal cultural and economic divergence is a pertinent one.

A second precondition for PSC is the issue of the lack of needs fulfilment. The community of NK's need for sustainable economic practices fulfilling its somatic requirements and its cultural survival are problems internal to the community and an endemic problem for Maroons throughout the country. NK is a poor forest community subsisting on small scale mining and agriculture and reliant upon the central government for basic services such as electricity, health care and education. The levels of human development are already quite rudimentary and the introduction of large-scale mining not only compromises the village's ability to provide for its basic necessities but also threatens the very existence of NK irrespective of the community's relocation.

A third precondition leading to PSC is the role of good governance. The lack of good governance on the part of the central government is a clear indication that the state is intimately involved in this case. Although there is relatively little state repression today when compared to the period of the interior war, the government has been largely ineffective in delivering public services let alone providing adequate representation to Forest Peoples. There is ethnic stratification at the state level whereby the consociational nature of Surinamese politics has been unable to deal with the problem of interior development. Moreover, the centralized government in Paramaribo has not devolved sufficient political decision making influence to communities within the interior. Taken together, these factors represent a

fundamental structural problem of government unaccountability and democratic deficit in the form of systemic minority exclusion from the political process.

The final element in Azar's PSC model is the precondition of international linkages. Pressure to conform to international investment norms in the context of neoliberal development is a ubiquitous international force that illustrates the structural nature of the problem. First is the manner in which foreign investment negotiates with LDC governments in obtaining natural resource concessions. In North America, it would be virtually inconceivable to develop a mine within several hundred metres of an indigenous community without prior consultation and approval of the local community. It would appear that when doing business in third world countries, where economic and democratic institutions and regulations are systematically weak, GSR, and now Cambior, apply different modes of ethical conduct not in conformity with practices in the North.

A second international linkage is the larger context of the neoliberal development model, which is at the root of the economic transformations disrupting traditional social, political and economic relations in LDCs. In turn, global market forces can aggravate the already existing national propensity to fall into a form of PSC. For instance, the austerity programmes imposed by international financial institutions in the 1990's contributed to reduced public services, unemployment and weakened the Surinamese state capacity to manage conflicts and maintain civic order.

An additional contextual factor known to emerge in recent years is the notion of environmental scarcity perceived as a distinct cause of violent conflict particularly in the developing world. Thomas Homer-Dixon maintains that an unequal distribution of wealth at the systemic level where some groups obtain a disproportionate share of control of resources is called 'structural scarcity' which is a:

...key factor in virtually every case of scarcity contributing to conflict. Often the imbalance is deeply rooted in institutions, class and ethnic relations inherited from the colonial period. It is frequently sustained and reinforced by international economic relations that trap developing countries into dependence on a few raw material exports. It can also be reinforced by heavy external debts that encourage countries to use their most productive environmental resources—such

as their cropland and forests—to generate hard currency rather than to support the most impoverished segments of their populations.²

In the NK case, the struggle between state control of natural resources and the territorial sovereignty of Maroons had been aggravated by the introduction of foreign capital investment. Azar notes that the third world is often afflicted with this type of problem particularly when states embark upon a rapid economic development programme that destabilizes traditional allocations of economic and political power.³ Certain groups, particularly minority groups, tend to be marginalized by this rapid development.

Access to political and economic power is by and large based on acceptance of elites in each community. Grievances resulting from needs deprivation are most often expressed collectively, which was seen in the case of NK. Reiterating the four elements of Azar's model clearly indicates that this dispute encompasses all the characteristics of a full blown PSC corresponding to the structural problem-solving conceptualisation of conflict. However, we label this PSC differently to incorporate the new genre of conflict emerging within the context of neoliberal globalization as *structural global local discord and democratic deficit*.

3.2. The Case of Nieuw Koffiekamp: A Manifestation of SGDDD

Conflict in the 21st century has taken on a whole new meaning as international conflicts tend to be no longer defined by interstate wars. International conflicts in the contemporary era are increasingly defined by intrastate disputes between non-state communal and partisan groups or, as in our case, between international non-state actors such as foreign investors and local populations. Our case study manifests an endemic reality for many third world nations struggling to survive in the increasingly globalized world of economic integration and domestic socio-political fragmentation. The detailed examination of the Nieuw Koffiekamp case study reveals how this complex problem represents the genre of conflict we have identified as structural global-local discord and democratic deficit as illustrated in figure 3.1.


² Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, (1999), *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, pp. 15.

³ Azar, 1990, op.cit., pp. 9.

The conflict emerges in the wake of a country undergoing structural reforms to its economy within the era of neoliberal globalization. Under pressure exerted by international financial institutions and creditor governments, the Government of Suriname has implemented a series of policies aimed at reducing government expenditures while attempting to augment its GDP and export earnings.

Figure 3.1. SGDDD Conflict Dynamic in LDCs under Globalization

ACTORS



PRESENT CONFLICT TYPE IN LDCs = PSC

- Communal Content
- Systemic Deprivation of Human Needs
- Unresponsive Government
- International Linkages

EMERGING MANIFESTATION OF CONFLICT UNDER NEOLIBERAL GLOBALIZATION

Structural Global-local Discord and Democratic Deficit

This is where Golden Star Resources Ltd., a North American mining junior, stepped to the forefront to take advantage of Suriname’s relative political stability and openness to

foreign capital. After being actively courted by the Surinamese Government, GSR signed a mining rights agreement for the Gros Rosebel Concession. This may have been a clean and profitable marriage of convenience if it were not for the residents and miners who had already been living and mining within the boundaries of the concession long before the arrival of the international mining junior.⁴

In the North, painful neoliberal reforms have been offset by growth in new sectors of the economy and by political and social systems able to attenuate the negative impact of a general withdrawal of the state in the provision of services, the deregulation of private enterprise, and trade and investment liberalisation. This is not possible in LDCs from the South because progressive welfare state political and economic institutional safeguards have never fully matured. Underdevelopment in the age of heightened and largely unregulated foreign investment is becoming a problem of structural proportions. Northern investors and entrepreneurs collude with LDC elites in the name of national development to the detriment of local populations who should ultimately be the main beneficiaries of such development.

Figure 3.1. on the preceding page, incorporates many of the elements that we have identified explaining the nature of the conflict of NK and displays how it is a manifestation of SGDDD in the context of neoliberal globalization. This conflict is an emerging clash of two different forms of economic development and ways of life: traditional small-scale subsistence farming and mining and capital-intensive industrial mining. This is the consequence of a sudden switch to a neoliberal development model in the context of a third world nation which remains in a state of latent protracted social conflict. All the elements of a PSC are present in the NK case as justified earlier and as evident on Figure 3.1.

In addition the figure illustrates this emerging genre of conflict with the main protagonists being the mining companies and local tribal populations, whose mere relationship elicits the link between the global and the local. It is equally a structural problem because the

⁴ Mining junior companies acquire the rights to exploit 'discoveries' of mineral deposits and prepare the terrain by conducting feasibility studies and by arranging government approvals for the eventual establishment of a mine that is often taken over by a mining major. Forest Peoples Programme, 2000, op.cit., pp. 6, describes how the two types of mining companies have become a predominant force in the mining industry worldwide.

government is at fault for not coherently instituting policies that affect its citizens. In this case, the government did not fully honour its obligations to local Maroons in granting them certain privileges over their traditional territory as per the terms of the 1992 Agreement on National Reconciliation and Development (ANRD), but instead signed over these same privileges to a foreign TNC.

It is not coincidental that these systemic national level issues leading to SGDDD were the fundamental causes of an armed conflict that ravaged the interior of Suriname for the 6 years prior to the onslaught of foreign investments in the early 1990s. Clearly, this is an indication of the lack of democratic accountability to local citizens that we have labelled a 'democratic deficit'.⁵ From a global perspective, this is a problem not only in the way TNCs invest, but also, in the manner by which they obtain concessions in countries without local consultation or consideration of fundamental human and environmental rights.⁶ The tensions between local populations and international actors on the one level, and the traditional more fundamental tensions between Forest Peoples and the government on a national level demonstrate the double-edged discord characterizing this conflict. We now move on to the role of the OAS as third party conflict intervener and as institutional peace builder in the case of NK.

3.3. The OAS Commitment to Democratic Development, Conflict Resolution and the Case Nieuw Koffiekamp

When attempting to resolve or transform structural global-local discord and democratic deficit one needs to address the fundamental issues described above. One possible intervener capable of addressing these structural issues at the international level, while concomitantly providing timely and pertinent advice on how to deal with SGDDD at the national level, would be a regional intergovernmental organization. The main organization whose principal tenet is to reduce the risk of conflict in the hemisphere is the Organization of American States.

⁵ The OAS report on NK notes that some of the negotiators and government authors of the 1992 Peace Accord struck between Forest Peoples and itself, were involved in the negotiations and drafting of the Mineral Agreement signed with GSR just 2 years later.

⁶ FFP, 2000, *op.cit.*, This study lists numerous examples illustrating how SGDDD type conflicts are endemic globally.

The OAS is one of the oldest regional organizations in the world originating from the International Conference of American Republics held in Washington, D.C. in 1889. The defence of representative democracy, a commitment to insure peace and collective security with due respect to the principle of non-intervention, and the assurance to resort to, promote and institute the pacific settlement of disputes have been the principles upon which the OAS was founded.⁷ The OAS commitment to the consolidation of democracy gained momentum in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This period initiated with the Santiago Commitment to Democracy, the Renewal of the Intern-American System, and the adoption of Resolution AG/Res. 1080, brought wind to the sails of the OAS's ostentatious and rhetorical banner of democratic development. In 1990, the OAS created the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD) to assist in the consolidation of democracy, particularly in countries plagued by authoritarian rule and flagrant human rights violations. This period marked a turning point in Inter-American affairs as the OAS adopted a more aggressive moral and political stance, threatening to intervene in the domestic affairs of states for the defence of democracy when necessary. For instance, the OAS became far more active in condemning military or political coups as illegitimate, in electoral monitoring and in fielding missions to help build a lasting peace in nations undergoing post-civil war reconstruction.

The latter emphasis on the OAS's efforts to rebuild peaceful societies in conflict ridden member states is of particular interest to this study. However, it was only in the year 2000 that the UPD inaugurated an official programme for conflict resolution. The institutionalization of conflict resolution comes after over a decade of ad-hoc activities in Latin America devoted to rebuilding the peace through comprehensive mission interventions. Since 1990, OAS-UPD peace programmes have been established in Nicaragua, Guatemala, Haiti, Colombia, and Suriname.⁸ These programmes sought to consolidate peace and democracy through institutional reconstruction and efforts aimed at national reconciliation. This includes capacity

⁷ Some of the cardinal documents affirming the OAS commitment to such ideals include; the Charter of 1948, the Protocol of Buenos Aries (1967), the Protocol of Cartagena (1985), and the Democratic Charter (2001).

⁸ These programmes include: the International Commission for Support and Verification (CIAV-OAS) in Nicaragua, which supported the disarmament and reinsertion of former combatants of the Contra-Sandinista civil war; the Special Support Program for the Peace Process in Guatemala following the 1996 Peace agreement; the OAS/UN International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH); and the Samoré project in Colombia.

building work with government and civil society such as that of PROPAZ in Guatemala, which continues to increase the capacity of local actors to engage in dialogue and to resolve conflicts locally. OAS-UPD programmes may also include demining activities, legal support to national legislatures and congresses, technical support for electoral institutions, and electoral observation missions. Nearly all of the peacebuilding projects have been ad-hoc and individually tailored by mission chiefs to meet the particular demands and needs of each country requesting assistance. Commenting on OAS peacemaking programmes, Sereseres argues that individually tailored interventions are a strong attribute of OAS programmes because they are not institutionalized and can deal with problems within the specific context of each country as they arise in the field.⁹

Before moving on to a detailed analysis of the OAS intervention in the Nieuw Koffiekamp conflict of Suriname, it is important to enumerate a few problems that the OAS has had in the past in intervening for the preservation of peace in the Hemisphere. In the past the OAS has had problems enforcing its multilateral commitment to democracy and to the pacific resolution of disputes between and within states for numerous reasons. During the Cold War, the organization was used as an extension of the US policy of containment. From the 1950s through to the 1980s the US was known to manipulate the OAS to advance its own anti-communist agenda in the Hemisphere. This often took the form of isolating or punishing member states who dabbled too much into ‘red’ or even ‘pink’ revolutionary politics. When the Latin American states grew tired of US interventionism and blocked its resolutions, the US simply ignored the organization all together and acted unilaterally. It is no surprise, then, that the principles of non-intervention and national sovereignty became cardinal values to which a great majority of the Latin American and Caribbean members staunchly defended in the Permanent Council. Their preponderant fear was the influence of the USA in their internal affairs and saw the OAS as a forum to criticize and a diplomatic tool to try and limit US interventionism.

⁹ Caesar Sereseres, (1996), “Case Study: The Regional Peacekeeping Role of the Organization of American States: Nicaragua, 1990-1993,” in Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, & Pamela Aall, (eds.), *Managing Global Chaos, Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*, Washington, DC: States Institute of Peace Press, pp. 551-563.

Although this problem of US unilateralism exists today, it is no longer as salient due to the end of the Cold War as the policy of Communist Containment can no longer serve as a pretext for military incursions. However, there is another limitation, which is equally debilitating to the progressive actions of this IGO. The fact remains that the OAS is primarily a diplomatic organization, staffed and lead by senior foreign service officers or by high-ranking political appointees. Therefore, the organization has become a virtual sounding board for official government policy. This makes the task of the General Secretariat headquartered in Washington and in the field rather difficult. In the first place, the Secretariat of the OAS is reluctant to provide any scathing critiques of the policies of member countries for fear of the internal political and bureaucratic ramifications. One of the only exceptions is the work of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which publishes annual reports on the Human rights situation in countries with poor human rights records. Conversely, even with the work of this noble section of the OAS, it is largely understaffed and has had limited success in trying to influence government policies to respect the fundamental rights of their own citizens.

One of the main problems with the OAS is that there is a lack of consensus on the definition of a democratic state. Although the quality of democracy in the Americas has significantly improved over the last decade and a half, there exists a wide disparity between the participative and open democracies of certain nations in the OAS and other emerging 'democracies' in the Americas. Progressive political theorists generally accept that a market-oriented representative democracy incorporating periodic elections is not enough to be regarded as achieving the status of having a functioning and participative political system. This issue should be addressed if the OAS and especially the UPD are to have a progressive influence on encouraging certain forms of political institutions, which foster greater civil participation, and social, economic and cultural inclusion in all nations of the Americas.

Another problem related to the issue of the institutional capabilities of the OAS is the capacity of the Secretariat to independently evaluate and report on member countries for the benefit of democratic development in member states. This role as political *vérificateur général* for the Americas can only be assumed by the organs of the OAS Secretariat if they function independent of the political rumblings of the Permanent Council. The reports drafted by the

OAS's UPD, for instance, require Permanent Council approval prior to their publication and diffusion. Often Secretariat executives become frustrated, at times admonished and even implicitly chastised for attempting to push sensitive issues relating to democratic and human rights critiques in front of the Permanent Council. These watchful state hawks from a good number of member countries diligently scrutinize the work of the Secretariat in order to maintain their respective states' facade of democratic legitimacy. There is certainly a problem of inherent political credibility for the OAS while boasting to defend the principal values and institutions of a functioning and participative democracy. There needs to be a separation of powers between the evaluators of the law, the adjudicators of the law, and the legislators, which currently does not exist in the power framework of this regional IGO.

3.3.1. Analysis of OAS Intervention in Nieuw Koffiekamp: Process and Outcome

The internal institutional limitations of the OAS as an IGO inform us about the range of capabilities that it can have as an effective conflict resolution intervener. This micro-conflict intervention provides a detailed look at the OAS approach to conflict resolution in Suriname, which may then be interpreted to draw some conclusions on OAS conflict resolution programmes and the role of the regional IGO in general. It is not a forgone conclusion, that the parties will conceive the NK conflict as a protracted social conflict manifesting all the attributes of a structural global-local discord and democratic deficit conflict. By the same token, just because the conflict is best understood by employing the structural problem-solving approach does not necessarily mean that a third party will adopt a structural problem-solving method of intervention. As we have previously mentioned, in the past, international conflicts of this nature over resources and sovereignty issues have most often been handled by third party mediators using a judicious and pragmatic-realist approach to conflict resolution. This entails the employment of a power bargaining framework of resource and interest based negotiation techniques by asymmetrical international belligerents and interveners. In contrast, the OAS approached the conflict with supportive and analytical techniques of communication, attempting to foster greater understanding of conflict issues.

Employing the Conflict Resolution Theory Comparison Table enables us to characterize the type of OAS intervention in NK. In addition to examining the processes of conflict resolution, we shall also comment on the outcome of the OAS intervention as well as the peace process in general. The OAS approach is exemplified by its role as a third party willing to engage with the parties to help resolve the conflict in the Commission for NK. The OAS began by conducting extensive fieldwork in the Gros Rosebel Concession, interviewing actors on both sides and gathering relevant information. This first hand analysis enabled it to better support the peace process of the Commission. Subsequently, OAS representatives in the Commission suggested that the parties submit their own proposals of a possible solution. The OAS put forward its own version of a possible resolution. The effort to achieve a synthesis of ideas was executed with the objective of adopting a consensual proposal formulated with the input of all the parties involved. This effort to bring the parties together in a single forum to share experiences and objectives is tantamount to fostering greater mutual understanding of the issues and the parties themselves. In addition, the NK Report is a testament of the OAS mission effort to approach the conflict from the structural problem-solving approach in that it implicitly stresses communicative exchange and expert conflict analysis.

Table 3.2. Conflict Resolution Theory Table: Intervening Methods

Analytical Framework for Intervening Method	Pragmatic-Realist Known also as Conflict Managers	Structural Problem-Solver Known also as Democratizers
Approach to conflict resolution stresses	Application of influence and threat systems, manipulation through coercion if necessary	Supportive techniques of communication and fostering greater understanding of the other
Focus on improving relations of the parties stresses	Employing pragmatic confidence building steps to foster the trust among the leaders present in the negotiations	Principled focus working on modifying the relationship between groups of people via the structure of their relationship
Relationship of intermediary to parties stresses	Non-partisanship/or assistance to the top dog by default	Non-partisanship/or assistance to the bottom dog to be able to fully participate and have a bearing on an asymmetrical peace settlement
Interventionist tactics	Process based mediation and negotiations within a power bargaining framework	Facilitation and rapprochement through interactive problem solving framework
Intervention objective	A reduction of violence, reconciliation, settlement, order and stability based on balance of forces, also known as 'negative peace'	Legitimized resolution of conflict, structural change and the institutionalization of the rule of law stressing social justice or a positive peace also known as 'provention'

Table 3.2. is the latter segment of the Table extracted from Table 1.1.

According to the second element of our Intervening Methods Table, the pragmatic-realist will employ confidence-building exercises between conflicting parties to improve their relations and foster a sense of trust between the leaders of the negotiations on both sides. Conversely, the structural problem-solver adopts a more principled focus working on modifying the structure of the relationship between groups of people. This is less evident to ascertain in the case of Nieuw Koffiekamp. Nonetheless, the fact that the OAS encouraged the parties of the validity of the Lelydorp Accords in the NK Commission illustrates that it was attempting to fundamentally transform the relationship between the Forest Peoples and government authorities. However, in the end it had relatively little power to reach a binding agreement among the members of the Commission.

The first major contribution of the OAS intervention in the NK conflict was its field work and participation in the semi-formal deliberations seeking a resolution to the stand off between the many parties. The Commission for NK attempted to resolve the dispute by bringing together the Government, via various governmental agencies: the Ministry of Natural Resources, the Geological Mining Service, Grassalco, and local district commissioners. The OAS mission representatives actively encouraged the parties to adhere to Article 10 of the ANRD, which stipulates that Forest Peoples should be accorded certain territorial rights to their communities and to the lands they employ for economic purposes such as fishing, farming, lumbering and small-scale mining. If the parties had of recognized the terms of Article 10, then government authorities, as well as others would have been required to relate to the Maroons as property owners rather than property squatters as they have been regarded in the past. Granting Forest Peoples property rights necessitates other individuals, groups, or states to obtain their consent prior to relocating or employing their territorial zones for other purposes. Unfortunately, this crucial issue remains unresolved in Suriname despite the efforts of the OAS and other NGOs.

The third element of our Table seeks to determine the relationship of the third party to the belligerents. In general, the OAS was a relatively neutral participant. In all intents and purposes it would appear that the three main parties in the conflict had confidence in the OAS

to remain relatively neutral. After all it was the government of Suriname who invited the OAS to help mediate the conflict. However, over time it appears that the Government's wavering position and its lack of leadership to provide the Commission for NK with an unambiguous mandate, would tend to suggest that it did not like the way the Commission's work was progressing. It simply gave up on the whole process indicated by its non-response to the final draft report submitted to it in the summer of 1996. The OAS mission, if anything, was sympathetic to the community and attempted to assist the community to gain some form of significant title to the land it inhabited.

From this perspective, the OAS' involvement in the Commission took a more supportive and problem solving approach to its relationship with the belligerents. OAS representatives helped to facilitate the discussions in a seemingly non-partisan light while at the same time fully comprehending and assisting the local community's need to organize and defend its point of view during the negotiations. It also attempted to address the more fundamental issue of land ownership rights for the Maroons. In a report on the conflict Fergus MacKay suggests that this implicitly addressed the issue of relocation.¹⁰ Upon conducting some interviews with OAS staff in the field, he suggests that the community of NK was predominantly opposed to relocation but that the OAS took the approach that the community should try to have their land rights recognised as specified in the Lelydorp Agreement Art. 10. The OAS believed that this would empower the community of NK with more negotiating leverage for compensation should relocation occur. Following the comments of Fergus MacKay of the FFP, the OAS even sought to improve the bargaining power of the community in the NK Commission and in the face of an eventual relocation. This was the intent of having the Government and GSR recognise the land rights references in Article 10 of the ANRD.

Given the asymmetrical nature of SGDDD conflicts, the disadvantaged side, in this case the local tribal community which is often internally divided, is far less able to articulate its concerns unanimously in front of company and Government delegations. Local tribal communities are especially vulnerable because they lack knowledge of the laws of the land

¹⁰ Fergus MacKay, (2002), "Mining in Suriname: Multinationals, the State and the Maroon Community of Nieuw Koffiekamp," forthcoming in August 2002 in Lyuba ZARSKY's ed. *Human Rights and the Environment Conflicts and Norms in a Globalizing World*, London: Earthscan Press.

and effective communicating skills in the dominant language and are not used to such negotiations with powerful external entities. The OAS takes heed of the fact, indicating a partial relationship with the community of NK underdog rather than with the top dog mining firms.

The intervention tactic, which constitutes our fourth element of the Intervening Methods Table, executed by the OAS resembles the structural problem-solving approach. The OAS's contributions as third party intervener in the Commission for NK and its analytical presentation of the conflict demonstrated in the NK Report will be analysed in the following section discussing their relevance and outcome. We begin with the discussion of the former contribution. A process of mediation and negotiation within the power bargaining framework characterizes the pragmatic-realist approach to conflict resolution. This would entail some form of litigious negotiation incorporating timetables, offers and counter offers. Although the conflicting parties resorted to power-wielding tactics ranging from threats to violence perpetrated by the government and the companies to pressure tactics employed by Maroons including sabotage and roadblocks, the intervention of the OAS did not validate nor employ these types of methods. Many of these tactics were employed before and after the negotiations of the NK Commission. Although, not identical to the interactive problem solving workshop outlined in section 1.1.2.3., the Commission's efforts attempted to familiarize the adversaries with the issues and primary concerns of the others while looking at possible avenues of resolution.

However, the OAS-team was not able to achieve any concrete results despite its diligent efforts because it never obtained an independent and a clear mandate to adjudicate or officially mediate between the parties. This is perhaps because there was little willingness demonstrated by GSR to engage in meaningful negotiations. One can only speculate that the company preferred to regard the conflict as the Government's problem. This seemed to stump the Government. By the eleventh meeting government representatives in the Geological Mining Service (GMD) expressed their disagreement with the stated mandate of the Commission. Their view was that the Commission should simply provide advice to the Government, and subsequently, the Government would prepare the final agreement.

The mandate was the subject of intense discussions and an official request was put forth to the Government to clarify the mandate of the Commission. That request was never officially answered. The fact that only the village of Nieuw Koffiekamp and the Commission for NK in part officially responded to the draft agreement stating their approval for the accord, reveals that the other parties, that is, the Government, Grassalco, and GSR, did not take their adversary or the whole resolution process seriously. The draft agreement was struck after 14 meetings of deliberations conducted over a 10 month period in which all the parties were able to voice their own views and make proposals. At the end of the process a consensus proposal was drafted but it was clearly achieved in bad faith if some parties did not intend to implement the proposal nor even respond to it officially. This is a major lacunae of the peace process and it stems from not clearly agreeing upon the parameters of the negotiations from the beginning. The mandate of the Commission should have been agreed upon by all the parties right from the outset providing each party with effective negotiating leverage to influence the manner by which they would participate leading to their genuine contribution to the final agreement.

However, the NK Commission Agreement was never implemented. This outcome represents a failure of the third party intervention in the conflict resolution process. Perhaps the third party should have been given more leeway in developing a more permanent and binding resolution. More importantly the government should have assumed a more direct leadership role in the conflict resolution process. The problem of a lack of consensus over the official mandate of the Commission is simply due to a flagrant lack of initiative taken by officials and parties involved in the negotiations, but most strikingly by the Government.

Perhaps there is a more profound explanation for the failure of the Commission for NK related to the conflict resolution approaches adopted by the parties. It would appear that both the Government and GSR employed the NK negotiations to further their ultimate goal of relocating the community. Although, as we have already indicated, there were reports that Desi Bouterse, his associates working for the Government and other GSR consultants did attempt to cajole and threatened community leaders that they would have to be relocated whether they liked it or not. Even the Government minister responsible for the Police

threatened local community-based miners that if they did not clear the concession they would be at risk of being fired upon from the air.

For the Government and GSR, matters of Maroon Tribal and Aboriginal rights, and territorial and political sovereignty were superfluous to preparing the terrain for eventual exploitation of the mine without the hindrance of the community. It would appear that both of these actors were negotiating in the pragmatic-realist frame of resource or interest based bargaining in the Commission for NK. For them the question was a matter of compensation for the damages incurred and a settlement based on negotiable interests. In resource or interest based bargaining, parties agree on what is at stake and engage on a dialogue over their share of what is at stake. For instance, this type of bargaining is common in industrial relations disputes where parties agree to the parameters and negotiate in the same frame.

Conversely, the Maroon community of NK saw the Commission as an attempt to resolve an outstanding PSCs or identity based conflict. This means NK's approach to the conflict is integral to the very survival of their communal identity. GSR and the large scale mining development proposed, pose an existential threat to the community and so NK villagers view the conflict resolution process in a different frame. They are not negotiating common interests although there is the issue of who has access to certain economic resources. This a common distinction between 'within frame' and 'between frame' conflict negotiations explained by Rothman and Olson.¹¹ This is one of the reasons why the mandate was never clear for the Commission for NK in the first place. Although the OAS may have been aware of the identity based issues it was not successful in persuading all the parties in employing an identity based problem solving approach incorporating the systemic policy recommendations that are integral to the approach. The fact that the Government and GSR approached their participation in the Commission from the pragmatic-realist frame, and that the OAS and the community of NK approached their participation from the structural problem solving frame had the result of creating a major contradiction of CR procedures finally impeding the settlement of the conflict.

¹¹ Jay Rothman & Marie L. Olson, (2001), "From Interests to Identities: Towards a New Emphasis in Interactive Conflict Resolution", *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 39, no. 3., pp. 289-305.

The second major OAS interventionist tactic was its publication of a detailed report on the conflict for the belligerents. The fact that the OAS produced such a comprehensive study of the conflict, including detailed information on NK culture, economic activity and traditional social and political customs exemplifies the organization's concern for the structural and underlying causes of the conflict. In this way the analytical report resembles most the structural problem-solving approach to conflict conceptualisation and resolution in that it employs a multidisciplinary approach to identifying the individual and collective human needs of the community for its physical and existential survival.

The first main objective of the report was that it was to contribute to the process of bringing the parties together by enabling them to familiarize themselves with the issues at stake for their adversaries as well as for themselves. This may have been realised notwithstanding the fact that the conflict is still not resolved, but it remains unclear how the report has affected the comprehension, attitudes and behaviour of the parties. The second objective of the report was to acquire hands-on experience conducting a land rights survey, which suggests again that the OAS was concerned about the systemic issues of the conflict. In that light, the information presented in the report and the methodology for collecting this information may be useful in determining how to deal with the hundreds of other Maroon communities of the interior that have outstanding land rights issues to be settled with the government. The report mentions that such information may be employed to develop political and legal instruments at the national level that can assist in dealing with such problems in the future.¹² However, this report does not spell out how to institute such reforms let alone identify specific democratic institutions that require this reform. This is the single most important lacuna of the OAS intervention with regards to the structural problem-solving perspective.

Unfortunately, as of the summer of 2002, OAS efforts in Suriname had not had any significant impact on the NK conflict resolution process. The parties of the Commission for NK did not obtain the report during the Commission's life from September 1995 to July 1996.

¹² OAS, 1997, *op.cit.*, pp. xx.

The 1997 report was only made available a year after the last meeting of the Commission thus it could not have had a visible effect on the Commission outcome. In October of 1996 after the failure of the Commission for Nieuw Koffiekamp, the new Government related to the Desi Bouterse's Military Regime, established a Task Force on the Relocation of Nieuw Koffiekamp. Talks quickly broke down, as government representatives and company executives were unwilling to consider anything less than the complete relocation of the community. Therefore, NK leaders simply boycotted the talks for a few months while the Government and the Companies continued to negotiate a resettlement programme. A report was submitted in August of 1997 but it was never made public.¹³ Ostensibly, the OAS NK Report was not taken into account in these negotiations.

It appears that the general OAS intervention objective, which consists of the final element in our Intervening Methods Table, was a legitimized resolution of the conflict via structural change showing from the intent to help implement the terms of the 1992 Lelydorp Peace Accord. The pragmatic-realists prescribe the brokering of a settlement and a return to some form of order and stability to a conflict-ridden zone as the primary objective of his intervention. This is in effect, the approach adopted by the Government and GSR in this case. However, in order to implement the full gambit of the structural problem-solving approach one needs to implement institutional changes to the structure of the relationship inherent in the economic, political and social institutions stressing the rule of law for the promotion of social justice. This was not seriously contemplated nor acted upon judging by all the reports gathered in the present study.

The issue of the political inclusion of Forest Peoples in the decision-making apparatuses of the central government is an important systemic factor that was identified in the OAS report. It is clear that this should be an essential policy objective if the Government wishes to establish the foundations for peace and development in the interior. The establishment of the Council for Development of the Interior (CDI) prescribed by Article 4.1. of the Peace Accord had this objective in mind. The CDI was to be a consultative mechanism to allow indigenous and tribal peoples to participate effectively in public policy decisions

¹³ MacKay, 2002, op.cit., pp. 6-7.

related to their land and resource management. Unfortunately, this body is not functioning because indigenous leaders have refused to field representatives due to their objections at how the CDI was incorporated into the government administration. This means that the government has been unable to effectively incorporate the participation of Forests Peoples in policy decisions. This situation is more than “particularly unfortunate” as the OAS NK study concludes.¹⁴ It is apparent that the question of democratic deficit is directly linked to the issue of the lack of representation for the minorities and Forest Peoples of the nation. The OAS must robustly emphasize the case of this structural aspect of the conflict if it is to be an effective problem-solving intervener.

The fact that the community of Nieuw Koffiekamp was not willing to be resettled was a solid impediment to the resolution of the conflict. It is unacceptable for a society boasting its democratic values to force the relocation of a community without its consultation and agreement. First, the government recognises that interior forest communities do have ‘certain’ territorial rights over lands and resources in the ANRD, but then it strips those unspecified rights and grants them to foreign developers. This is tough to swallow for any potential investor with a sense of justice. Free consent of the community is a cardinal necessity for the Tribal Peoples of the interior along with their participation in the decision making process.

The issues of political participation and territorial rights continue to be a thorn in the side for the government because they are of primordial importance to the institutionalization of adequate democratic processes in Suriname. As late as the end of November 2001, the community of Nieuw Koffiekamp remained in the dark as to the status of the Companies’ mining developments in the concession.¹⁵ This produces a great deal of anxiety and frustration among local residents. Not only are they not included in the decision making process with regards to what happens to their community but they are often the last to find out about decisions taken. In a letter to President Ronald Venetiaan, the *Brotherhood and Unity in Politics* (BEP), the Maroon party in Suriname’s National Assembly, called for the

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 120.

¹⁵ De Ware Tijd, (2001), “Maroon’s Party Asks Venetiaan to Move up Ultimatum Nieuw Koffiekamp”, in the Internet News Source English Bulletin, from the 27th of November, <http://www.dwt.net/englishnews/archive/Archive%202001/November/English271101/E2.htm>

Government to be more open as to the intentions of the government and the Companies involved in the exploitation of the proposed mine.¹⁶ The BEP also contends that the NK miners, who continue to mine on the concession when not forced off by police and security forces, deserve a government brokered solution to the protracted conflict as soon as possible.

The complex NK conflict represents a structural problem. The OAS may have been able to force this issue more astutely and consistently if it had of continued to examine the issue of democratic institutionalization in its report and provide council to the Government based on systemic reforms required to address it. In other words, if the OAS intervention had of adopted the full gambit of the structural problem solving approach it would have provided more analysis on the structural factors leading to the conflict. Although, the intent may have existed drawing from the OAS NK Report's secondary goal of providing a template for conducting a land rights survey in view of assisting the government to deal with future tribal rights disputes, this was largely ineffective and underutilized by authorities. The government was in no way obliged or motivated to take heed of the report's findings. In fact, we were not even able to locate any official response to the NK report by the government. The facilitative problem solving intervention of the OAS did not include the final critical component of a process to implement structural change. Without wide-scale acknowledgement and reform of the inherent structural and institutional problems that are endemic to Surinamese economic, cultural and political relations causing protracted social conflict, the country will never see the breaking light of a sustainable peace.

In sum, Forest Peoples are the most affected by central governmental decisions concerning interior development, so therefore they have the right to be privy to development plans and indeed need to be involved in which ever decisions affect their traditional territory. It is striking that the OAS did not stress this point more forcefully in its intervention in the negotiations of 1995-96 and in its report. This is what is meant by the systemic lacunae of the OAS intervention, which the structural problem solving approach prescribes in these circumstances. The research on Suriname suggests that many companies are moving into the interior to exploit its rich natural wealth to the detriment of the traditional tribal peoples living

¹⁶ Ibid.

there. The government has not stopped this unrestricted development in the interior, and in fact, is actively encouraging it. The mechanisms simply do not exist that should ensure that the interior development of the country be conducted in such a way as to benefit all those concerned, mainly the Forest Peoples who risk benefiting or enduring the costs of the said development the most. Although the case of NK is just one conflict in Suriname, the OAS was well aware that it manifests a problem endemic to the country and perhaps to the entire region.

We now move on to identify some general reflections about how a regional IGO can play a more constructive role in combating this form of emerging conflict called SGDDD.

3.4. The IGO as Third Party Regional Intervener

Upon the examination of our case study what can be said about the role of the regional IGO and the structural problem-solving approach in the resolution of SGDDD conflicts? This approach highlights the identity-based, value laden, and existential crisis constituting the crux of the conflict between the belligerents in cases like the Nieuw Koffiekamp conflict. The refusal of the community to relocate is a clear indication that there is much more at stake than simply the economic well being of the community no matter how lucrative a deal on its relocation might be. If we are to arrive at a durable solution and a 'positive peace', then the intervener will need to approach this conflict from a structural problem solving perspective. To ascertain what the OAS could do in the future we will attempt to reiterate the problems of the NK intervention, comment on its wider implications and state what can be done by a regional IGO involved in conflict resolution. Subsequently, we will establish who is to blame for the failure of the NK peace process in the concluding section of this analytical chapter.¹⁷

3.4.1. Dual Pronged Action of Future IGO Conflict Resolution Interventions

A regional Intergovernmental Organization is ideally positioned to act as a central clearing house of information on related conflicts that afflict the region. Drawing from the theoretical and case study experience examined in this study we argue that there are two

¹⁷ Our reading of the failure of the conflict is inferred and secondary and has to be taken as such, as we were not able to obtain first hand knowledge or to question any of the actors directly involved with the OAS intervention.

interrelated roles for an IGO in the area of conflict resolution; the intervening ombudsperson role and the institution building role. This dual pronged approach is the key focus of the structural problem solving school to CR. The first is the short term role of analytical conflict intervener. This role would be analogous to the conflict resolution ombudsperson involving the deployment of IGO field missions to facilitate dialogue, mediate negotiations and recommend ways to improve relations. This also includes the role of analysing specific conflicts and general trends of conflict emerging across the entire region. Our second role incorporates the institutional assistance and capacity building role of IGOs in assisting states and their regional community to deal with structural conflicts that defy international borders. In addition, this institutional assistance should focus on reforming nationally specific political, constitutional and economic structures in order to improve relations between asymmetrical adversaries within states.

3.4.1.1. The IGO as Conflict Resolution Ombudsperson

Many IGOs already possess groups of experts in conflict resolution and mediation who can provide assistance to member states and monitor the type of global-local discord that is occurring throughout the region. They have dispatched conflict resolution missions to several countries and have made worthy contributions that have lead to the establishment of a relative peace in many countries. IGOs can use this collective experience, analyse it, and come to an institutional consensus on what has lead to systemic improvements for peace as well as what has not worked successfully. For instance, one of the main advantages noted earlier by Sereseres, was the OAS' ability to dispatch ad-hoc and individually tailored post-conflict reconstruction programmes that work well under the specific conditions of that country. However, the OAS needs to analyse the whole gambit of its programmes and develop a more structured approach to post-conflict resolution and institutionalize its multilateral engagement by setting up some general guidelines for future conflict interventions reflecting this collective experience.

If IGOs adopt the structural problem-solving approach to SGDDD conflicts they guarantee the full participation of the disadvantaged local communities or groups in

discussions or negotiations when acting as mediator/facilitator. By doing so, IGOs would level the playing field, ensuring that disempowered groups in society participate in a meaningful manner to build the peace. Furthermore, this entails a conflict resolving outcome that would benefit disadvantaged groups by equally ensuring that their fundamental issues are addressed in a final peace agreement. In order for this to occur, all the stakeholders privy to the negotiations need to be able to substantively influence the initial design, direction and final terms of the peace accord. Regional IGOs can fulfill this mediating role by offering to build the capacity of local residents or the weaker adversary to understand how CR negotiations occur and to teach them how to communicate their primordial needs and interests effectively in such an environment.¹⁸ An IGO can do this by remaining relatively neutral or impartial if need be in the problem solving communicative process. Thus, it would maintain a high degree of credibility and objectivity by remaining independent. However, in such interventions, the IGO's quest is for an ethically just and durable resolution of the immediate conflict. If necessary, IGO field operatives should have the right to recommend possible solutions to their Permanent Council (or commanding political body). This would effectively arm these bodies with some political leverage to morally reprimand parties of the negotiations if they have either stymied attempts to ensure the full participation of all belligerents or if they have not negotiated in good faith and earnest.

In our case, it is clear that the Nieuw Koffiekamp intervention did not build a lasting peace. Today, the same actors are dealing with the same issues to no avail. This stems from the failure of the state to implement the stipulations of the 1992 Peace Accord, which ultimately lead to the NK conflict. However, the fundamental issues that should have been dealt with were the questions of political voice and land entitlement rights for Maroons. Therefore, it is deemed necessary that IGOs do more over a longer period of time to insure that states do all possible to implement the terms of peace accords that deal with the fundamental issues leading to conflict. When states do not, IGO secretariats should inform the other members of their organizations of the lack of progress and suggest an appropriate way to deal with such inaction. A more aggressive stance by the international community can pressure states to address the systemic issues fuelling conflict in their countries. Otherwise the

¹⁸ In some programmes, such as PROPAZ, the OAS has begun to engage in local capacity building.

likelihood that other Nieuw Koffiekamp situations will erupt in a cyclical fashion, as Galtung, Burton and other structuralists have predicted, will undoubtedly reoccur.

From the structural and regional vantage point, IGO conflict resolution units can trace conflict areas and sporadic flare ups providing an ‘early warning system’ for member states and the international community in general. They have the scale and the scope of an organization that can make the connections between local conflicts in individual and seemingly far flung communities, and the general trends occurring throughout their regions due to their relations with governments, other IGOs, NGOs and business alike. This is the regional analytical role critical to the identification of structural conflict at the hemispheric level. IGOs can also track the progress of conflict resolution programmes conducted by a multitude of financial institutions, private firms, governmental and non-governmental organizations simultaneously working in various post-conflict zones. This way, they may be able to provide a coordinating role among conflict resolution interveners reporting on successful programmes that may be replicated elsewhere. In the same vein, the IGO can act as a forum for political dialogue and exchange for intrastate and interstate actors involved in conflict and between those organizations intervening to resolve it.

3.4.1.2. The IGO as Conflict Resolution Institutional Capacity Builder

The second fundamental role the IGO can play is a more systemic institution building one. The long term institutional reform assistance required by such an intervener would be directly influenced by the analytical function of examining the root causes of conflict both at the individual case level and the macro-regional level. For instance, the OAS’ Unit for the Promotion of Democracy maintains a body of political experts that have been providing institutional support to governments all over the Americas for over 10 years. So far the OAS has primarily been a reactive-like IGO, in that, it intervenes after the fact to extinguish constitutional conflicts erupting in places where governmental corruption, *caudillisme* and a culture of violence have been known to thrive. However, its conflict resolution section needs to further develop its analytical and institution building capacity if the hemisphere is to gradually reduce the amount of conflict inherent in the political and economic institutions

existing at the intrastate and interstate levels respectively. IGOs need to take a holistic approach to development issues and the resolution of conflict that are two inextricably related phenomena.

Institution building activities to address the structural problems related to development and conflict resolution include assistance to the electoral process and parliamentary reform. This incorporates constitutional modifications to insure the full participation of minority groups in the political life of the country. The devolution of powers from the central authority to regional or local authorities is considered an important component of a constitutional power sharing reform programme for states with significant minority groups clamouring for more political voice and local control over certain jurisdictional competencies. This is a particularly pertinent reform as it is the major cause of conflict in our case study and in many other conflicts throughout the hemisphere. In addition, the justice system and its corresponding policing arm are targets of institutional reforms and local capacity building deemed essential to establishing trust in the nation's institutions.

Programmes and assistance in anti-corruption are equally critical in restoring the faith of nationals and non-nationals in the system of good governance. Small arms control is also related to the anti-corruption and anti-mafia-cartel criminal organization so endemic and interdependent in most of the countries on the American continents especially. Multilateral environmental agreements and the management of water resources in LDCs are also areas that are in critical need of assistance by international organizations. Finally, rules on investment and corporate social responsibility are areas which IGOs can address at the interstate level and have a direct bearing on the protection of citizens' fundamental rights in the age of a rapidly globalizing economy.¹⁹

Modern IGOs have the credibility and the authority to play a primordial role in the structural alleviation of conflict through a multifaceted approach of engagement and recommendation in countries where conflict is omnipresent. IGOs such as the OAS are the primary forum of state envoys representing democratically elected governments from

¹⁹ We shall return to this issue in the Conclusion.

throughout their region. They are the ultimate political manifestation of the will of the states within their area. IGOs can identify systemic problems leading to conflict in the hemisphere and then immediately bring it to the attention of their secretariat, Permanent Council, member States and to the general public. The IGO has the authority to act, if it so chooses and, if it obtains the political and financial support of its members. It can establish norms of conduct for states, companies and even international financial institutions that affect the institutional infrastructures supporting the underlying causes of conflict such as poverty, dislocation, underdevelopment, corruption, political neglect, and systemic violence.

The IGO can not only recommend institutional reforms at the national level to countries embroiled in conflict, but it can also suggest policies to nations and governments of the hemisphere that have TNCs and other private or public actors, that are directly implicated in conflict areas. Returning to our case study for instance, the OAS could attempt to advise Canada and other member states on how to regulate the conduct of its nationals doing business abroad to insure that states and its TNCs are not complicit in the systemic abuse of the fundamental rights of individuals in neighbouring countries. This would effectively endow the regional IGO with more credibility as a norm creating institution. This is the soft law approach to conflict resolution based on a structural problem solving strategy of dealing with SGDDD at the interstate level.

In our case, the OAS is already involved in the adoption of norms affecting the hemisphere. For instance the Inter-American Indigenous Rights Declaration project has advanced the agenda of indigenous rights in the hemisphere, albeit at a very slow pace, which could have a direct impact on conflicts similar to the NK case. The question of indigenous and tribal legal rights both at the international and domestic level is critical to the resolution of the systemic friction points in the hemisphere from Nanuvut to Tierra del Fuego. Recognition of aboriginal and tribal title and the principle of free and informed consent are tantamount to the rights afforded to any local community with regards to local development decision-making. Mining development occurs in all parts of the hemisphere and in most cases it affects the lives of aboriginal and tribal peoples in each country more severely than the general population. This is so because in these states First Nations peoples have been historically treated, as wards

of the state by ruling elites. Through the work of the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, two parallel entities within the American system of regional governance, the OAS is fulfilling an important role in conflict interventions and in human rights monitoring and reporting. Systemic monitoring in these countries by a multilateral institution helps identify the structural problems facing this underclass of American citizen. The OAS could use greater autonomy in being able to criticize the actions and institutions of states in the Americas that permit such systemic abuse against its disadvantaged groups of society.

The neoliberal economic integration model of development, espoused by the proponents of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) initiative is moving through its negotiation stages in the hope of its eventual implementation by 2005. However, a corresponding supranational political and social framework is not being constructed. States are increasingly interdependent but are also in competition for jobs and investment. The relative advantage of LDCs is based on cheap labour, lax environmental and democratic provisions and their relative natural resource wealth. Currently, it is debatable whether a certain degree of stagnant and even downward harmonisation of labour and environmental policies is occurring in the Americas despite such accords as the NAFTA side agreements. This needs to be kept in check by regional institutions otherwise the lack of effective state institutions and development in LDCs will continue. International rights protection is necessary to ensure that not only the economic rights of private individuals and enterprises from Northern states are protected, as evinced in the FTAA, but that the rights of citizens no matter what nationality and ethnic origin receive the same protections of fundamental rights throughout the hemisphere.

More needs to be done by IGOs to cooperate with other hemispheric actors such as the World Bank, the IDB, the World Health Organization, free enterprise and NGO's to help LDCs build effective and socially just health and education sectors, and to ensure that investments serve a social function. After all it makes sense that the IGOs, as the supreme political expression of the states in the region representing their democratically elected governments, provide the general direction and establish guidelines for international financial

institutions such as the IDB or the World Bank. Poverty reduction, and the development of political and social institutions need the assistance of the international community, but most particularly investors need to be investing in local development as much as in the extraction of an LDCs' comparative advantage. The rights empowerment movement of IGOs and the United Nations that attempt to protect fundamental rights should be taken into account when states negotiate and implement other major international agreements such as the FTAA. Furthermore, IGOs need to do more to insure that individual and local communal rights are protected in such cases of structural global-local discord and democratic deficit. Ultimately, this would entail the integral adoption of the structural problem-solving approach to institutional reforms for peace. Evidently, the implementation of these vast responsibilities entrusted to regional IGOs entails a very difficult task. However, institutional conflict resolution incorporating the above roles for IGOs is possible and is already being implemented in Europe.

The European approach to conflict prevention and resolution intervention is very much anchored in the structural problem-solving methodology. The European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe inextricably link conflict to economic and political development. All of these organizations attempt to deal with conflict from the perspective of addressing the underlying causes of conflict ranging from inter-ethnic rivalry and historical animosity to poverty. In a recent EU Commission policy paper on conflict prevention, the European Community spelled out how to deal with the underlying causes of conflict stating that;

The most efficient instruments to deal with the underlying causes of conflict (such as poverty, social inequality, ethnic and regional tensions, weakness of socio-political structures, exploitation and illicit trades and the competition for natural resources) remain the EU's programmes of aid and co-operation.²⁰

²⁰ European Union, (2001), "Conflict Prevention: Commission initiative to improve EU's civilian intervention capacities," EU's European Commission, last consulted 09-07-2002, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/news/ip_01_560_en.htm, the policy declaration lists a wide variety of priorities that focus on addressing the root causes of conflict including programmes that assist countries to rebuild their electoral, parliamentary, justice and policing institutions as well as programmes dealing with conflict rehabilitation for children, drug abuse, small arms, the Kimberly Task Force (on conflict-diamonds), water management, environmental protection, corporate social responsibility and poverty relief.

In this line of thinking, the EU has adopted a consolidated approach by proposing a systematic integration of conflict indicators and the objective of prevention into the programming of its external aid programmes. The policy report includes long term and short term prevention recommendations for the regional IGO to deal with the underlying causes of conflict. This is a true model of development in the area of conflict analysis and IGO institutionalization of policy interventions for the sake of building a ‘positive peace’ in Europe. The integrated approach to conflict resolution and ‘provention’ as coined by John Burton, can be an eventual objective for other IGOs such as the OAS.

Unfortunately, the current limitations of the OAS prevent it from incorporating this activist role in building the local, national and international institutions required to lessen the impact of SGDDD in communities across the Americas. However, the problem is not that difficult to address. The single most important set back for the OAS is its lack of political will and commitment by its member states to bestow the IGO with the necessary resources. Once provided with the political will, the necessary financial and technical resources, and the independence to recommend and criticize, the OAS could play the double role of analytical-mediator/facilitator and institution builder for the hemisphere. Rather than simply reacting to conflict, the OAS can thus fully incorporate the structural problem solving approach to conflict resolution leading to the ‘provention’ of conflict within its member states and between them at the systemic level.²¹

3.5. Case Study Conclusions

The preceding analytical chapter demonstrates how the Nieuw Koffiekamp conflict case study is an archetypical example of an emerging type of protracted social conflict. The NK conflict has all the elements of a PSC first defined by Azar nearly twenty years ago. It is a conflict between an ethnic minority attempting to preserve its distinct cultural, social, political and economic customs and an unresponsive Government, which is controlled by members of ethnic communities far removed from the Forest. The conflict is about the negation of the

²¹ Admittedly, this is a single case study and some of the suggestions here as to the remedies for resolving SGDDD conflicts similar to the Nieuw Koffiekamp problem may not readily apply to every conflict region. Any conflict analysis and corresponding conflict prescription must be conducted on a case by case contextual basis.

fundamental human needs of one community within the internal structures of a country's political and economic system. The international system of governance and finance has a profound impact on the conflict which rounds out the four elements that characterize this conflict as a protracted social conflict. This last element, the demands of the international system of finance and macro-economic policy reform, directly fuels this emerging type of conflict. This type of conflict is called structural global-local discord and democratic deficit and it is relatively novel because, with increasing frequency, local peoples are resisting international actors who impose development models that severely affect their communities. In countries where fundamental civil, political, cultural, social and economic rights of minorities and common citizens have never fully developed, SGDDD seems to flourish.

The OAS has a short but vital history intervening in the conflicts of its member states. For the first time, the OAS had intervened to try and resolve a dispute of SGDDD seen in our Nieuw Koffiekamp case study. Unfortunately in the wake of its intervention latent PSC lingers on. The nature of its intervention was the subject of this thesis. Two conflict resolution theories were explicated in chapter one and were applied to the NK-OAS study in the present chapter. With the employment of our Conflict Resolution Theory Comparison Table, we were able to examine the actions of the OAS and characterize its approach to resolving the SGDDD conflict of NK. The conflict resolution professionals of the OAS made two major contributions in attempting to resolve this dispute, which Fergus MacKay of the Forests Peoples' Programme characterizes as the "first and only sincere attempt at conflict resolution in the Nieuw Koffiekamp conflict."²² The first was its role as peace facilitator in the Commission for NK. This attempt, to bring the parties together to iron out a durable solution to the conflict, failed after the government (who initially invited the OAS to participate) did not clearly define the OAS' role or the role of the NK Commission. The other contribution of the OAS was the 1997 NK Report entitled *Natural Resources, Foreign Concessions and Land Rights: A Report on the Village of Nieuw Koffiekamp*.

In general, the OAS involvement in the NK conflict most resembles the structural problem solving approach as examined in section 3.3., however, it did not completely

²² MacKay, (2001), op. cit., pp. 5.

implement this approach's intervening method. The prime objective of such an approach is based on assisting a country to reform its political and economic system in order to transform the relationship between the belligerents. In this case, the OAS was short on recommendations and it is very difficult, with the current documentation available, to ascertain whether the OAS mission to Suriname attempted to assist the government in implementing fundamental reforms on the representation and governance of interior communities.

However, the burden of the failure to arrive at a resolution of this conflict lands squarely on the Government and GSR. Evidently, the Government did not adhere to the stipulations of the 1992 Peace Accord while signing over mining rights to GSR, nor did it adhere to international law with regards to the treatment of its Tribal Peoples. Under international legal instruments, that Otis and Melkevik regard as international legal 'norms' as opposed to 'rights,' first nations and tribal communities are entitled to the protection of their cultural integrity and to some form of land and resource entitlement including the protection of traditional land use patterns.²³ In our case, the recognition and implementation of the rights accorded to Maroons in the Peace Accord would have been sufficient to initiating the process of reconciliation in NK and elsewhere in the country. After neglecting to implement fundamental aspects of a peace accord for whatever reason, the Government then, did not fully commit to the NK peace process by defining its parameters and eventual trajectory.

Golden Star Resources Ltd. is not to be absolved for the failure of the conflict resolution process, nor for its actions in the Concession. Foreign investors must not be absolved from their role in abrogating the rights of local peoples either. GSR's conduct is less than admirable in its dispute with the local community of NK since it signed an agreement without consulting the local citizens who are potentially affected the most by its proposed mining development. This was not done as the company implicitly decided to take advantage of the weak institutional infrastructure of Suriname by developing on inhabited and locally used lands. Aside from the lack of consultation, the company became directly involved in a

²³ The distinction between indigenous rights and norms is made because it is clear to these experts of international law that when referring to international indigenous legal instruments we are not dealing with rights but norms that have been established in international conventions and declarations over the past 15 years. See Gislain Otis & Bjarne Melkevik's (1996), *Peuples Autochtones et Normes Internationales: Analyses et Texte Relatifs au Régime de Protection Identitaire des Peuples Autochtones*, Cowansville, QC: Éditions Yvon Blais.

violent and armed conflict, albeit at sporadic intervals, with small-scale miners and residents from the area. Regardless of who is at fault, for a company to resort to violence to protect its economic interests is utterly reprehensible conduct from an ethical point of view.

Therefore, to conclude we found that the OAS intervention failed for two principal reasons. First, the OAS failed to fully implement a structural problem solving approach to the conflict, which we deem the most appropriate theoretical approach to attaining a sustainable peace judging by the nature of this type of conflict known here as SGDDD. But this failure was not entirely its own fault as evinced by the ambiguous mandate accorded to it by the Government in the CR process. The community of Nieuw Koffiekamp was left completely unprotected from government policies directly affecting it, leading to the violent conflict with the Canadian mining firm. This is the discord and the deficit inherent in the system that should have been addressed by those seeking to find a long-term resolution to this type of conflict.

The second reason is that the principal protagonists in the conflict, GSR the Government of Suriname, and the community of NK and the OAS as third party intervener approached the CR process from two contradictory frames of reference. Ostensibly, the two former actors had no intention of dealing with the systemic issues. Their primordial objective was to negotiate with the Maroons of NK to reduce the friction and conflict between them but also to relocate the village entirely. This approach was a short sighted effort to negotiate a peace based on resource management, economic interests and ultimately conflict avoidance resembling the pragmatic-realist approach to CR. Conversely, the community of NK and the OAS approached the conflict from the structural problem-solving method of involvement in order to deal with the fundamental causes of the conflict.

We now move on to our conclusion to make some final observations on what this case study can tell us about conflict resolution theory. In addition, we will validate our null-hypothesis and suggest a future research agenda based on the problems identified in this study.

CONCLUSION

In our concluding chapter we return to the theoretical debate between the two main schools of conflict resolution to establish why, in our view, conflict resolution professionals are increasingly turning to one school over the other. In the era of neoliberal globalization and the type of conflicts that have arisen in its wake, we observe that peace created by a pragmatic-realist negotiation will not endure the test of time. Increasingly we observe that the underlying causes of conflict in most instances, resurface and erupt into violence after a deal has been struck over contending interests in the neoliberal context. The theories developing two diverging conflict resolution methods are pertinent because they allow us to identify the type of approach employed by interveners and that in turn, informs us about which might be the most appropriate approach to apply in SGDDD conflicts. Subsequently, we draw the links between the case study and the theory of conflict resolution. In doing so, we confirm our null-hypothesis. Finally, we suggest some possible avenues of research that may better inform the conflict resolution community and IGOs in particular, on how to deal with SGDDD conflict.

A. Case Study Enlightenment of Contemporary Conflict Theory and its Approaches to Conflict Resolution

There are two main schools of thought in the field of Conflict Resolution in international relations. The first, the pragmatic-realist school recognises the state as principal actor in conflict and adopts the realist framework of conflict analysis, in defining social conflict as an incompatibility of negotiable interests over tangible resources or access to forms of power between groups. On the other hand, the structural problem-solving school of conflict resolution stresses the subjective analysis of protracted social conflict emphasising the asymmetrical relationship between adversaries feuding over non-negotiable needs fulfillment, values and belief systems.

Both schools approach conflict resolution interventions differently. The pragmatic-realist school applies influence through a series of carrot and stick measures, manipulating the outcome if necessary. The pragmatic-realist seeks to mitigate or end the violent expression of

conflict by arriving at a settlement that satisfies the main actors involved in the negotiations. In contrast, the structural problem-solver focuses her intervention on a communication based procedure of exchange fostering greater understanding of the fundamental issues that incite the parties to defend their interests and needs. The structural problem-solver's principal objective is to promote social justice by attempting to redefine the relationship between conflicting parties through the structural reform of the institutions governing their relationship.

Jean Luc Marret delineates the contentious theoretical debate in the field of CR in a cursory fashion between European structuralists and North American pragmatists.¹ In the past, he notes, many Europeans felt that in the absence of open warfare, US Government policy advocates disregarded the existence of social injustices, thus supporting a 'negative peace' based on the oppression of the dispossessed that only fuelled future violence. A 'negative peace' has come to mean the absence of war and open hostilities. A 'positive peace', on the other hand, has been associated with the structuralist view of latent violence, war and peace. In a booklet published by the Five College Program in Peace and World Security Studies, Betty Reardon draws a clear distinction between the two objectives of the competing schools:

Negative Peace, focusing on the present and near-future, implies the prevention and eradication of large-scale organized violence (i.e., war). This concept emphasizes the development of local, national and global systems which foster the avoidance and resolution of conflicts by nonviolent means. A principal aim of such endeavors is to reduce potential for military conflict through arms control and disarmament...The concept of positive peace emerges from the belief that mere intervals between outbreaks of warfare do not constitute the true opposite of war or violence, and that a second, more permanent approach to peace is therefore essential. This approach calls for the eradication of militarism (that is the permanent mobilization of society for war) and of what is termed structural violence (that is the brutalizing and often lethal effects of oppressive social systems). Positive peace is generally understood to entail a re-ordering of global priorities so as to promote social justice, economic development, and participatory political processes. This attention to structural issues is motivated both by an understanding that poverty and oppression are a primary cause of violence and war, and by a desire to construct a more humane world future.²

Rogers and Ramsbotham consider this rift the first major controversy within the Peace Research movement with the original 'minimalist' agenda of preventing war, particularly global nuclear catastrophe, being the primary concern of pragmatic-realists.³ John Burton

¹ Marret, 2000, op. cit., pp. 20.

² Betty Reardon, (1990), *Guide to Careers, Internships, and Graduate Education in Peace Studies*, Amherst, MA : Peace and World Security Studies, p. 4.

³ Rogers and Ramsbotham, 1999, op.cit., pp. 744.

stresses a semantic distinction between settlement and resolution along the same lines as the ‘minimalist’ and ‘maximalist’ dichotomy. According to Burton, a *settlement* has a minimal and ephemeral connotation as it alludes to ending armed violence without resolving the conflict.⁴ Settlements are often imposed by powerful asymmetrical parties or third party actors insisting on a compromise that the other parties feel they have no choice but to accept. Conversely, *resolution* depends upon a long-term policy containing a basis for integration, especially with respect to educational policies and constitutional provisions. Resolution implies that a self-supporting and durable solution can be obtained when parties exercise free will to insure the integrity of their essential values.

Indeed, there are times when one approach is more appropriate than the other or a combination of approaches might very well be the best strategy when executing a conflict resolving intervention. However, because of the changing nature of international conflict which is emerging as structural global-local discord and democratic deficit, it becomes clear that one approach to conflict resolution is more appropriate than the other. Global conflict is increasingly characterized by inter-ethnic disputes or internal wars over recognition of certain fundamental human needs. In light of this, the pragmatic-realist has lost a great deal of its policy relevance. What our Nieuw Koffiekamp case study indicates is that intrastate conflicts have international linkages for the most part between asymmetrical ethnic, social and transnational economic actors rather than the traditional interstate military or political actors.⁵

Commenting on Guyanese ethnic politics, Perry Mars deems protracted social conflict to be self-evident at the local and state level and is compounded by the contradictory interrelationship between pressures to conform to economic globalization on the one hand and the demand profile of the state and domestic groups on the other.⁶ Shortly after the peace was struck in 1992 between the interior Forest Peoples of Suriname and the State, the Government embarked on an aggressive plan to reinvigorate the economy by adopting a comprehensive austerity programme and a neoliberal development plan. This ‘neoliberal peace’ as coined by

⁴ Burton, 1969, op.cit., pp. 11.

⁵ The Nautilus Institute from Berkeley California, is just coming out with an anthology consisting of nine cases of SGDDD type conflicts occurring around the world. Forthcoming in August 2002 in Lyuba ZARSKY’s ed. *Human Rights and the Environment Conflicts and Norms in a Globalizing World*, London: Earthscan Press.

Lipschutz has done little to address the structural problems inherent in society abandoning the notion of social justice for the most dispossessed groups of the nation⁷. If anything, adopting the neoliberal agenda of economic remedies for macroeconomic malaise in less developed countries already suffering from poorly functioning economic and political institutions, has further disempowered and marginalized traditionally neglected social groups. These same groups of dispossessed individuals like the Maroons of NK, who have resorted to violence in the past, will likely resort to violence in the future while striving to acquire a place and a voice in their countries' economic and political institutions.

The Nieuw Koffiekamp case study enables us to see how each of the two theoretical approaches was employed in an emerging type of conflict particular to the present era of neoliberal globalization. The Government and GSR both approached the conflict resolution process of the Commission for NK in the pragmatic realist mind frame. This meant the Government and the company approached the resolution process by insisting on the negotiable terms of the various economic jurisdictions of the actors and the eventual relocation of the village of NK. Obstinate, the community of NK sought to resolve long standing issues of territorial rights and its participation in political decisions that affect its traditional 'living domains'. Our study of the OAS intervention enables us to deduce that the OAS did recognize the intrinsic need to address the long standing issues of Maroons. However, the OAS was incapable of convincing the Government and the Company of the need to approach the conflict from the structural problem solving approach and so the conflict continues today.⁸

B. Validation of our null-Hypothesis

We propose the following **null-hypothesis**: The conflict of Nieuw Koffiekamp in Suriname between foreign investors and local peoples is a clear manifestation of what is

⁶ Mars, 2001, op.cit., pp. 3.

⁷ Lipschutz, 1998, op.cit., pp. 14.

⁸ Mackay, 2002, op. cit., pp. 19. Mackay notes that the now 100 percent title owner of the Gros Rosebel concession, Cambior Inc., refuses to accept that the community of NK has the right to consent to relocation. In a press release, Cambior President and Chief Executive Officer, Louis P. Gignac, stated that Cambior intends to begin construction of the Gros Rosebel mine by the end of the year 2002. However, the fate of the community of Nieuw Koffiekamp has still not been resolved, Cambior Inc., (May 21, 2001) Press Release, "Closing of the Gross Rosebel Transaction", http://www.cambior.com/english/01_press/fr_latest.htm, last consulted 17/07/02.

defined here as *Structural Global-local Discord and Democratic Deficit*. In addition, this study proposes that the structural problem solving approach is the preferred theoretical tool to diagnose SGDDD and to prescribe a systemic process of resolution with the assistance of a regional IGO as the most appropriate third party intervener.

In our multidisciplinary approach to analysing our in-depth case study we were able to assemble and interpret the various facets of the NK conflict establishing the links between the different phenomena affecting the situation and finally theorizing about what type of conflict it is and what type of approach best attempts to resolve it. In doing so, we compared two rival theories and applied them to our case study. This enabled us to propose our null-hypothesis and to validate it. The NK conflict is a stark example of the existential discord between local forms of socialization and economic sustenance, and global patterns of unfettered industrial development. This is largely a non-military problem but a prevalent one throughout the developing world. There is no need for a coercive military intervention but rather a political and institutional intervention to attempt to resolve the structural problems on multiple levels. The failure of the OAS to fully implement the structural problem-solving approach due to the domination of the Government and the Companies insistence to approach the conflict from the pragmatic-realist perspective stifled all attempts to deal with the fundamental issues giving birth to the conflict in the first place. Therefore, because of the nature of SGDDD, we justify the need to approach the resolution of such conflict by the structural problem solving approach.

C. Future Areas of Research

In the contemporary period of conflict we are not simply witnessing an era of seemingly isolated incidents of conflict between international actors, unjust institutions and local populations. SGDDD conflicts are manifesting themselves in various forms the world over. However, there is a serious dearth in the literature on this type of protracted social conflict. Secondly, there is a gap in the literature about how to deal with such systemic conflict particularly in the global neoliberal context within which we all toil. Thirdly, conflict interveners do not necessarily fully understand the role of a regional intergovernmental

organization nor the potential tools an IGO could employ within the host countries of TNCs involved in such conflict situations. The greater part the literature on third party interventions has been focussed on military peacemaking or peacekeeping operations prevalent in the post cold war era. Clearly, political, social and economic institution building is the only way to reduce the number of military interventions. This is the research problem set out in chapter one. It would be fruitful to begin to document the nature of such conflicts more systematically. We may then be able to locate the root causes of such conflict and attempt to deal with it in a concerted manner case by case and on a regional or global scale.

The notion of corporate social responsibility in international investing identified in our case study could be the subject of another thesis. There is already an international movement attempting to adopt a global covenant on the issue of corporate social responsibility.⁹ The question remains whether it will be sufficient to expect companies to abide to a self-imposed pledge to respect the fundamental rights of other individuals. We shall leave that debate for another day. Nevertheless, in the present type of Nieuw Koffiekamp context, the use of intimidation is not an anomaly and local populations suffer from a systemic lack of respect for their fundamental rights by TNCs.

Returning to the Tambogrande, Peru case cited in the introduction for instance, the local population has, with the assistance of Oxfam UK, conducted a plebiscite to determine what percentage of the local population is in favour of a proposed mining development. Vancouver BC's Manhattan Minerals Corp. proposed mine is slated to be erected right beside the Tambogrande community resulting in the relocation of hundreds of local residents. The plebiscite indicated that 94 percent of the 27,000 registered voters who cast their ballots rejected the mining project and only one percent voted in favour.¹⁰ In a similar case, the mining operations of Talisman Energy in southern Sudan have sparked international outrage.

⁹ The perennial case in point is the UN's move to have countries and TNCs recognise the nine founding principals of the Global Compact. Check web site for the principals and more information at <http://65.214.34.30/un/gc/unweb.nsf/>, last consulted 27/0702.

¹⁰ Rights and Democracy, (July, 2002), "Peru: Residents Vote No to Canadian Mining Project in Tambogrande," *Libertas* (International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development Newsletter), last consulted 09-07-2002, <http://www.ichrdd.ca/frame.iphtml?langue=0>, 10,000 registered voters abstained but observers maintain that this does not mean the abstainers are for the proposed mine.

The Harker Report, which was financed by the Canadian Government, recognises the complicit involvement of the Calgary based company in the operations of the military regime. Military operations in the South are, in part, financed by Talisman's tax remittances to the government. The company is even implicitly accused of supporting military repression because it has allowed the military to use its southern airfield while staging some attacks on rebel communities.¹¹ Canadian mining companies and their Canadian investors are essentially benefiting from economic deals struck in countries where civil strife, conflict, and poor and corrupt economic and political institutions systematically violate some of the most fundamental human values Canadians hold so dear. Despite the humanist convictions of former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, he was unable to commit the Government to sanction the actions of a Canadian Company doing business in an LDC that is complicit in committing human rights abuses.

There are certainly structural issues to be addressed when international firms continue to invest in countries where lax regulatory mechanisms permit environmental degradation, and abrogate the fundamental rights of local participation in development decision making and negate indigenous and tribal land claims. If SGDDD conflict is to be resolved then we must examine structural conflict not only at the domestic level but also by analysing its international linkages, which is the result of faults inherent in international regimes and international business practices. In a timely study suggesting the creation of an international environmental ombudsperson, Lyuba Zarsky offers three solid reasons why we must deal with this emerging type of conflict between TNCs and local communities via an institutional mechanism:

First, there will be a lot of action on this front in the coming decades. Governmental capacities for regulation and dispute resolution will not keep pace with processes of international investment. To maximally benefit from globalization, local groups and governments will need help in negotiating with corporate actors. On the other hand, many MNCs may find the work of the Ombudsperson very helpful in dealing with conflicts or in developing better corporate codes of conduct. Second, there is no other international conflict resolution mechanism expressly devoted to this range of

¹¹ John Harker, (2000), "Human Security in Sudan: the Report of a Canadian Assessment Mission" prepared for the Minister of Foreign Affairs, *Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade*, last consulted, 09-07-2002, <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreignp/3110186-e.pdf>

conflicts. Third, there are few NGOs who can credibly act as a bridge between MNCs and local NGOs.¹²

As a legitimate interlocutor in international relations at multiple levels and as an institution with extensive conflict resolution intervening experience, the regional IGO has a unique opportunity to get involved in the structural analysis and to assume the problem-solving advisory role on systemic conflicts.

Further research needs to be conducted on the role of IGO conflict interventions. This will allow conflict resolution practitioners and political leaders to make better decisions on how to deal with protracted social conflicts that have international linkages. It is deemed necessary to document more thoroughly the wide variety of programmes administered by various international actors to better ascertain their strengths and weaknesses. Only then can regional and global institutions effectively select the appropriate course of action to deal with Structural Global-local Discord and Democratic Deficit conflicts.

¹² Lyuba, Zarsky, (1998), *From Concept to Design: Creating an International Environmental Ombudsperson*, Berkeley, CA: Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, pp.31. Internet site: <http://www.omced.org/nautilus.rtf>, last consulted July 15, 2002.

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